Consequences of the Invasion: 1974

    The United States Senate sent a team of investigators to Cyprus after the war, and the following is their report.  The language of the report is obviously sympathetic to the Greek Cypriot situation.  There is no context for the Turkish action, for example.  The chair of the subcommittee was Sen. Edward Kennedy, often an outspoken opponent of Kissinger and elected from a state, Massachusetts, with a large and influential Greek-American community.  Still, the report is filled with useful observations and statistics.  

There are today two stark realities on Cyprus. The first is the presence of an army of occupation---approximately 40,000 heavily armed Turkish troops. The second is the humanitarian crisis confronting over 282,000 Cypriots---nearly half the population of the island---who are now refugees, civilian detainees, prisoners of war, or others in need of humanitarian assistance, on both sides of the uncertain cease-fire line. Regrettably, there is too little understanding outside of Cyprus as to the consequences of the invasion and conditions in the field. To comprehend what has happened to Cyprus---and especially to appreciate how central the resolution of humanitarian issues is to a settlement of the Cyprus problem---it is important at the outset to review current refugee and related humanitarian problems on the island.

1. HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVASION

As Table 1 outlines, there are several categories of displaced per- sons and other people in need of help. The first, and by far the largest category, are the Greek Cypriot refugees in the Government controlled area of the south. Official statistics in the field estimate that at least 200,000 Greek Cypriots have been displaced from Turkish occupied areas. Some 30,000 of these people have found shelter with relatives or friends, and need a minimum of relief assistance. The remainder, how- ever, have needed shelter as well as general relief. In addition to these "semi-permanent" refugees, thousands of other Greek Cypriots, living in areas bordering the ceasefire line, have been temporarily displaced, because of actual Turkish troop movements in their area or the fear and threat of new military operations by Turkish forces.

To drive along the roads of southern Cyprus, is to drive through an endless refugee camp. In early September, refugees were encamped under trees, along the roadside, in cars, in open fields, under small lean-to huts made of pine branches and sticks, and in tents provided by International Relief agencies. Every available public building anc accommodation was filled with refugeesCschools, churches, monasteries, and civic buildings. District towns had been flooded with refugees, and with idle men swelling the unemployment rolls. Small towns and villages along the way had doubled or tripled in size.

The Larnaca district, around the British Sovereign Base Area of Dhekelia, was overwhelmed by refugees, mostly from Famagusta. A typical situation was that of Ormidhia town, whose population had jumped by some 300%. Refugee families were scattered everywhere, and relief supplies were just beginning to arriveùover two weeks after many of the refugees first moved. An empty soccer field was being turned into a refugee city of tentsùcamping tents for six people, now holding one or two families with as many as 14 men, women and children huddled together.

Reflecting the fluidity of the refugee movement, and the serious lack of shelter and relief supplies in many areas of Larnaca district, a substantial number of the refugees were moving westward to the Limassol district. In early September, the Limassol District Officer estimated that some 1,200 refugees were arriving daily in and around Limassol city. And, because of a lack of adequate shelter and the approaching winter cold, thousands of refugees who had fled to the Troodos mountains from Northwest Cyprus, were heading for greater Nicosia and other populated areas.

The critical problems of the Greek Cypriot refugees are all the classic problems which confront refugees everywhere---the need for shelter, blankets, food, medicine, and other necessities of life. In Cyprus, all are still in short supply, and in some areas many are unavailable. In particular, there was, and remains, a desperate need for blankets. Despite the arrival of thousands of blankets in September, there was clear evidence of the need for more. In the town of Xylophaghou, for example, the school was crowded with refugee families who were forced to sleep on cold, concrete floors. Food supplies were rapidly dwindling, but a Government sponsored food distribution and rationing program was getting underway. Starting with a daily distribution of bread, relief officials were hoping to expand the ration pro- gram to include protein foods, milk, and other supplies, if---and it was a big "if"---relief supplies from abroad arrived on schedule before government stocks were depleted.

