The British Negotiate the Crisis: London & Geneva, July-August 1974

The negotiations following the Greek coup against Makarios mainly took place in London, and Britain=s foreign minister, James Callaghan, was the point man for those difficult talks. He recalls this effort in his memoir, Time and Chance (1987).

Britain felt a special obligation to Cyprus as a member of the Commonwealth, and to her people because of our past links, as well as our responsibility under the 1960 Treaty. The United States had neither a similar background of history nor a similar treaty relationship. Their principal concern was to avoid an extension of Soviet influence in the Middle East, and to the extent that this meant preventing Turkey and Greece from getting at each other's throats, British and American policy coincided. But it also resulted in the United States being less willing to antagonise either the Greek Colonels in the early stages of the conflict or the Turks after their invasion. I felt fewer inhibitions.

Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit of Turkey arrived at No. 10 Downing Street on the evening of 17 July, accompanied by some of his Ministers and two Generals. On our side were the Prime Minister, Minister of Defence Roy Mason, and myself: Ecevit was very direct. In view of the coup he no longer recognised Greece as a Guarantor of Cyprus and he would not therefore meet them for the consultations among the three powers, as laid down in Article IV of the 1960 Treaty. There must be immediate action to bring about an effective Turkish presence on the island to save Turkish lives. This could be achieved if we would allow the British sovereign bases to be used by Turkey for the purpose of landing troops in Cyprus. If Turkey was permitted to use these facilities she would minimise any embarrassment that might arise between the Greeks and ourselves. In future it would be necessary for Turkey to have secure access across the sea at a point somewhere close to Turkey. In an interesting aside which showed how much relations had improved between Makarios and the Turks Ecevit added that he was 'almost weeping' over the departure of the Archbishop, and hoped that one day a dialogue with him might create a sense of nationhood on the island.

I had not been prepared for this direct request to use British bases, but it was an impossible proposition. The island needed fewer Greek troops, not more Turkish troops, and we had called on the Greek Government to withdraw their National Guard officers. Both the Prime Minister and I emphasised that the legal status of the bases was different from the rest of the island and that to permit them to be used for a third country's troops to enter Cyprus would certainly give rise at some stage to a direct challenge to their status by the Government of Cyprus. Harold Wilson then suggested an alternative way forward. Despite Ecevit's declaration, Turkey and Britain had a responsibility to set the Treaty of Guarantee in motion and both countries should jointly invite the Greeks to join us in London for the consultation provided by Article IV. I added that the Turkish Government should not confuse our objective of restoring democracy and constitutional legitimacy in Cyprus with restoring the status quo ante, for Britain recognised that the Turkish Cypriots had legitimate grievances that needed remedy.

After an adjournment for dinner together, both sides returned to the Cabinet Room where we went over the same ground again. Despite all our efforts, Ecevit adamantly refused to send a joint message to the Greek Government inviting them to a meeting, although he saw no objection to Britain meeting the Greeks separately. Early on the following morning, I tried to restart conversations with the Turkish Foreign Minister, but although he came to see me, he was under instructions and we could make no progress. My final message was that Britain expected Turkey not to resort to unilateral military action and so worsen an already bad situation. The Foreign Minister gave me no assurance on the point and when the Turkish Prime Minister and his party left London later that day, we did not know what action they would take. On 18 July we at last received a reply from the Greek Military Government. Brigadier Ioannidis was as uncompromising as Ecevit had been. He told our Ambassador that Greece would not come to London for talks, either between the three Guarantor Powers under the Treaty or bilaterally with Britain.

Britain was faced with a situation in which two of the three Guarantor Powers had declined to play the part they had undertaken to do in the Treaty of 1960, but the matter could not be left where it was. We needed to remove any pretext for a Turkish invasion and our policy became one of securing the overthrow of Sampson and-the return of Makarios, with new safeguards for the Turkish minority. The Sampson regime was no more than surface deep and the Military Government in Athens was running into difficulty. I therefore worked to increase converging pressure on Athens by Britain, by the European Community of which France held the Presidency, and by NATO. Above all, we would need the utmost United States pressure on the Military Government in Athens, for America had more influence than any other country.

