Inter-Communal Violence, 1963-1964

This period, which has very different meanings in the two dominant political narratives, is meticulously described by the Canadian scholar Richard A. Patrick, who was an officer in UNFICYP in the late 1960s and pursued his interest in the Cyprus conflict as a doctoral student in political geography at the London School of Economics. This research, published as Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, 1963-1971, is considered among the most authoritative accounts of the period. Below is Chapter Three from this classic work.

THE MOST VIOLENT PERIOD:  21 DECEMBER 1963 -10 AUGUST 1964

On 21 December 1963, an angry Turkish-Cypriot crowd surrounded an armed and nervous Greek-Cypriot police patrol in Nicosia. Accounts of the confrontation differ between the Cypriot communities.[footnote 1] On one point, however, they agree; two Turk-Cypriot civilians and one Greek-Cypriot policeman were shot dead. This incident marked a major crisis in the Cypriot inter-communal conflict. The struggle developed into one of overt violence. The initiative fell from the hands of the politicians and was taken up by the communal paramilitary forces.

Greek-Cypriot leaders characterized the fighting following 21 December as an insurrection of Turk-Cypriot extremists against the Republic to achieve partition, and of justified counter-measures by government forces to contain violence and rout the rebels.[2] The Turk-Cypriot version of these same events is that the inter-communal fighting was initiated by a Greek- Cypriot offensive. In accordance with the Akritas Plan, as a result of which the main Turkish-Cypriot centres were to be occupied as a precursor to a Greek-Cypriot renouncement of the 1960 treaties and constitution, and a declaration of enosis.[3]

There is no doubt that by December 1963 both communities were extremely frustrated by the constitutional wrangle, and most Cypriots expected an outbreak of violence to be precipitated by armed extremists of either side. Perhaps there is little to be gained from apportioning blame to one of the communities for starting the fighting. Nevertheless, it is known that the Greek-Cypriot leaders fully appreciated that the thirteen proposed amendments to the constitution would be unacceptable to Turk-Cypriots, and that their presentation and rejection could precipitate fighting by either side. As early as 1962, Polycarpos Georgadjis, the Minister of the Interior, had warned the officers of his underground army that in the following year President Makarios would propose amendments to the constitution which would be so unacceptable to the Turk-Cypriots that TMT would start fighting. When the amendments were proposed, there was general dismay among many of the leaders of this Greek-Cypriot force that Turk-Cypriots did not rise to the bait. As a result, elements of the Greek-Cypriot police and a number of armed Greek-Cypriot irregulars were attempting to goad TMT into action in December 1963. Had the incident of 21 December not occurred, there can be no doubt that a similar Incident if would have been precipitated by Christmas.[4]

1. Movement: Coercion and Political Manoeuvring

The period from 21 December 1963 to 10 August 1964 was the most violent phase of the Cypriot conflict. Both communities estimate that several hundred of their members were wounded. In addition, several hundred were kidnapped and temporarily held hostage until exchanges were arranged. Official records show that 191 Turk-Cypriots were known to have been killed and 173 are still missing and now presumed dead. On the Greek-Cypriot side, 133 are known to have been killed and 41 are still missing and presumed dead. It is probable, however, that the figures for Turkish-Cypriot deaths include some who were killed accidentally by their own hand or by other Turk-Cypriots. Greek-Cypriot deaths are probably understated. There are indications that some casualties, for propaganda reasons, were never publicly announced. Also, casualties among Greek Army soldiers in Cyprus are not included in the Cyprus Government's figures. It may be more prudent therefore to accept that approximately 350 Turk-Cypriots were killed in this period while about 200 Greek-Cypriots and mainland Greeks were killed.[5]

The chronological sequence of casualties between December 1963 and August 1964 is illustrated in Figure 3-1 [not included]. If we compare this sequence of violence to a number of relevant political events occurring during the same period, a pattern emerges which can be used as a basis for organizing a narrative of this phase of the Cyprus conflict. The period from 21 December 1963 to 10 August 1964 is thus divided for descriptive purposes, into eight sections.

(1) 21 December 1963 to 31 December 1963, the first outburst of violence;

(2) 1 January 1963 to 31 January 1964, the violence Is partially subdued while a negotiated settlement is sought at the London Conference;

(3) 1 February 1964 to 14 February 1964, following the failure of the London Conference the violence intensifies;

(4) 15 February 1964 to 4 March 1964, the violence is again held in check while the Security Council takes up the problem and resolves to form a peacekeeping force (i.e. UNFICYP) and to send a mediator;

(5) 5 March 1964 to 26 March 1964, violence increases as the Cyprus Government attempts to consolidate Its holdings before UNFICYP becomes operational;

(6) 27 March 1964 to 13 June 1964, UNFICYP is unable to halt the violence which reaches a climax in Famagusta;

(7) 14 June 1964 to 5 August 1964, the violence is contained following the return to Cyprus of General ' Grivas, and both communities concentrate on re-organizing their armed forces;

(8) 6 August 1964 to 10 August 1964, an offensive by Greek-Cypriot troops against Turk-Cypriots at Kokkina prompts Turkish air raids and halts the attempt to find a geopolitical solution through force of arms.

