The Cyprus Conflict

by John Tirman

The inability of the two communities to agree to a set of governing principles and institutions for forty years has drawn countless conflict interveners to the island. Most of these have been official negotiators and diplomats. The main narrative and attached documents describe most of the important initiatives by the United Nations to resolve the impasse. The major powers, particularly the United States and Britain, have ongoing attempts within the U.N. framework. Some dozen or more Aspecial representatives@ to Cyprus are active. Individual embassies in Cyprus, such as the Slovak mission, conduct more informal efforts to bring the two sides together. Many governments, such as the Swiss, fund projects to find solutions and reduce tensions.

The numbers of civil society groups, typically called non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which are involved is also impressive. In the last few years, perhaps a dozen significant projects have been engineered by NGOs from outside Cyprus. Individuals, funded by the Fulbright Commission and others, have played a role as well, particularly in fostering the bicommunal activities of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot citizens. Academic researchers have contributed many useful ideas.

Increasingly, civil society in Cyprus is taking up the challenge of reconciliation. Civil society is a loose concept, but it typically designates the Aspace@ between the family and the state in which new ideas can be developed, experimented with, and refashioned to provide institutions and other mechanisms to solve problems. In Cyprus, civil society is in an embryonic form. In Greek Cyprus, the traditional ties of village and Church, and the vibrant economy, have tended to retard the development of NGOs dedicated to substantive issues. In Turkish Cyprus, the village traditionalism was also strong, but since 1974 the strong state (Turkey), the presence of the military, and the weakness of the economy have combined to slow down the emergence of civil society organizations. (It is worth noting that civil society in this sense is also an undernourished phenomenon in Turkey and Greece, certainly well behind the rest of Europe and much of Africa, the Americas, and Asia.) But this is changing. More and more groups interested in the Anational problem@ are appearing, and some have very substantive agendas.

The main goal of the official negotiators since 1974 has been to engage the two parties in substantive negotiations that could lead to a reconstitution of the Cyprus nation, typically envisioned as either a federation or a confederation. The talks, usually facilitated by the United Nations, have from time to time demonstrated some small progress but have not apparently come close to a final settlement. The method is classic third-party facilitation, with sets of ideas profferred, and Agood offices@ used as a platform for convening the antagonists. Greece and Turkey have not officially been part of these processes (as they were in the past), but they have played a role in the background. The uncertain rapprochement between Athens and Ankara wrought by foreign ministers George Papandreou and Ismail Cem, has created a better atmosphere for negotiations, but as of this writing (early 2001) this warmer climate between the motherlands has not produced any change in the Cyprus talks. Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot negotiators, led by Rauf Denktash and Glafkos Clerides, have become stuck in a seemingly irreconcilable set of positions, with Denktash insisting on a two state solution with some Cyprus-wide interlocking institutions, and Clerides holding out for a bizonal federation, with guarantees for Turkish Cypriot safety in the absence of Turkish troops. The United States ostensibly supports the Greek Cypriot position, but its strong alliance with Turkey has meant that Washington will not put effective pressure on Ankara.

Below this official negotiating level, a considerable amount of activity is pursued by governments and quasi-official organizations to break the impasse. A number of governments have convened parties to the conflict to promote dialogue, Aconfidence building measures,@ and what is sometimes called functional reconciliation. The latter is a technique in which antagonists are brought together not to Asolve@ the main points of difference but to address other, common problems, such as environmental protection. In Nicosia, this has occurred in a decades-old discussion and planning on sewage and water treatment common to both sides of the Green Line. An example of other semi-official efforts to create elite-level dialogue was Richard Holbrooke=s attempt, while American assistant secretary of state (1993-96), to create a bi-national business leaders forum, which ended in failure.