My belief was that prompt withdrawal of the Greek National Guard officers who had initiated the coup might persuade Turkey to stay her hand. I urged the United States on 17 July to use their influence with the Greeks to procure the downfall of Sampson, and Henry Kissinger sent Joseph Sisco, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, to London overnight, with the intention that he should travel on to Athens. Sisco arrived in London before Ecevit had left for home and he offered to travel to Ankara for talks on 20 July, after he had seen the Greek regime. Ecevit was clearly determined to keep the United States at arm's length and rebuffed him, saying that his visit would not be convenient. Sisco and I reviewed the situation and both of us shared the view that, despite Ecevit's tactics, military action by the Turks was not imminent.

I urged on Sisco the need to evolve a joint Anglo-American policy as the only way of containing the serious Turkish-Greek differences. Not only did the United States have much more influence with both countries than Britain, but our experiences in the Second World War led me to be a strong advocate of Anglo-American cooperation when crises developed. I had no intention of exposing Britain to the kind of differences with the United States which existed at the time of the Suez invasion and which had resulted in a terrible setback for British arms and influence. During that contest the radar of the American fleet had deliberately interfered with and confused the signals of the British and French ships. Further, American destroyers had moored themselves alongside Egyptian ships in harbour so that the Royal Navy could not fire. I was determined that if military force had to be used in Cyprus, there must be a clear understand- ing with the United States, with their support fully guaranteed.

I admired very much the diplomatic skills which Henry Kissinger had demonstrated after the Arab-Israeli War. No one could handle the Greeks and Turks better if he were so minded, and I therefore sent him a detailed personal message on 19 July urging the need to coordinate British and American views on the best way to bring the situation under control. I made certain proposals on lines of policy. These were: to assert the legitimacy of Makarios; to work for the disappearance of Sampson; to use the constitution for the legal appointment of a successor to Makarios if he was unable to act; to revise the military agreements under which Greek and Turkish armed forces were present on the island; and to consider constitutional changes which would give better protection to the Turkish minority. Procedurally we should work bilaterally, aiming to bring the parties together, but also using the United Nations, for this purpose.

In short, at that stage very great pressure was needed on the Greeks in order to remove any excuse for a Turkish invasion. To this end I asked that America should redouble its efforts. Because of President Nixon's preoccupation with Watergate, it seems to me that Henry Kissinger was unable to get any clear guidance from him. He telephoned our Ambassador in Washington with his reply, saying that the United States would certain- ly not work to keep Sampson in office and agreeing that this was the least desirable outcome. On the other hand, he was cool about Makarios's return, although he would go along with my efforts - perhaps one step behind. The United States would not be hurried into committed positions on constitutional change, and as to putting pressure on the Greeks, he would be ready to do so only once it was clear what our goals were in the matter of constitutional change. This was of no immediate assistance to me, for constitutional discussions would obviously stretch into the future, whereas pressure on the Greek Government to withdraw their officers was needed without a moment's delay if the Turks were to be denied an excuse for acting.

Whilst this exchange was taking place we became aware that Turkish troops and ships were on the move, and some time after midnight Turkish forces landed on the island. I was awakened with the news at 4.20 a.m. on the morning of Saturday 20 July as a result of a telephone call from Henry Kissinger to my home. . .

Now that the crisis had burst, my spirits rose and my energies redoubled. First I awakened both Greek and Turkish Ambassadors, who came at once. I saw them separately and reminded both that their countries had by Treaty guaranteed the territorial integrity of Cyprus and had further agreed to prohibit either Enosis or partition. The provisions of the Treaty were now being violated by both countries and we had a joint responsibility under Article IV to consult together to bring this state of affairs to an end. I therefore formally called on the Greek and Turkish Governments to meet with the British Government immediately, either in London or at any other agreed location, and asked the Ambassadors to convey this at once to Athens and Ankara. On this occasion it did not take long for the Greek Junta to respond. By eight o'clock the Greek Charge d'Aflaires informed us that his Government was not willing to meet with the other Guarantors arid that unless Turkish troops were withdrawn from Cyprus, Greece would declare war on Turkey and declare a state of Enosis that would permanently unite Cyprus with Greece. The Turks made no reply during that day.