(a) 21 December 1963 to 31 December 1963

Although the first inter-communal shooting incident occurred on 21 December 1963, the Greek-Cypriot plan to isolate the Turkish-Cypriot population centres was not implemented until widespread street fighting began in Nicosia on 23 December. Telephones were disconnected, and road blocks were erected around the main Turk-Cypriot villages and quarters. Outside of Nicosia, the Turkish-Cypriot community was completely bewildered by the course of events. Throughout the island, most Turk-Cypriots did not dare to venture out into their fields or on to the roads. Even so, some Turk-Cypriots moved to the security of larger Turkish-Cypriot centres and a refugee movement began to gather momentum. Government radio and television broadcasts, as well as Greek-Cypriot newspapers, portrayed the fighting as a Turkish-Cypriot revolt against the Republic, a revolt fomented to provide an excuse for Turkey to invade and impose partition. There is no doubt that this propaganda generated an intense Greek-Cypriot enmity against the Turk-Cypriot community, and encouraged a number of revenge murders throughout the island. Many Turk-Cypriot employees were turned out by their Greek-Cypriot employers; some left on their own initiative. However, most Turk- Cypriots simply found it too dangerous to attempt to go to work in Greek-Cypriot areas. As a result, the Cyprus police, the government and the civil service became de facto Greek-Cypriot organizations. Apart from the casualties caused by major fighting incidents in Nicosia, Larnaca, Mathlati, Ayios Vasilios and the Kyrenia Pass, an additional 33 Turk-Cypriots were killed, or are now presumed to have been killed, in scattered, unreported incidents throughout the island during December.

By Christmas the Greek-Cypriot forces, because of superior numbers, were on the verge of completely over-running the Turkish-Cypriot quarter of Nicosia. Only Turkey's threat to invade Cyprus forced President Makarios to accept a cease-fire on 25 December, to be maintained by British troops. An exchange of hostages was arranged on 26 December under the personal supervision of Duncan Sandys, British Commonwealth and Foreign Secretary. The government handed over 545 Turk-Cypriots, and the Turk-Cypriots gave up 26 Greek-Cypriots. On 30 December, British troops began patrolling Nicosia. During the week of street fighting in Nicosia, 49 Turk-Cypriots and 20 Greek-Cypriots are known to have been killed; in addition, 30 Turk-Cypriots and four Greek-Cypriots are still missing.[6]

In Larnaca shooting broke out on 23 December and continued sporadically until British troops began to patrol a cease-fire line on 28 December. Six Turk-Cypriots and two Greek-Cypriots were killed. Another two Turk-Cypriots have been missing from Larnaca since that time.[7]

Greek-Cypriot irregulars attacked Turk-Cypriots in the mixed villages of Mathlati (23 December) and Ayios Vasilios (24 December).[8] On 12 January 1964, in the presence of foreign reporters, British Army Officers and Red Cross officials, a mass grave was exhumed at Ayios Vasilios. The grave contained the bodies of 21 Turkish-Cypriots who were presumed to have been killed in or near Ayios Vasilios on 24 December. The observers verified that a number of the victims appeared to have been tortured, and to have been shot after their hands and feet were tied.[9]

Subsequently various Greek-Cypriots offered two reasons for the Ayios Vasilios attack. Firstly, Greek-Cypriots were afraid that Turkish-Cypriots in Ayios Vasilios and Skylloura might attempt to block the Nicosia-Myrtou road. Since the Nicosia- Aghirda road was already under Turkish-Cypriot control, road- blocks at Ayios Vasilios and Skylloura would have seriously hindered road movement to the north during a period when many Cypriots believed that a Turkish Invasion on the north coast was imminent. Secondly, it was alleged that the attack was in revenge for certain murders of Greek-Cypriots carried out by local Turk-Cypriots during the EOKA campaign.