During the Study Mission's visit to the Dhekelia area, the Turkish army undertook what United Nations officials later described as "armed reconnaissance in force" along the ceasefire line above Athna. This type of military action or its threat, which occurred regularly in August and September---and variously described as Turkish "land grabs" or "salami tactics"---produced thousands of new refugees or temporarily displaced persons. Like the thousands before them, they fled for safety out of fear of the Turkish army.

Whether real or imagined---and it is probably real---the fear of what the Turkish military might do is widespread. Whenever and wherever the Study Mission talked with Greek Cypriot refugees, the story was basically the same: People moved the instant they saw or thought the Turkish army was advancing towards their town or village. And they moved instantly---dropping everything, taking very little with them, and by foot, car, tractor, truck, bus, or wagon, moved to safety in Government controlled areas. The stories of rough and sometimes brutal treatment of civilians by Turkish forces in Kyrenia, after the first phase of the invasion, had spread over the island like wildfire. Thus, during the second phase of the invasion, Greek Cypriots fled the moment there was rumor or sight of military force---creating a virtual vacuum into which the Turkish army could and did move without resistance and without the presence of people.

The Study Mission saw direct evidence of this the day it visited the Athna forest, bordering the British Base Area at Dhekelia. Cars and trucks were moving down the road from Athna town, loaded with people and with whatever they could carry---clothes, baskets, mat- tresses, a few pots and pans---and heading for the safety of the British Base and the shelter of the trees. But conditions were miserable---hot, dusty, no tents, few blankets, no water, little sanitation, and a meager amount of food distributed by the British. Yet the refugees continued to come that day---by the hundreds. The night before the fall of Famagusta, some 8,000 refugees came into the forest area, and in the days that followed some 7,000 more arrived. It was, for many, a first stop before moving onward, but over 9,000 refugees were still encamped last month under the trees. Before long, the winter cold and rains will come, and a major question for the refugees is whether tents will arrive in time, or other shelter will be found.

Another category of refugees and persons in duress are the Turkish Cypriots in Government controlled areas---a total of some 34,000. Approximately 10,000 are refugees at Episkopi (on the Akrotiri British Base), where camps have been established under the auspices of the ICRC and the UNHCR. In almost every way, the plight and the needs of these refugees are identical to that of their Greek Cypriot counterparts. In addition, about 24,000 Turkish Cypriots are cut-off or isolated---either by choice or by circumstance---in Turkish villages or in the Turkish quarter of larger towns in the south. These beleaguered villages are under the observation and protection of "United Nations Forces in Cyprus, and are also receiving relief assistance under inter- national auspices.

The Study Mission visited one mixed village, Kalokhorio, where the Turkish quarter has not been disturbed---having hoisted a white flag above the mosque as a signal of the lack of hostile intentions. There was no indication of any harm being done to these Turkish Cypriots. However, there can be no question that other Turkish villages are, and do, feel beleaguered and isolated. International observers indicated that physical conditions in these cut-off villages and towns are not as bad as suggested by the Turkish Cypriot administration in Nicosia. As one United Nations official, who has been on the island for many months, stated: "Objectively nothing has changed in these Turkish villages, except the fear that something has changed." But in the context of the violence and random mass killings that have occurred on the island since the fighting broke out, the apprehension that conditions may change for the worse does not reassure Cypriots huddled in enclaves, on whatever side of the ceasefire line they find themselves at the moment.

The last categories of refugees and persons in need are those in the Turkish occupied areas. These people include some 8,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees, and an estimated 20,000 Greek Cypriots displaced or cutoff. The Turkish Cypriot refugees are those reportedly displaced during the fighting, such as around the old city of Famagusta, and those who have fled from the south to the north. In September, some of these refugees were in schools in the Turkish sector of Nicosia. They appeared to be in good condition, with no overcrowding, and adequate relief assistance from the Turkish Cypriot Red Crescent Society.