My next step was to call in the Soviet Ambassador. It was still very early in the morning and he was unaware of the invasion until I explained to him what had taken place and what I proposed. I told him he would be kept closely informed of developments for, although I certainly did not expect Soviet assistance, I did not want Soviet misunderstandings to complicate further a tangled situation. Foreign Office officials continued to brief Soviet representatives privately whilst the tension was at its height, with some advantage to the general situation. The Russians were watchful and questioned us closely throughout the period about our actions and our intentions, and my policy was to respond as frankly as possible. As was to be expected, they made propaganda about our supposed intention to convert Cyprus into a NATO base, but their heart was not really in it for they knew we were being candid with them. There was only one occasion on which I had a major grievance against them, namely when the Soviet Union vetoed a Security Council Resolution to expand the United Nations Force on the island. I complained strongly but privately and twenty-four hours later they abandoned their veto, allowing the force to be strengthened.. . . .

Sunday 21 July was a mad day of activity. Henry and I spoke on the telephone about nine or ten times, and it may be of interest to those who wonder how such matters are conducted if I set down some of the telephone conversations that were held that day.

12.45 I telephoned Ecevit and urged an immediate cease-fire in accordance with a Security Council Resolution of the United Nations. He promised to put the proposal to his National Security Council later today. Would he be ready to meet me ? Says he can't afford to be too far from Ankara, but suggests Switzerland as the venue. I tell him Greeks have demanded that Turkish Air Force should not bomb a convoy of Greek ships en route to Cyprus and urge compliance. He agrees provided the warships accompanying these ships turn away. (We telephone Greeks to tell them of this exchange.)

13.20 I telephone Bruno Kreisky (Chancellor of Austria). If Switzer- land is not available as a meeting place, could Ecevit and I (and perhaps Greeks) meet in Vienna? He agrees.

13.30 Kissinger telephones. Arrangements for cease-fire are making progress. Greeks accept without conditions. Two Governments will announce and subsequently I can announce further talks between the three Guarantor Powers.

13.45 Kissinger telephones. Greek Government is very weak. Athens should not be asked to make more decisions than it can handle. This may slow down the timetable for talks. Kissinger says Turks are not now ready to cease-fire.

15.55 Kissinger calls. He says if cease-fire is not agreed he has authority from President to threaten removal of United States nuclear weapons from Turkey. Also, if war breaks out between the two countries, nuclear weapons will be removed.

16.25 Kypraios, Greek Foreign Minister, telephones in highly emotional state. Turkish Air Force is bombing Greek Cypriots, cannot wait three days for cease-fire. If cease-fire is not agreed immediately, the Greek Army will launch an attack on Turkey.

16.50 I reach Kissinger, and tell him the Greek Government will decide at 19.00 today on beginning hostilities. Kissinger says United States sup- ports removal of Sampson. Kissinger says he has told Ecevit that the United States will proceed to remove nuclear weapons from Thrace and Anatolia if there is no cease-fire. This has made Ecevit think again and he has promised a further answer within thirty minutes.

16.55 During my call to Kissinger am told that Ecevit is waiting to speak to me (presumably as a result of Kissinger's ultimatum). He says he wants to postpone a cease-fire because the Greek Colonels may resign and there may be a Moscow-inclined Administration in Greece by tomorrow. I reply 'no dice' unless he also wants war and tell him what I know of Junta's intentions. His best course is to accept Security Council's Resolution. He says he intends to tell Kissinger he accepts cease-fire 'in principle', but will not implement completely until Tuesday 22 July. He complains that Greek ships are landing troops in Cyprus under cover of flying the Turkish flag and Greek planes have Turkish-speaking pilots on board to confuse. I propose that the three Powers meet in Vienna at 08.00 on Tuesday 22 as soon as cease-fire is in place. He will let me know.

17.20 I telephone Kissinger and tell him of Ecevit's response. I say I believe he will come to talks. Now Turkey accepts cease-fire in principle, I suggest he pressures Greeks to come to Vienna.

17.55 Kissinger calls. Joe Sisco is going to see the Greek Junta now. They want a cease-fire tonight and a meeting on Tuesday morning. If they won't buy a cease-fire 'in principle' effective Tuesday, he and I must both tackle Ecevit again.