The fourth major clash outside Nicosia occurred in the Kyrenia Pass on 26 December. The main road from the north coast to Nicosia crossed through this pass. It was obviously strategically important, especially in view of a threatened Turkish invasion along the North coast. A force of Greek-Cypriots, directed by mainland Greek army officers from a headquarters in Kyrenia town, attempted to control the pass, but was beaten back by Turk-Cypriots from Aghira. One Turk-Cypriot was killed.[11]

(b) 1 January to 31 January 1964

With British troops patrolling cease-fire lines in Nicosia and Larnaca, Greek-Cypriot leaders thought that Turkey would not invade. President Makarios therefore announced on 1 January 1964 that he had unilaterally abrogated the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee. However, when Sandys made it clear to Makarios that such an abrogation would almost certainly provoke a Turkish invasion, this declaration was quickly changed to a statement of intention to terminate the Treaties by the appropriate means. Subsequently, Sandys persuaded both Cypriot communities, as well as Greece and Turkey, to send representatives to a conference in London, beginning on 15 January, to thrash out the problem.

None of the parties were optimistic that inter-communal conflict could be resolved at the conference. President Makarios wanted to take the dispute to the United Nations where he felt he could count on the support of the Afro-Asian States. His agreement to send representatives to London was based on the strategy that the Conference would fall, and that a direct recourse to the Security Council would prove more successful if, as under Article 33 of the U.N. Charter, all possible alternative solutions had been exhausted.

When the London Conference convened, the Greek-Cypriots insisted on abrogating the Zurich-London Agreements. They wanted a unitary form of Cypriot government which would be free to amend its own constitution. They agreed to incorporate some Turk-Cypriot minority rights into the constitution but insisted that such rights should not be guaranteed by threats of external intervention. The Turk-Cypriots insisted on an enforcement of their rights under the 1960 Constitution; in addition, they claimed that the December fighting proved that the security of the Turk-Cypriot community could only be assured if the Cypriot communities were physically separated. Partition and the creation of a federal state in Cyprus was the first choice of the Turk-Cypriot representatives. Partition and double enosis was their second choice. Both Greece and Turkey essentially supported the positions of their respective Cypriot communities. Since neither side would accept a compromise settlement, the Conference ended in deadlock on 31 January.[14]

Once British troops had assumed their peace-keeping role in Cyprus, and both communities had committed themselves to send representatives to the conference in London, the intensity of inter-communal violence quickly subsided. However, the occurrence of incidents became more dispersed spatially. Nicosia and Larnaca remained centres of tension throughout the entire period under review (i.e. 21 December 1963 - 10 August 1964). Hardly a day passed without an exchange of shots across the cease-fire lines in these towns. In Nicosia especially, both communities improved and extended their defensive positions along the cease-fire line (i.e. the Green Line) until the beseiged Turk-Cypriot quarter was demarcated by parallel lines of fortifications separated by a no-man's zone patrolled by peace-keeping troops. No major battles were fought in Nicosia after the street fighting of December 1963. However, the casualties of numerous minor incidents made a distressing sum. Between 1 January 1964 and 10 August 1964, about 30 Cypriote equally divided between the communities, were killed in Nicosia. In addition, from 30 to 40 Cypriots, mostly Turk-Cypriots, were abducted and presumably killed on their way to or from Nicosia.

Apart from Nicosia and Larnaca, shooting incidents occurred on 1 January at Galaktotrofousa Monastery[15] and Lemba [16], and in several villages in southern Paphos District[17] during the period of 21-23 January. A series of six Greek-Cypriot abductions between 12 and 18 January may have been a direct result of the discovery of the 21 Turk-Cypriot corpses at Ayios Vasilios on 12 January. On 9 January 1964, the Cypriot communities and the British peace-keeping force negotiated a freedom of movement agreement whereby most of the roadblocks, apart from those along the Nicosia and Larnaca cease-fire lines, were to be removed. British troops escorted food convoys to mainly Turk-Cypriot villages. Turkish-Cypriot political and TMT leaders visited outlying villages, bringing to them the first descriptions of the December fighting.

(c) 1 February 1964 to 14 February 1964

Throughout the deadlocked London Conference, British troops were subjected to increased criticism and obstruction by the Greek-Cypriot community. The British Government made it clear that it was no longer prepared to act as the sole peace-keeper on the island. As the London Conference ended, the United States and Britain jointly proposed the dispatch of a N.A.T.O. peace-keeping force, together with the appointment of a neutral mediator. Most N.A.T.O. members showed little enthusiasm for the project, and Russia threatened counter action if an attempt were made to place Cyprus under N.A.T.O. control. However, Greece and Turkey were influenced by their dependence on American military and economic aid to accept the N.A.T.O. force proposal. Turkish-Cypriots agreed to the proposals, while the Greek-Cypriot leaders made it known that they would only accept an international force under United Nations control. Greek-Cypriots expressed their feelings against N.A.T.O. intervention by bombing the American Embassy in Nicosia on 4 February. By mid-February it was certain that a N.A.T.O. force would not replace the British peace-keeping troops.[18] In the meantime, violence increased in Cyprus with major fighting in Paphos District, at Ayios Sozomenos and in Limassol.