However, the refugees the Turks most often mention are not those from the current conflict, but rather those from the 1963 intercommunal violence, when some 25,000 Turkish Cypriots were displaced. One deserted and run down area bordering Nicosia, called Ormorphita, remains a symbol of the neglect the Turks feel the Greek Cypriots and others paid to their needs 11 years ago. The sense of Turkish Cypriot grievance is real and runs deep. As Vice President Denktash told the Study Mission, "the many drops of Greek injustice to the Turkish minority has, over the years, filled the ocean in which we are all now drowning." And to many officials of the Turkish Cypriot community, the current suffering of the Greek Cypriots, although quantitatively far greater, is in principle the same as that suffered in the past by the Turkish Cypriots. As one official phrased it "the refugee problem is not the numbers involved, it's the principle." And, given what they feel has been world indifference to suffering among Turkish Cypriots, they only grudgingly recognize the current plight of Greek Cypriots and say they do not understand the current international concern over these victims of the Turkish "peace operation" in Cyprus.

The second type of refugee problem in the Turkish occupied areas is that of some 20,000 Greek Cypriots isolated in such places as Kyrenia and Bellapais, and in several villages cutoff in the so-called panhandle area of Karpasia. In Kyrenia, about 450 Greeks are still being cruelly detained by Turkish authorities in the waterfront Dome Hotel. They had been rounded up from their nearby homes by the Turkish military during the early stages of the invasion, or had fled on their own to the hotel in search of safety.

Bellapais, a small village of some 400 Greek Cypriots and in normal times a favorite tourist spot, has now become a virtual prison for the local population as well as some 450 Greek Cypriot refugees who are also-held within the confines of the village. At the peak of the fighting during the first phase of the Turkish invasion, well over 2,000 refugees fled to the sanctuary of this small village. But after the Turkish military occupied the village, cordoning it off, most were forcibly moved across the Green Line in Nicosia. The Turkish army also rounded-up the male population, taking some 150 men to destinations unknown. At the time of the Study Mission's visit, the families of these men still had no word as to their fateCwhether they were in prisons or dead.

The situation in Bellapais had improved from the worst days of over-crowding and panic. But although the number of refugees in the village had decreased, the conditions had become more desperate physically as well as psychologically, as the days of uncertainty and confinement press on. Only minimal food was being provided through the Red Cross. And, contrary to the official Turkish line that there are only local people in Bellapais staying in their homes, there were at least 450 refugees cut-off and separated from their families, and told by Turkish authorities that "reunification of families is not sufficient grounds for permission to move."

In the abandoned city of Famagusta, with the old Turkish quarter of the city sealed off by the Turkish army, no life stirs on the empty streets, which were once home for over 40,000 people. The only population left behind are an undetermined number of old people---old men and women, hiding in their homes, some too feeble or ill to move, others afraid to come out in sight of the Turkish army. The Swedish contingent of UNFICYP located in the new city area, has reported sighting a number of old people scavenging for food and supplies in the darkness of night.

In Famagusta. as elsewhere, Turkish authorities said they have attempted to search abandoned areas in order to find elderly Greek Cypriots who have stayed behind. They indicated that whenever these old people were found and were unable to care or provide for themselves---as was generally the case---they were then handed over to representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross to be reunited with their families in refugee areas in the Government- controlled zone. While visiting Famagusta, the Study Mission witnessed such a round-up of old people, observing six or seven old men and women, huddled together in the back of a guarded Turkish army truck, with troops at fixed bayonet, hauling a group of old people from their homes---a scene tragically reminiscent of pictures from Germany in 1939.

As noted earlier, the Study Mission was not able to arrange a visit to Karpasia, and United Nations officials have had only very limited access to the area. Reports suggest, however, that the Greeks remain- ing in Karpasia are in increasingly desperate straits. They are, in fact, prisoners of the Turkish Army. They are confined to their villages or are being detained in churches and other civic buildings. The younger men have been taken away. Food, medicine and other materials are in short supply. And international relief is generally denied by the Turkish authorities.

Until outside observers and relief officials are able to freely deliver relief supplies and to have unrestricted access to refugees in the Turkish occupied areas, the world will not know the full tragedy of Cyprus, nor will international relief agencies be able to provide all the help they can. And until the Turkish policy of isolating inhabitants of Karpasia ends, the world must assume the Turkish authorities have something to hide. This policy contrasts sharply with the free access enioyed by the United Nations and the Red Cross throughout the Government controlled area in the south.