20.40 I tell Kissinger there must be a definite cease-fire by 14.00 on 22 July so that the three Powers can meet. He asks me to telephone Ecevit and he will do the same. We should both send notes on the same lines to Athens. Would I approach the Nine to do the same ?

21.00 I speak to Sauvagnargues (French Foreign Minister) who is acting for the Community. He agrees to take action in both capitals at once.

21.40 Kissinger calls. Sisco is still with Greeks. They are naturally more interested in assurances from the United States than Britain. He says the Junta don't love Britain. Turks now promise effective cease-fire tomorrow. He will propose noon Washington time. I suggest noon local time. I say we are getting reports that Turks 'have bombed and sunk some of their own vessels. This will not improve their mood.

22.25 I speak to Kyraios about proposed cease-fire and urge him to come to Vienna on 22 July. He says he will not meet Turks until they adhere to the terms of the Resolution passed by the Security Council.

23.00 Sauvagnargues calls to say that French Government will despatch note on behalf of Nine tonight.

23.10 Kissinger telephones. Ecevit has now finally agreed to recommend acceptance of cease-fire for 14.00 tomorrow. These almost continuous telephone exchanges were slotted into many other activities that day. It was necessary to keep the Prime Minister thoroughly up to date as well as remaining in close touch with the Minister of Defence. Broadcasts had to be made to our own people, and emergency evacuation arrangements for the many thousands of British tourists and holiday-makers. Roy Hattersley took charge of this aspect and like everyone he turned to the task with tremendous zest, unafraid to take decisions.

Thousands of Greek Cypriots were fleeing from the area where the Turkish Army was fanning out whilst other thousands of Turkish Cypriots living in Greek Cypriot areas were taking refuge in Turkish strongholds to escape the wrath of the Greeks. Our first step was to advise the seventeen thousand British residents and dependents of servicemen who lived among the civilian population to withdraw to the sovereign base areas, where they would have protection from the inter-communal hatred. Stephen Olver, sometimes telephoning London from the basement of his office in Nicosia whilst a violent battle raged around it, speedily organised a convoy of a thousand cars to take British evacuees to the nearest British base. A British armed convoy was sent from Dhekelia to escort them and 4,500 passengers drove perilously from Nicosia to the southern base. All arrived safely. It was a successful mixture of improvisation and planning. Britain had undertaken to help the nationals of other European countries as well as Americans, and they am some other British residents and holiday-makers grouped together to make their way north to Kyrenia, hoping to be evacuated by sea. Turkish tanks were already in the town and our High Commissioner engaged in some delicate negotiations.

Large crowds of evacuees gathered on the beaches and the Royal Navy with crews at action stations, came close in to the shore, despite some slight attempted harassment by the Turkish Navy. I called Bulent Ecevit to complain about this and he admitted that the Turkish Navy had orders to keep the Royal Navy ten kilometres from the coastline. I warned him that our ships were going in and that we would hold Turkey responsible if there were any incidents. Fortunately for the Turkish ships they dis not attempt to enforce their orders, and by 9.15 a.m. on Tuesday morning 22 July, with Turkish ships watching, HMS Devonshire and HMS Andromeda had safely embarked every single person who wished to leave. I believe Ecevit himself was anxious to avoid any action that might have led to an armed clash with the United Nations Forces or with Britain but some fire-eating Turkish Generals were at large in Cyprus, backed by a belligerent Turkish Ambassador. At one stage Turkish tanks began to mass around Nicosia and the Commander of the United Nations Force reported that they feared an attack on their positions at the airport. The possessed only side-arms for protection. We at once offered reinforcements to the United Nations forces and flew 1,300 extra troops from Britain to Cyprus. Their arrival had a steadying effect.

The Turkish Government had given an undertaking not to take over the airport at Nicosia, but despite this they continued to inch forward slowly edging the United Nations forces back. As soon as the British 16/5th Lancers reinforcements were in position I asked that they be given orders to stand fast and not give further ground. At the same time Phantom aircraft were flown out from Britain to give them air cover. I telephoned Ecevit personally and told him of the orders the 16/5th Lancers had received, that they would hold their ground and resist any further encroachment. If they were fired on they would respond. We held an acrimonious conversation, at the end of which Ecevit undertook to look into the matter personally, saying that Ankara did not always know what was taking place on the island. The upshot was satisfactory, for the Turks halted their gradual push forward and the airport did not pass into their hands although it remained closed.