The Paphos District continued to be a centre of conflict. On 4 February, clashes occurred at Khoulou [19], during which five 20 Turk-Cypriots were probably killed, and at Ktima [20], in which two Turk-Cypriots and two Greek-Cypriots were shot dead. Tension throughout this district remained high and on 14 February it culminated in major street fighting in Ktima, during which five 21 Turk-Cypriots and one Greek-Cypriot were killed,[21] and in Polis, where two Turk-Cypriots were killed. It seems clear that Greek-Cypriots were the ones who launched the attack on Polis. The Turk-Cypriots of Prodhromi, a suburb of Polis, all retreated to the Turkish-Cypriot quarter of Polis under fire. Before the day was out, the entire Turk-Cypriot population of Prodhromi and Polis (about 800 people) had taken refuge in the Turkish Secondary School under a Greek-Cypriot seige. British troops intervened to arrange a cease-fire. However this Turk-Cypriot population remained besieged within this school grounds until the Cyprus Government undertook normalization measures in early1968.[22]

During the same period (i.e. 1-14 February) frequent shooting incidents occurred between neighbouring Greek-Cypriot and Turk-Cypriot villages in the central region of Paphos District.[23]  It is probable that an 'unofficial' Greek-Cypriot gang operating in the area was responsible for a number of incidents. At the same time, the TMT organizations in Ayios Ioannis, Stavrokono and Anadhiou were becoming more aggressive.

On 6 February, Turk-Cypriots from Ayios Sozomenos ambushed a party of Greek-Cypriots from the neighbouring village of Potamia killing two of them.[24] Greek-Cypriot police and civilians then attacked Ayios Sozomenos. During the fight, six Turk-Cypriots were killed; the Cyprus Government reported that four Greek-Cypriots were killed. However, Turk-Cypriots allege that Greek-Cypriot casualties were much higher and that most of the Greek-Cypriot deaths occurred when two groups of Greek-Cypriots mistook each other for Turk-Cypriots and fired on one another. In fact, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership published the names and details of 24 Police and Gendarmerie members which it alleged were killed during the Ayios Sozomenos fight.[25]

On 9 and 10 February there had been sporadic firing in Limassol and serious fighting in the nearby villages of Asomatos and Episkom.[26] Cease-fires were arranged by British troops, but on 12 February Greek-Cypriot forces under government direction launched a deliberate attack on the Turkish-Cypriot quarter of Limassol. A cease-fire was again negotiated on 13 February 1964 but by that time ten Turk-Cypriots and one Greek-Cypriot had been killed. Unlike Nicosia and Larnaca, the cease-fire arrangements in Limassol did not provide for the establishment of a cease-fire line and a consequent restriction of inter-communal movement. As a result, the Limassol residents of both communities continued to have dally contact with each other. In practice, business and social contacts were restricted as much as possible to members of one's own community, and a walk through the other community's quarter at night was a highly dangerous undertaking.[27]

(d) 15 February 1964 to 4 March 1964

On 15 February, Britain, which had recognized the defeat of its N.A.T.O. proposals, called for a meeting of the United Nations Security Council to discuss the Cyprus situation. This move forestalled a similar and a long planned appeal by the Cyprus Government. After two and a half weeks of debates and behind-the-scenes negotiations, the Council agreed on 4 March 1964 to authorize a United Nations peacekeeping force (i.e. UNFICYP) and a political mediator for Cyprus. The force was put under the control of the Secretary-General, with financing by voluntary contributions. UNFICYP's mandate was to prevent a recurrence of fighting, to contribute to the restoration and maintenance of law and order, and to facilitate a return to normal conditions.[28]

During the Security Council debates, both Cypriot communities had managed to keep their militants under control so that the position of their spokesmen at the United Nations would not be undermined. The only major violent incident occurred at the mixed village of Ayios Theodhoros. Inter-communal tension here had resulted in an exchange of shots between the villagers on 5 and 6 February.[29] Shooting again broke out on 15 and 16 February with graver results; two Greek-Cypriots were killed.[30] British troops moved into the village and established an observation post. Nevertheless, revenge shootings could not be halted and a Turk-Cypriot was killed on 29 February.[31] These incidents created in Ayios Theodhoros an air of inter-communal enmity that was to contribute to one of the most critical battles in Cyprus, the National Guard assault on Ayios Theodhoros on 15 November 1967.