Finally, there is the humanitarian problem of releasing prisoners of war and civilian detainees---some 6,000 on both sides. Considerable and very encouraging progress has been made in this area, resulting from the recent talks, under U.N. auspices, between President Clerides and Vice-President Denktash. Two prisoner exchanges have been made, and more are promised in the coming weeks.

2. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVASION

It is exceptionally difficult to quantify the full extent of the damage and destruction caused by the conflict, nor all the ramifications the invasion has had, and will have, on the economy. But, for a state as small as Cyprus, there can be no doubt that it has been catastrophic.

Regarding the extent of physical destruction, the evidence suggests that minimal bomb or structural damage occurred---with the exception of areas in and around the Kyrenia-Nicosia enclave, which was the site of the original Turkish landing and the staging ground for phase two of the invasion. Considerable looting has occurred in many areas. Kyrenia city, for example, has been looted beyond description, and in driving across the island to Famagusta, there is wide-spread evidence of looting of Greek Cypriot villages along the road. In fact, the Study Mission observed two military trucks and a lorry loaded with miscellaneous pieces of furniture heading for some unknown destination down the road from Famagusta.

The new city of Famagusta---the "Miami Beach" area known as Varosha---is the major exception to the problem of looting. As of early September, evident care had been taken by Turkish military commanders to seal this area off from all potential looters. It was relatively untouched. However, it symbolizes what has happened to the economy of Cyprus. This once bustling city, a key element in the island's tourist industry, is now a ghost town. Standing on the empty main street---AJohn F. Kennedy Blvd."---amid high-rise hotels and apartments and expensive shops, one can see only a few stray dogs and cats, and a lonely contingent of Swedish U.N. troops. The Greek population had fled.

Since the Turkish invasion, the Government of Cyprus estimates that the country is losing some $4.5 million in economic production every day. The vast citrus industry in the Morphou area rots on the trees. The wheat fields, which should have been planted, lie fallow. Unknown numbers of livestock and cattle are dead because of the lack of food and water. The mines and light industry lie idle. And not a single tourist remains on the island. It will not be too many months before the foreign exchange crisis becomes critical---a fact that has only been delayed temporarily by the action of Greece in providing some direct financial support to the Government of Cyprus. There can be little doubt today that the damage to the economy of Cyprus will only serve to heighten the plight of the people, and make the life of the refugees all the more precarious. With each passing day the economic situation worsens, as will the condition of the refugees, if something more is not done soon.

3. POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVASION

There can be little doubt today that the Turkish invasion succeeded in altering the political situation on Cyprus. Indeed, it is generally accepted that the invasion has destroyed the constitutional framework and political structure of the Government of Cyprus, as it was established in 1960, and there can be no turning back the clock. The future of Cyprus will be a future governed by a new and different governmental and political structure. The precise form of this new structure will be a primary focus of negotiations in the days and weeks ahead. There are currently a number of options and arrangements being discussed in Nicosia, Athens, Ankara, and other capitals. Most frequently mentioned, particularly in Ankara and Washington, is some form of Federal system involving territorial separation of the two communities on the island---of geographic separation between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, in order to create a Turkish majority area on Cyprus. By whatever name it is called, this is tantamount to partition, and it will mean traumatic shifts in the current economic and population patterns of the island.

To an outside observer, it may seem possible, even easy, to work out some new "bi-regional", "zonal", or "federal" arrangement on Cyprus. It may seem today only a question of where the line should be drawn. But the central question is whether any Greek Cypriot government can be found that would accept a settlement imposed by the force of arms, and predicated on the non-return of two out of five of the Greek Cypriot refugees. If that kind of "solution" is forced upon the Greek Cypriots, there can be little question that they will resist it, perhaps with violence and guerrilla war---with all that that implies for the future peace and stability of the Eastern Mediterranean. The very likely outcome, then, would probably be de facto partition in its extreme form---in effect, double enosis. With a political, or at the very minimum, administrative and economic union of the two separate parts of Cyprus with Greece and Turkey, Cyprus would cease to exist.