NGOs have pursued similar means of bringing Turkish and Greek Cypriots together. The Fulbright Commission, a funding mechanism for scholars and overseen by the State Department, began a program to bring conflict-resolution specialists to Cyprus to work with the two communities in a constructive manner. (See the evaluation of this effort.)  The first and probably the most successful of these was the work done by Ben Broome, a communications expert at George Mason University in Virginia (and now at Arizona State University), who virtually created the bicommunal community of Cypriots on both sides of the Green Line. This community of perhaps 200 active participants has attempted to build relationships across the divide in a number of ways, from choral groups to problem-solving workshops on the conflict. A great amount of mediation training has also been pursued by a number of NGOs. Broome has continued to convene groups of Cypriots off-island to build relationships and explore the ethnic problems besetting the island. The Peace Research Institute, Oslo*, one of Europe=s major research and action organizations, has also attempted to create forums for dialogue between elites of both camps. Seeds of Peace, based in Jerusalem, started a youth-oriented project in 2000.  Off island, the work of conflict resolution has been much less energetic, as one would expect, although the London community of Cypriots, which is enormous, has a number of activities percolating; the most important forum has been the Association of Turks, Greeks, and Cypriots*---their web site has many useful features and articles.  A number of Americans have conducted occasional workshops* and other investigations or speculations* about possible solutions as well.

Among the Cypriot civil society organizations and individuals, a number of initiatives have been started, including some work on school curricula and the teaching of history, building a business education center, news media, youth programs, web sites*, and the like; and some labor unions have held widely publicized cross-border meetings.  In 2003, an important educational initiative on the Annan Plan was Cyprus Decides, which has many useful articles.  The bicommunal community in the north and south holds considerable promise for further and more substantive activity.

The brief descriptions above, which scarcely touches on the range and number of efforts, indicate a depth of interest and inventiveness that is encouraging. Involvement in non-official activities carries with it a certain risk in both societies. The prevailing mindset in the south is that Turkish Cypriot organizations are agents of Turkey and not to be trusted. Moreover, the central cause of Greek Cyprus is not reconciliation, but Ajustice@ - - which is to say, return of land occupied by the Turkish military in 1974. So those who aim for reconciliation without preconditions are at risk of being ostracized in a society that is closely knit ideologically and small by any standard. In the north, the risks can be even greater if activity is viewed as implicit criticism of the state; a number of activists have been harassed by the Turkish authorities and military, sometimes violently. Denktash closed down bicommunal activities in 1997, making it difficult to meet and exposing bicommunal activists to additional inconvenience or worse. The Greek Cypriot authorities have made meetings difficult, too, by its border restrictions that limit access for Cypriots and non-Cypriot activists.

The NGO efforts have promoted dialogue, skills, trust, relationships, institutions, education, and the like - - all necessary, though not sufficient, conditions for peace. New and recent emphases on exploring history (an approach at the root of this educational Web site), cleansing school curricula of hyperbolic and militant nationalism, and involving institutions and people not previously a part of the reconciliation culture are important advances.

At the semi-official level, the dialogues and workshops have no doubt had some salutary effects of exploring problems and options, and building relationships. Indeed, one of the obvious benefits to all the dialogues and meetings between the two sides is the creation of personal ties, an essential condition for the success of any final settlement. But, like the NGO efforts, they are too frequently managed poorly, without the resources or long-term commitment that conflict resolution requires. The supposition, for example, that mediation skills training or more dialogue will produce some tangible results, in the absence of other kinds of initiatives, is ill-founded.

The official efforts have been more glaring in their failures and fundamentally insincere in their conduct and norms. The expectations wrought by the political cultures on both sides constrain the possibilities for compromise. The most hard-line elements on each side regularly intervene to impose discipline on the negotiators - - i.e., the political leaders in negotiations have little room to maneuver for fear of being seen as appeasers. This is particularly true in Greek Cyprus, where the Church still plays a militant role opposing even a federation, and political parties jockey for advantage relentlessly. In the north, the Denktash regime is somewhat safe from electoral challenges, but must answer to Ankara. In neither society are the values of reconciliation nurtured by political institutions, the news media, or the educational system, so the public as a whole cannot be expected to support far-reaching solutions. And the presence of so many outside negotiators relieves political leaders of responsibility for failure; it may be that the U.N. and other such interlocutors should simply pull out. The U.S. stance, for instance, is fundamentally dishonest - - insisting on the Greek Cypriot position but unwilling to expend significant political capital on persuading Ankara to negotiate in good faith. The U.K. is so discredited by its disgraceful colonial administration that it is not considered trustworthy either.