(e) 5 March 1964 to 26 March 1964

The authorization of the United Nations peacekeeping force on 4 March 1964 did not mean that UNFICYP was yet operational. Both Cypriot communities were aware that once this force was deployed the then existing pattern of coercive control throughout the island would be 'frozen'. Both sides therefore were intent on consolidating or extending their control before UNFICYP could intervene.

Following 4 March 1964, violence increased markedly. An examination of the incidents of this period show that the specific causes of this violence varied from place to place. A common theme of many incidents was an attempt to secure control before UNFICYP became operational. At the same time, the taking of hostages prompted a self-perpetuating cycle of abductions.

On 7 March, the leaders of both communities agreed to an exchange of hostages.[32]   The government turned over 49 Turk-Cypriots; Turk-Cypriot leaders returned four Greek-Cypriots. However, Turk-Cypriots had calculated that 225 members of their community were being held by Greek-Cypriots. Since the government claimed that it now had returned all its Turk-Cypriot prisoners, Turk-Cypriot leaders announced that they now presumed an additional 176 Turk-Cypriots had been killed. It was evident that many of the hostages of both communities had been cruelly treated by their captors. This exchange, which had been negotiated to reduce inter-communal tension. Immediately increased inter-communal enmity. Within 24 hours of this exchange, a number of shooting incidents had occurred in widely separated locations throughout Cyprus and major fighting was underway in Ktima and Mallia. It seems clear that Turk-Cypriot anger over the hostage issue may have fermented some of this violence.

Fighting in Ktima began on 7 March when Turk-Cypriots took, as hostages, hundreds of Greek-Cypriots who were shopping at the municipal market located between the Greek-Cypriot and the Turk-Cypriot quarters of the town. Turk-Cypriots claim that this action was prompted by the fatal shooting of a Turk-Cypriot in Ktima earlier that day and by the reports that only 49 of the anticipated 225 hostages had been released in Nicosia by the government. Greek-Cypriots in their turn took hundreds of Turk-Cypriot hostages, not only in Ktima, but also in the village of Lapithlou.[33]

Once fighting had begun in Ktima, the Government decided to make a determined effort to over-run the Turk-Cypriot quarter. Before a cease-fire and an exchange of hostages could be arranged by British troops on 9 March 1964, 14 Turk-Cypriots and 11 Greek-Cypriots had been killed. The size of the Turk-Cypriot controlled sector of Ktima was reduced to an area which was only a few hundred yards square, where the majority of Turk-Cypriots in Ktima had become refugees. A cease-fire line was demarcated and patrolled by British troops, while both communities built fortified outposts parallel to this line. Inter-communal contact within Ktima virtually ceased. A situation analogous to those at Nicosia and Larnaca had been created.[33]

On 7 March, fighting also broke out in Mallia. Over 200 Turk-Cypriot refugees from Prastio and Kithasi had been in the village since the end of January and the Turk-Cypriot population out-numbered Greek-Cypriot residents by ten to one. In the then existing circumstances, the government's desire to disarm the Turk-Cypriots of this village is understandable; however, its methods cannot be condoned. A large armed Greek-Cypriot force from Limassol entered the village and attacked the Turk-Cypriot quarter. The entire Turk-Cypriot population retreated into the community's school and was laid seige. British troops intervened and a cease-fire was accepted on 10 March after the Turk-Cypriots agreed to surrender their arms to the Greek-Cypriots. During the fight, five Turk-Cypriots were killed. It is alleged that most of these casualties were unarmed and occurred when the cease-fire was supposed to be in effect. News of the fighting at Ktima and Mallia prompted Turkey to issue an ultimatum on 13 March that it would intervene within 36 hours unless all Turkish-Cypriot hostages were released and freedom of movement was restored to the Turkish-Cypriot community. Greece announced that she would resist any such invasion and the Soviet Union assured Greek-Cypriot emissaries of its support. Great Britain and the United States urged Turkey not to intervene and they offered, as inducements, increased military and development aid. The United Nations Security Council, in emergency session, reaffirmed the sovereignty of Cyprus and called on all states to show restraint.[36]

Turkey did not invade. This stand-down may have been a response to the international pressures, but some commentators have suggested that at that time Turkey did not have the equipment nor had she adequate planning for an invasion.[37] Most would agree, however, that the arrival in Nicosia, on 14 March, of the advance party of the Canadian UNFICYP contingent allowed Turkey to withdraw its ultimatum without losing face.