The cease-fire finally came into force on 22 July and on the following day the humiliated Greek Junta resigned, while in Cyprus Nicos Sampson was replaced by a respected Greek Cypriot leader, Glafkos Clerides, as Acting President. In Athens Constantine Karamanlis, a statesman of wide experience, formed a new Government committed to democracy and at once reversed the Junta's position by agreeing to take part in three-party talks under the Treaty of Guarantee. The Turks also changed their position and assented. By agreement we switched the venue from Vienna to Geneva; I met the other two Foreign Ministers there on 25 July in the Palais des Nations.

With the arrival of a democratic government in Greece, British policy acquired a new element. It was important for the Greek people and for international relations that Greek democracy should be strengthened. The new civilian Government must not be brought down by the folly of its predecessor, nor humiliated in the forthcoming talks with Turkey. George Mavros, the newly appointed Foreign Minister, had been arrested by the Greek Junta for applauding my decision in the previous spring to cancel the British naval visit to Greece, and was exiled to the island of Cos. He said with a smile when we met at Geneva, 'You took the action. I paid the price.' But as he also attributed his later release to the efforts I had made on his behalf, we began (and remained) on good terms. He was a convinced democrat and a leading liberal politician, very conscious of the dignity of Greece, sometimes irascible when under strain (he occasionally threatened to walk out), but anxious to reach an agreement with Turkey.

Turan Gunes, the Turkish Foreign Minister, was a dark, loquacious character who looked somewhat like Groucho Marx but without the humour. He was capable of repeating the same interminable argument time after time until the words lost their meaning. He was moved neither by passion nor patience. He was an expert at obstruction, once holding up one of our meetings for several hours as he elaborated his objections to the name-plates that identified us at table. He sometimes disappeared without trace at critical moments and was said to be visiting the casino. It was typical of Gunes that a few hours before the Turkish invasion he had on my instructions been asked by our Ambassador in Ankara, Sir Horace Phillips, to confirm categorically that the Turkish sea-borne force was not about to land. He gave what Phillips later described as a 'duplicitous assurance' that they had been given no instructions to attack. Despite this I at first gave him the benefit of the doubt, but soon was convinced that he used stalling tactics merely to gain time and prevent progress. The Turkish delegation became little more than a cypher, and on one

occasion this resulted in Ankara repudiating a rare agreement that had been hammered out between Mavros, Gunes and myself. It seemed to us that Gunes had little or no authority. Behind him stood the Turkish Cabinet, and behind the Cabinet stood the Turkish Generals. I told him that I was negotiating with a highly random telephone wire, the British role being that of patient referee and mediator, with my officials continuously bringing forward new initiatives and proposals.

The talks developed into a gruelling cliff-hanger with the Turks as well as the Greeks at times inclined to say that they were prepared to face war rather than 'retreat' or 'humiliation'. With up to fifteen thousand fighting troops landed on the island the Turks held most of the cards, and as our formal sessions were rarely productive, I spent much of my time bilaterally with one or the other in an endeavour to secure two major objectives: first, to make the cease-fire stick; and second, to prepare the ground for a new settlement between Greek and Turkish Cypriots that would strip the Turkish Army of any excuse for remaining in the field. Henry Kissinger continued his diplomatic pressure from afar and ten days after the invasion had begun, on 30 July, both parties were ready to sign a declaration committing themselves to a standfast cease-fire, acceptance of the principle of a buffer zone between the two sides to be patrolled by United Nations forces, and agreement to meet again on 9 August with the addition of representatives of Greek and Turkish Cypriots to consider the wider issues involved in a lasting solution.

These were important gains, provided both sides adhered to them, although the size and shape of the buffer zone and the precise functions of the United Nations Force remained to be delineated. But within a day of my return to London, the new Acting President of Cyprus was complaining of violations of the cease-fire by the Turks and mutual accusations of infringements grew as a team of British, Greek, Turkish and UNFICYP representatives began demarcating the buffer zone. The second round of talks therefore began on 9 August in an atmosphere of charge and counter-charge. The Turks were flushed with success and their Government enjoyed a new-found popularity at home, while the Greek Government was too weak to be able to compromise.