What will alter this very rigid and static situation is difficult to say. Conflict resolution at any level must be cognizant of political and social realities. Dialogue and relationship building continue to have value. Functional reconciliation projects and confidence building measures can be effective tools. The lure of the European Union may alter the dynamics measurably and unpredictably. But the rigidity of the two incompatible negotiating positions suggest something more Adisruptive@ is needed. The social values underlying this rigidity must be transformed in order to break the deadlock. Some interveners are addressing this through explorations of history, stereotypic views of "the other," and similar emphases on "tolerance" or more fundamental changes toward acceptance.  But substantial political transformation rarely occurs without a Apublic demand@ for change, a demand that is typically articulated by a social movement. (To see a more complete explanation of this argument, see my paper on public demands and peace, and a bibliography, by clicking here.)  This is absent in Cyprus (although more apparent recently in Turkish Cyprus), and without such demands - - which in effect give politicians Apermission@ to compromise - - the possibilities for a near-term settlement are remote. It may be that an attitude change has already occurred sufficiently to support such a social movement, reflecting a fatigue with the problem or a willingness, in an atmosphere of prosperity or prospective prosperity, to put aside differences in the interests of a permanent settlement. (Such attitudes could be explored by expert survey research.) Whatever the current state of public opinion, however, a more active and insistent public demand must be manifested. Social movements usually introduce far-reaching ideas that have a tenuous or poorly understood support among the public; these movements confront the shibboleths of officialdom while educating the public on the utility or morality of an alternative future. That is probably what is needed in Cyprus in the coming months and years, unless Cypriots from all sides are willing to have another foreign Asolution@ imposed (the EU's rules on openness, for example), or are willing to live in a bitterly divided island.

  John Tirman
  December 2000, revised 2003

A Hopeful Addendum, 2003

What altered the static state of affairs that obtained for so many years was indeed a very bold act---the opening of the Green Line, which by many accounts was pushed by Rauf Dentash's son (Serder) and the bicommunal community of which he was a part.  This extraordinary event, which is described elsewhere on this site, was perhaps a political ploy by the elder Denktash to deflect criticism for his rejection both of Anna's plan and EU ascension, but whatever the causes, the consequences are dramatic.  There have been a reported 2 million crossings at the Green Line, and the stories of reunions, visits to old homes, warm hospitality of peoples that had been vilified by politicians as enemies, etc., are simply astonishing.  While the opening has not instantly resolved the political dilemmas posed by the Annan Plan and its rejection, nor indeed of EU membership, it has answered the social dilemmas that many people feared---namely, that once there was access north and south, reprisals and violence would follow.  Despite the teachings of the extremist institutions and religions, and their thirst for revenge, the people have responded with maturity and foresight---and forgiveness.  That they have confounded the politicians and priests so profoundly is certain to have positive political repercussions down the line.

--- January 2004  

Another Postscript, and Less Hopeful

The defeat of the Annan Plan in the Republic of Cyprus referendum on April 24, 2004, ended a long episode of U.N. negotiating involvement.  It is difficult to imagine the U.N. Secretary General, this or one of his successors, engaging so personally to resolve the impasse.  It will likely solve itself, so to speak, some years hence, if and when Turkey is granted entry into the EU.  But why did Greek Cyrpiots this time so overwhelmingly reject the Annan Plan?  Below, I expanded on remarks made earlier on this site and elsewhere (on CNN, the International Herald Tribune, Greekworks.com, and others over the years) with respect to how a demand for peace is articulated.  This article appeared in the Wall Street Journal Europe, and confirmed my hunch in August 2000, in the same newspaper, that international mediators would not be able to negotiate a settlement.  

    One Island, Divisible
            by John Tirman

Even Kofi Annan's tireless efforts couldn’t avert yet another failure in talks on reunifying Cyprus. The time ran out for the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, chaperoned by their motherlands' prime ministers, Wednesday night at midnight. The negotiators, meeting in Switzerland, couldn’t agree on the Annan Plan so carefully crafted to end the decades-long impasse that left the Mediterranean island split in half.