Despite the arrival of the United Nations peacekeeping force, it was not yet operational. The government continued its campaign to force its control over Turkish-Cypriot held areas, and on 19 March Greek-Cypriot forces launched an attack on the Turk-Cypriot village of Ghaziveran. The village occupied a very strategic position on the shore of Morphou Bay, an obvious landing ground in the event of a Turkish invasion. However, of even more significance, the only coastal highway passed through Ghaziveran and the other main roads into the area were already controlled by the Turkish-Cypriot villages of Kokkina, Limnitis, Ambellkou and Lefka. Seven Turk-Cypriots and one Greek-Cypriot were shot dead before British troops were able to arrange a cease-fire agreement that assured Greek-Cypriot 18 freedom of movement through the village.[38]

(f) 27 March to 13 June 1964

On 27 March 1964, the commander of UNFICYP declared his force to be operational, and United Nations troops took over the British observation posts which had been established along the various cease-fire lines. It soon became apparent to UNFICYP, as it had earlier been learned by the British peace-keepers, that they could do no more to contain the violence than both Cypriot communities would, by tacit agreement, allow them to do.[39]

UNFICYP's mandate, and the Secretary-General's interpretation of that mandate, strictly limited the force's coercive powers.[40] In simple terms UNFICYP could use its guns only in self-defence. It could not kill Cypriots to prevent them from killing each other. The force's main deterrent was its presence. Its observers ensured that the communities' versions of events could now be verified and international support for their causes could be lost or gained by those observers' reports. However, such a deterrent as this was hardly adequate to curb the 'official' armed forces of either community when they were convinced of the justice of their actions. The control of local irregulars was even more difficult. They scarcely noted any outsiders' opinions at all, and they were not under the effective command of those conmunity leaders who may have been sensitive to international public opinion.

The first serious test of UNFICYP's effectiveness came in the Tylliria Region on the north-western coast of Cyprus. A major irritation to the Greek-Cypriots in this region was that the only highway through the area was controlled by the Turk-Cypriot villages of Kokkina and Limnitis. On 4 April armed elements of both communities fought to gain control of a hill which dominated a section of this highway. This incident provoked an outbreak of sporadic firing between a number of villages in the area. On 8 April, after prolonged negotiations, the UNFICYP arranged a cease-fire for the region; UNFICYP troops occupied positions between opposing villages, and the coastal highway was opened to traffic.[41]

The second major test of UNFICYP was to be at the Kyrenia Pass. Turk-Cypriots controlled this pass and their mountain positions provided an unimpeded view of Greek-Cypriot activity both along the island's north coast and on the Nicosia plain. Apart from the major tactical threat that Turk-Cypriot control of this mountain ridge posed to the government, Greek-Cypriots also had to be wary of shots fired by Turk-Cypriots down into the villages of Kami, Bellapais and Dhikomo. Sporadic firing between government and Turk-Cypriot forces continued in this area despite UNFICYP's attempts to arrange a cease-fire. On 25 April, Greek-Cypriot units began an offensive against Turkish-Cypriot positions near the pass during which six Turk-Cypriots and one Greek-Cypriot were killed. Efforts by UNFICYP to stop the fighting were completely ignored until 29 April when President Makarios announced that his forces had achieved their objective of pushing back the Turkish-Cypriot front lines. However, the Kyrenia Pass remained under Turkish-Cypriot control and continued to be a focal point of sporadic shooting incidents.[42]

Armed Greek-Cypriot irregulars scorned government requests either to join its organized forces or to surrender their weapons. The allegiance of most of these dissident groups was pledged to General Grivas, the exiled commander of the 1955-1959 EOKA campaign, rather than to President Makarios. Any government attempt to intern these groups would have resulted in major intra-communal battles and possibly an attempted coup d'etat. Many Greek-Cypriot leaders believed that a united Greek-Cypriot front could only be achieved if General Grivas were given command of the community's armed forces. Such a move was resisted by President Makarios. The actions of the irregulars eroded much of the President's international support, but he preferred this rather than having an effectively organized armed opposition commanded by his chief political rival. General Grivas. However, the excesses of these irregulars eventually led to the return of Grivas. The turning point was the Famagusta kidnappings.

On 11 May 1964, a car, carrying three Greek army officers and a Greek-Cypriot policeman, was driven into the Turkish-Cypriot walled city of Famagusta. Turkish-Cypriot policemen signalled the car to stop as it approached an exit gate. The occupants of the car fired at the Turk-Cypriot policemen and their fire was returned. Two of the Greek officers and the Greek-Cypriot policeman were killed; the third Greek officer was wounded; a Turk-Cypriot bystander was killed in the cross-fire.