It would be tedious to recount the wearisome exchanges of the following days: their flavour can be gathered from the account I sent to the Prime Minister at the end of our very first meeting. >I am fairly satisfied at having prevented the meeting from breaking up in disorder . . . At least they managed to [put their case] without anyone walking out and we are to meet again tomorrow. I did not hope for much more.=

From the beginning Gunes was adamant. His position was as follows: the Greeks themselves had overthrown the 1960 constitution and the island would not return to it. Our declaration of 30 July had failed because thousands of Turkish Cypriots were refugees. Their permanent safety must be assured and this required a geographic division into two separate zones, autonomous in internal law and administration, but unified within a federal state. He demanded an answer from the Greek Foreign Minister and the Acting President, Clerides was firm but patient. He agreed that the 1960 constitution was unsatisfactory and required substantial change, but he was not prepared to accept a new constitution at the hands of the Guarantor Powers. Cyprus was an independent sovereign state and the communities themselves must work out the necessary amendments. He accepted that a degree of internal autonomy was required for the protection of both Turkish and Greek communities, but neither he nor Archbishop Makarios, who had remained in New York, could accept federation based on a geographical division.

Mavros reinforced this, adding that the Greek Government would be humiliated by such a solution. We adjourned and the British team spent some time trying to discover by bilateral talks with each side whether there was any room for accommodation. As the days went by, we were forced to conclude that there was no 'give' of any kind in the Turkish position, although the Greeks might have been willing to concede some kind of autonomous administration in separate regions.

I must also place on record that during these talks Gunes reassured me on two occasions that Turkey had no intention of her troops advancing nor of them remaining on the island. But my doubts increased, especially in the light of a talk I had with Dr Waldheim, the Secretary General of the United Nations, who called on me in Geneva. He was deeply concerned that the Turkish Prime Minister had brusquely informed him that the United Nations Force had no judicial right to take action in any area controlled by a Guarantor Power, and he should therefore withdraw the Force from the Kyrenia-Nicosia Turkish enclave. Kurt Waldheim said he was haunted by memories of U Thant's disastrous decision to withdraw United Nations forces from Sinai in 1967.

I agreed and encouraged him to make a robust response. The next day we met again. I told him of my growing belief that the conference would end in deadlock and if so, the Turks might resume their advance, perhaps in the week of 18 August. This would be bound to carry them through areas patrolled by the United Nations Force. On the previous occasion Britain had provided reinforcements to the United Nations very rapidly and if the occasion arose we would once again supply troops, equipped with anti-tank guns and heavy artillery. If we did so would the Secretary General seek authority for United Nations Forces to stand astride any Turkish line of advance, thus placing the onus on the Turks to decide whether to advance in the knowledge that the British troops, acting under the authority of the United Nations, would not be pushed aside ?

Waldheim said that UNFICYP's original mandate did not extend to resisting the forces of a member state, but in the prevailing circumstances he did not believe that the Security Council would be an impediment to this. The Soviet Union would probably not oppose and the Chinese would absent themselves. He was very ready to cooperate, and I was heartened by his staunchness. Although I was in no doubt that the Soviet Union would not be unhappy if we all became embroiled in Cyprus, there was a balance of risks and my assessment was that if we showed ourselves sufficiently resolute the Turks would at the last moment back off. They had done this in earlier years and once again within the previous few days, when they had been faced by the 16/5th Lancers at Nicosia Airport.

I gave a private briefing to the British press and, as I had intended, it soon became public knowledge that in view of the uncertain situation the British Phantom aircraft, together with the added British troops sent to the island, would not be withdrawn and would be reinforced if necessary. I reported to the Prime Minister and also explained my thinking to Arthur Hartman, the American Assistant Secretary of State, who had accompanied me to Geneva at Henry Kissinger's request, adding that I feared that the still-fragile Greek Government of Karamanlis might be driven from office if the Turks broke the cease-fire. Hartman responded that there was no longer an odious regime in Athens, no illegal regime in Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots were protected, and there was a strong United Nations Resolution. These were rational arguments that should appeal to Turkish intelligence, and restrain them from action. I replied that I could not agree with the assumption that we were in a rational situation and I asked Arthur Hartman to convey to Washington my misgivings and proposals, and ask that prudent forethought be given to possible Turkish military intentions so that the attitude of both our countries could be decided before a response was needed.