The plan is not dead, not quite yet. A referendum will be held in the Greek and Turkish sides of Cyprus, separately of course, on April 24. But the accord has little chance in the referendums--no matter that a settlement is in the best interests of all Cypriots, Greeks and Turks.

Hopes for this latest round of talks were raised by Cyprus's European aspirations. On May 1, the EU will admit the Republic of Cyprus---the Greek Cypriot side of the island---to full membership. Because the Republic does not control the Turkish Cypriot north, the latter will be excluded from the EU unless an agreement on reunification is reached beforehand.

The Annan scheme for a loose federation would go far to unite Cyprus for the first time since it was splintered in 1974 by a Greek coup against Cypriot President Makarios and subsequent Turkish military invasion. The plan is complex but generally fair. It stirred a shiver of hope because of high-level diplomacy, the lure of the EU, helpful leadership change in Turkey, and even the opening of the once-forbidding Green Line that separated the two communities.

But the plan now looks to be drawing its final breaths. It is the object of derision by Greek Cypriots, who view it as a capitulation to Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash's dogged pursuit of a separate state. According the opinion surveys, the referendum on the plan is certain to fail in the Greek south, possibly by a three to one margin, especially now that the Republic's leaders are rejecting it, too. The plan may also fall short in Mr. Denktash's phantom republic.

The give-and-take bargaining in Switzerland was undercut by the excessive demands of each side, too little giving and too much taking that provided many openings to those who are conditioned to say "no." One can blame the millennium-long animus between Greeks and Turks, and the violent history of the 1950s, '60s, and '70s, in which terrorism, ethnic cleansing, obstructionism and international intrigue beleaguered the two sides even before the momentous events of 1974. What is remarkable now is how neither can see their own interests clearly.

The Turkish north has much to gain by minimizing their demands and approving the plan. They could, in one glorious act, end years of international isolation and gain from the economic growth certain to come with reunification and EU membership. The Greek Cypriots, too, would benefit. Some of the island would return to their control, much of the property expropriated in 1974 would be returned or compensated, and the accursed Turkish troop presence would be radically reduced in size. Long-term interests would also be served: Ankara would score handsomely with European opinion, and would in effect gain a new foothold in Europe. The Greek Cypriots would be able to deal directly with Turkey on a range of key issues, not least the immigration influx from Turkey if and when it enters the EU. Cyprus’ prosperity makes it a magnet for Turkish migrant workers, and the Greek side is likely to be swamped with Turks later this century.  Athens would gain a predominantly Greek ally in Europe.

If everybody wins in the Annan Plan, then why is everybody so keen to subvert it? The short answer, and probably the most important lesson for diplomacy, is that the social conditions for rapprochement were never cultivated. There is little public demand for peace in Cyprus. Native Turkish Cypriots not benefiting from Denktash's patronage are the only large social group agitating for peace and reconciliation, and they did bring about a narrow victory for pro-plan candidates in elections last winter. But their popularity stumbles when it comes to security guarantees (Turkish troops) and EU norms on free flows of people. In the south, they are joined only by a handful---perhaps 20%---of Greek Cypriots. For 30 years, the prevalent ideology in Greek Cyprus has been a hunger to avenge the insult of the Turkish invasion. This hateful ideology is nourished by the state, the Greek Orthodox Church, the schools, the army and the news media. It derives from genuine grievances, but does not offer genuine solutions. In the north, the older generation of Turkish Cypriots remembers their gross mistreatment in the 1960s and cling to an ideology of safety-through-separation. They and the large contingent of Turkish immigrants from the mainland enable Mr. Denktash to play the role of spoiler he has perfected for so many years. On neither side has there been a serious and sustained effort to deconstruct and dissolve these ideologies.

The lesson for diplomacy is apparent. No matter how well intended or clever or supportive, outside negotiators like the U.N. cannot impose solutions if there isn't a social agreement, however inchoate, which supports the goal of resolving the conflict. There must be an authentic, native thirst for a settlement, which then can be parlayed by diplomats into a workable plan. Cyprus has the plan but not the thirst. Once this attempt at an accord collapses, and the recriminations abate, it will be time for all parties of good will to stimulate the desire to come to terms with the past as if the future mattered.

This article appeared in The Wall Street Journal Europe, April 2, 2004.

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