It has never been satisfactorily explained why these men entered the Turkish-Cypriot quarter. Most likely it was a reckless act of bravado during which some amateurish spying of Turk- Cypriot defences was carried out.[43]

News of this incident immediately inflamed inter-communal enmity. Government press reports portrayed the incident as an atrocity in which Turkish-Cypriot 'terrorists' riddled four lone Greeks who had strayed into the Turkish-Cypriot quarter by mistake.[44] This completely fallacious version of the incident encouraged Greek-Cypriot extremist groups to exact their own revenge. Between 11 and 13 May, probably 32 to 35 Turk-Cypriots were abducted and executed as a reprisal for the deaths of these three men. The abductions seem to have been carried out by a well-organized Greek-Cypriot gang based in Famagusta and Larnaca Districts, although it is not improbable that a few of the kidnappings may have been spontaneous and uncoordinated acts of revenge.

The UNFICYP investigations into these mass abductions were undertaken by a British officer, Major Masey, the UNFICYP liaison officer to the Turkish-Cypriot leadership. On 7 June, Major Masey and his driver were themselves abducted in the Famagusta District, and presumably murdered.[45] There may be some question as to whether Masey's murder was motivated primarily to prevent an investigation into the Famagusta abductions, or as a result of Greek-Cypriot enmity of the British troops which was quite intense at that time.[46] There is, however, no doubt that Masey's murderers were Greek-Cypriot irregulars.

The United Nations' inability to stop the inter-communal violence, or to prevent the Cyprus Government from importing large amounts of Russian and Czechoslovakian arms, convinced Turkey that only its own intervention could ensure the security of the Turkish-Cypriot community.[47] The Famagusta abductions were the last straw. In June, Turkey began to prepare in earnest to invade Cyprus.

The Cyprus Government appealed to Greece for troops to defend Cyprus. The troops were to be sent, and their commander was to be General Grivas. Greece felt that only Grivas could persuade the several Greek-Cypriot dissident armed groups to unite under a central command. Only if these irregulars were controlled would international support be regained, and would the justification for a Turkish invasion be removed. President Makarios reluctantly agreed.

(g) 14 June 1964 to 5 August 1964

On 14 June 1964, General Grivas returned to Cyprus. In the next two months 5,000 Greek troops arrived to form the Greek Army in Cyprus under his command.[48] The 950 men of the Greek

National Contingent, whose status was based on the 1960 Treaty of Alliance, ostensibly remained a separate organization.

In February 1964, the Government had undertaken to reorganize and regularize its armed forces as the 'National Guard'. The Cyprus Government, in consultation with the Greek Government, had vested the command of this force in a Greek Army general, General Georgios Karayannis. Originally a recruiting ceiling of 5,000 men had been set. The invasion threat prompted the Government to introduce conscription in June 1964 and to increase the National Guard by 15,000.[49]

The relationship between the National Guard and the Greek Army in Cyprus was not clearly defined. The senior N.C.O.'s and the officers of the National Guard were seconded from the Greek Army. General Grivas wag supposed to command the Greek Army in Cyprus; in practice however, he began to establish himself as generalissimo of all Greek and Greek-Cypriot forces in Cyprus. Grivas' interference eventually prompted General Karayannis, the National Guard commander, to resign on 15 August 1964, and Grivas then officially assumed command of the National Guard as well.[50]

General Grivas considered himself to be answerable only to the Greek General Staff in Athens; however, many of his actions were undertaken without prior authority from Greece. In no case did he consider himself to be ultimately responsible to the Cyprus Government. As a result, a number of National Guard actions took place without prior consultations with the Cyprus Government and occasionally despite its specific injunctions.

General Grivas did manage to exert a restraining influence on the activities of Greek-Cypriot irregulars. The abduction of Turk-Cypriots on the roads ended and no major inter-communal incidents occurred involving dissident Greek-Cypriot gangs. Violence, for the most part, was confined to vendetta murders, shootings between shepherds of neighbouring villages, and to sentries occasional firing across the Green-Line barricades in Nicosia.[52]

The Turkish-Cypriot community was also reorganizing its armed forces. The TMT structure had been expanded into a voluntary force known simply as the 'Fighters'. The junior leaders of the Fighters were TMT cell leaders, police officers and N.C.O.'s, and officers of the defunct Cyprus Army. Senior staff and command positions were filled by Turkish army officers. It is difficult to ascertain the military strength of the Turk-Cypriot community at this time; UNFICYP estimated this strength at about 10,000 men, excluding 1,700 police and members of the Cyprus Army, and 650 men of the Turkish National Contingent.[52] However, it should be noted that virtually all able-bodied Turk- Cypriot men considered themselves to be one of the Fighters. Full-time armed Fighters were much fewer than the UNFICYP figures indicated, and their organization, training and militancy varied a great deal among the various Fighter units throughout the island.