At noon on Sunday 11 August 1974 he returned with the Administration's reply. Hartman is an able career diplomat, a European and Soviet expert, courteous, quiet but firm in manner and an excellent analyst. On this occasion he abandoned the relaxed informality we had become accustomed to as he informed me stiffly that the United States was not happy with Her Majesty's Government's approach. Dr Kissinger had spoken to Prime Minister Ecevit following the receipt of the Brisith assessment urging him to refrain from military action and making clear that Turkey would get no support from the United States if they made any further advance. As a result of this conversation he was convinced that Ecevit understood that further action would have serious consequences and Kissinger had asked Hartman to tell me that he had received assurances from Ecevit on this score with which he was content.

Hartman added that the Secretary of State would react very strongly against any further announcement of British military activities, because it would have an adverse effect on his tactics with Ecevit. He said that the best course was to keep the diplomatic talks going, and he hoped I would be prepared to listen and wait. The Turkish Foreign Minister should be receiving fresh instructions from Ankara allowing him to be more flexible. I responded that I was doing my best to keep discussions alive, despite the fact that the Turkish Foreign Minister was preventing us from meeting by absenting himself from arranged sessions, but I asked him to tell the Secretary of State of my anxiety that the Turks were not being handled effectively, nor were we preparing our response in the event of further Turkish military action. I believed the worst interpretation should be put on Turkish future intentions and there were sufficient pointers in this direction for us to prepare contingency plans. What was the United States prepared to do if the Turks enlarged their bridgehead ? Hartman replied that Kissinger would not get himself boxed in on this question---even to focus on this eventuality would influence events to move on to a military plane. The Secretary of State had the same objective as I had but reached a different assessment on how they could be achieved. My response was that Dr Kissinger was mistaken. The Turks had backed off at Nicosia Airport, but it was highly likely they would try again.

I told Hartman that I had earlier made clear to Ecevit that although the British troops facing them were wearing United Nations berets, they would stand their ground in face of a Turkish Army encroachment and my country would not be prepared to see them pushed aside. Since that conversation the Turks had been heavily reinforced, but Britain was ready to strengthen a static defence against possible lines of Turkish advance by moving in more reinforcements and flying in further Phantoms. I would repeat the warning to the Turks on whom would fall the onus of challenging the United Nations, but I must be assured of American support if I were to do so, and in the light of our conversation this would apparently not be forthcoming. I continued that I understood American concern with the broad issues of the south-east flank of NATO but the United States was ignoring other perspectives, including Britain's role as a Guarantor Power and the safeguarding of the lives of thousands of British citizens.

As soon as Arthur Hartman had left, I fired off a telegram to Henry Kissinger, saying that these important differences were impairing our mutual confidence. I reiterated that it was not sufficient to approach the Turks solely through the medium of diplomacy. The correct policy was to tackle them on parallel lines, namely to convince them that we were in earnest on both the diplomatic and the military level. This was the most likely way to achieve results. As to his complaint that the British had introduced a military dimension, I reminded him that the reality was that this dimension was constantly hanging over the heads of the British troops who were heavily outnumbered by up to twenty-five thousand Turkish soldiers.

Kissinger's response was to telephone Ecevit once more to renew his personal plea that Turkey should adhere to a political solution, telling him that he could expect no support if the Turks made a military move and that the United States would mount a major diplomatic effort to halt them. Kissinger told me that he would give every support to British efforts to save the crisis by diplomatic means, but he did not consider threats of military action either helpful or appropriate, as they distracted attention from the political options. I recognised both Henry's ability and the influence of America, which had been very considerable in securing the cease-fire on 22 July, but I was convinced that more would be needed on this occasion. The only thing that might deter the Turks was the conviction that they would face military opposition if they attempted to advance further.

I continued with our diplomatic efforts, but with every hour that passed our team became more gloomy. There were flashes of common sense. Acting President Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denktash, the leader of the Turkish Committee, both brought intelligence and genuine concern to the discussion on the future of their country. If it had been left to them it is conceivable that they might have hammered out an understanding. But Denktash was not a free agent, and confessed to me that in the last resort he was obliged to obey his masters on the Turkish mainland.