While there was close liaison between the Fighter leaders and both the Turkish-Cypriot political leaders and the Turkish Embassy, it could not be said that the Fighters were controlled by the community's political leaders or by the Embassy. Indeed, in some areas rivalries for local community leadership had developed between Fighter leaders and civil office holders.[54]

Within the Fighter organization itself, a strong centralized control had not yet been established. This was due in part to the parochial outlook of the villagers and to the difficulties of communication among the scattered and isolated Turk-Cypriot centres. There were also cases of friction between Turk-Cypriots and mainland Turkish officers. Some of this was due to disagreements over political and military policies; some of it could also be attributed to a condescending attitude that some Turkish officers adopted towards the 'provincial' outlook and manners of their Cypriot cousins.

American pressure was chiefly responsible for convincing Turkey to again suspend its invasion plans and to undertake negotiations with Greece on the Cyprus problem.[56] The United States was concerned that the Cypriot Government would seek Russian support, and that a Turk invasion of Cyprus would not only develop into a war between N.A.T.O. allies but also would result in a Russo-American confrontation In the Eastern Mediterranean. The Johnson administration decided that the best counter to the creation of a 'Mediterranean Cuba' would be to bring the Greek-Cypriots under the control of N.A.T.O.

Dean Acheson, special envoy of President Johnson, proposed a plan which he believed would reconcile the demands of all concerned parties. A military base, comprising almost the entire Karpass peninsula of Cyprus would be ceded to Turkey on a fifty year lease. The rest of Cyprus would be politically united with Greece. The island would be divided into a number of districts, two or three of which would have a Turkish-Cypriot majority and would be under a Turkish-Cypriot administration. Those Turk-Cypriots who wished to emigrate to Turkey would receive compensation. In addition it was suggested that there should be some minor adjustment of the Graeco-Turkish border. The Greek Government had proposed to cede the island of Kastellorizon to Turkey in exchange for enosis. Turkey insisted on cession of Cyprus territory with sovereign rights unless a strip of Greek 58 territory in Thrace was offered instead.

The 'Acheson Plan' was warily studied by Greece and Turkey. The Cyprus Government rejected it outright, and in any case, consideration of the plan was interrupted by the Tylliria fighting in August. This clash, the most critical since December 1963, destroyed any spirit of compromise that had existed. The plan was relected bv Greece and Turkey as well.

(h) 6 August to 10 August 1964

The Cyprus Government was becoming increasingly concerned about the Tylliria Region, not only because of Turk-Cypriot road blocks on the coastal highway, but because it was now convinced that large numbers of weapons and men were being smuggled into the island from Turkey through the beaches at Kokkina. In fact, about 500 Turk-Cypriot youths who were studying in Turkey had received some military training and had been landed at Kokkina.[59] However, Greek-Cypriot roadblocks prevented these reinforcements from leaving the area.

On 6 August, National Guard and Greek Army units attacked Turk-Cypriot villages around Kokkina.[60] Turk-Cypriot civilians and Fighters were forced to retreat into a narrow beachhead and were subjected to an intense artillery bombardment. On 7 August, Turkish aircraft had over-flown the battle-zone and fired their weapons out to sea as a show of strength to reinforce a Turkish ultimatum to stop the attack. On 8 August, Turkish jets attacked National Guard and Greek troops in the Tylliria region. UNFICYP was unable to negotiate a cease-fire. President Makarios announced that if Turkish air attacks were again carried out, he would order an attack on every Turkish-Cypriot village and quarter in Cyprus. Despite this threat, it is probable that Turkey would have continued its air attacks, or would have even launched an invasion, if the Cyprus Government had not heeded the Security Council's resolution for a cease-fire on 9 August. The cease- fire was in effect by 10 August and UNFICYP established observation posts around Kokkina and Limnitis.

Official casualty figures issued by the Cyprus Government show that 55 Greek-Cypriots were killed and 125 were wounded. Almost all these casualties were due to the air attacks. Of these casualties, it was reported that 28 dead and 56 wounded were civilians. Any casualties among Greek Army officers and men involved in the offensive were not disclosed. Ten Turk-Cypriots were killed.

The Tylliria offensive showed that Turkey was indeed committed to military intervention in Cyprus if the Greek-Cypriot community continued to pursue enosis by force of arms. In the light of this, President Makarios decided that the struggle would be continued by political and economic means. General Grivas, for his part, decided that the lesson of the Tylliria battle was not that a military solution to enosis must be eschewed, but rather that Greek and Greek-Cypriot forces must be better prepared for an inevitable future confrontation with the Turks.

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