By the evening of 12 August matters had reached an impasse, Clerides was near despair when I told him that there was no prospect of a determined stand by the United Nations, the United States and Britain of the kind I had worked for. Despite Waldheim's earlier optimism, the United Nations forces were ready to withdraw if the Turks advanced, while the United States was not prepared to put military pressure on the Turks. In these circumstances I suggested he should work for the best possible accommodation. Both he and Denktash had already agreed on the need for constitutional revision, the creation of a federal system which would accord with the bicommunal character of the island, and both of them were keen to preserve the independence and sovereignty of the island. He had hinted earlier that he might be ready to consider two internal zones and I urged him to consider very seriously the establishment of two autonomous Administrations with defined geographical boundaries within a federal state. I read out a draft prepared by my staff that covered these points, and which proposed that further discussions should take place in Nicosia immediately between him and Denktash, followed by a report to the three Foreign Ministers in Geneva on a later date in September.

Clerides promised to consider these proposals subject to the reasonable condition that his acceptance of such a framework would be conditional on all Turkish forces withdrawing from Cyprus. We agreed to call in the Greek Foreign Minister, and at the end of our talk both Clerides and Mavros said that they were willing to return to Athens and Nicosia to consult their colleagues and secure their reaction to the proposal for two zones. They would leave at once and would return to Geneva the following evening with their answer.

As the Turks and Greeks had both given up tripartite meetings I at once took this proposition personally to Gunes. He responded angrily. Unless Clerides was willing to state in advance of his departure that he accepted the principle of a single geographical zone for the Turks he, Gunes, would also leave Geneva and bring the conference to an end. I urged patience, saying that in my opinion Clerides would in fact advocate such a single zone when he met his colleagues but would probably argue for a smaller area to be allotted to the Turkish minority than they claimed. Gunes remained adamant and also declined to attend a further joint session unless he was assured beforehand of Clerides' agreement. When we parted I enlisted Henry Kissinger's aid and we both telephoned the Turkish Prime Minister. He may subsequently have instructed Gunes to attend a further meeting and accordingly we met for a final gruelling but pointless session in the company of observers from the United Nations.

Gunes repeated his demands, putting them in the form of an ultimatum. Did the Acting President and the Greek Foreign Minister accept here and now that there should be a Turkish region extending from the Turkish sector of Famagusta to the Turkish sector of Nicosia, continuing on a line that would extend to 34 per cent of the area of Cyprus? Further, that this new zone must be established within the next three or four days ? He must have a reply that very evening and if Clerides and Mavros were unable to indicate their acceptance there would be no point in continuing the conference. He would have no more to say.

Despite this, the death throes of the conference continued for several hours, Clerides and Mavros repeated once again that they must have time for consultations in Nicosia and Athens. They were ready to return to Geneva within thirty-six hours. I asked Denktash if he would agree but he replied that he was bound by the Turkish Government; he would attend a further meeting only if the Turkish Foreign Minister would do so. I appealed to Gunes to accept the time that Clerides and Mavros had asked for. Once more Gunes refused. There was no formal end to the proceedings. Gunes rose from the table at which we sat, ungracious as ever, and departed, followed by his aides. The time was 2.25 a.m. on the morning of 14 August. The rest of us shook hands and filed out wearily. I gave a press conference in which I did not spare the Turkish tactics. Even while I was speaking, the Turkish Army was advancing once more, breaking the cease-fire. Gunes had played out time.

At 5.00 a.m. on the same morning the Greek Cabinet met in the Ministry of Defence. With the exception of the Prime Minister, Constantine Karamanlis, those who were present demanded that Greece declare war on Turkey forthwith. The Prime Minister, who kept a cool head throughout, proposed as an alternative that Greece should request NATO's immediate assistance in accordance with the dictum that an attack on one is an attack on all. The Greek Cabinet agreed but Joseph Luns, the Secretary General of NATO, was told by the Turks on the next day that 'a visit from him would not serve any useful purpose and might be counter-productive'. Luns withdrew. Karamanlis saw there was nothing more he could do to save Cypriot unity.

From Callaghan's Time and Chance, pp. 339-355.