Turkey insists that this is not the outcome it seeks, even as the Greek Cypriots insist that it is an outcome they cannot accept. In the middle lies a solution. Where that is today, much less tomorrow, is for all parties to negotiate.

The Greek Cypriot position, supported by Greece, is that before negotiations can resume, there must be some gesture, on Turkey's part, to accommodate Greek Cypriot demands to have a substantial number of refugees return home. Greek Cypriot spokesmen have indicated privately and publicly that the Government of Cyprus will be flexible in negotiations---that it is prepared to accept new constitutional arrangements, including perhaps some form of "cantonal" system granting Turkish Cypriots full communal security and autonomy. But Greek Cypriots insist that progress must be made at the very outset on the return of refugees to their homes.

The Turkish Cypriot position, as well as Ankara's, emphasizes that speedy progress on a political solution involving biregionalism would enable both sides to address the refugee problem on a permanent basis. Their spokesmen emphasize the past failures and long-standing grievances of the Turkish Cypriots, and speak of new realities on Cyprus. They stress that Turkey does not seek partition, either political or economic, and that they wish to preserve the independence of the island. Precisely how these contrary objectives can be accommodated is the large unanswered question.

4. IMPACT OF PARTITION

If Whatever name or label is used to describe partition in Cyprus---whether it is called "bi-regionalism," "geographic federalism," "consolidated cantonments," or "double enosis"---the reality of any partition on an island the size of Cyprus is that there will inevitably be serious human and economic consequences.

The partition line most frequently envisaged in discussions on Cyprus, particularly within the Turkish community, relates to the so-called "Attila line." This line was first proposed by the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber in 1964, and was raised again this past July by Turkey during the Geneva talks. As the accompanying map indicates, the Attila line runs from Kokkino in the northwest, via Xerarkaka, south of Lefka, Akaki, through Nicosia, east through Angastina and Prestio, to Famagusta. The area north of this line is approximately 1,170 square miles, comprising roughly one-third of the territory of Cyprus. Currently, the Turkish Army occupies land considerably beyond the Attila line.

But no matter where a line is finally drawn, any artificial division of the island will bring immense economic problems as well as massive population dislocation---the general character of which can only be imagined after an analysis of important economic and population factors. The following information was obtained from official sources in the field, and serves to document some of the population and economic factors related to partition in Cyprus.

Drastic changes in the population patterns of Cyprus would come with partition---changes every bit as serious and disruptive as those which have already come with the Turkish military invasion, which has, in effect, turned the island upside down. Most severely affected of course, is the Greek Cypriot community, which comprises some 78% of the population.

A partition along the Attila line, which would require a significant segregation of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots into separate areas---and which seeks to assure a Turkish majority in their area---would mean moving nearly half the total population and resettling them elsewhere on a permanent basis. Based on 1972 population estimates, this would amount to moving some 51,800 Turks (44.6% of the total Turkish Cypriot population) from scattered areas around the island into the northern zone. In turn, this would require moving out of that northern area at least 147,500 Greek Cypriots (or some 29.3% of the total Greek Cypriot population), who, until the invasion lived there.

Official estimates indicate that such a shift could involve as many as 40,000 families, and it would significantly alter the population density in each of the two ethnic areas. According to Cyprus Government estimates, this would reduce the density of population in Turkish areas by half---from 185 to only 76.9 persons per square mile. Yet, at the same time, it would force the population density in the Greek area to jump from 181 to 202.6 persons per square mile.

In short, if partition in Cyprus is to mean significant segregation between Greek and Turkish Cypriote, and if it also means the Turks are to have a majority in their area, as Turkey now seems to demand, it would require a drastic rearrangement of existing population patterns---rearrangement that cannot help but be painful, and probably inequitable, to the Greek Cypriots. An example is the city of Morphou, which falls above the Attila line, and which seems clearly within the Turkish area from the Turkish point of view. If Morphou were made to become a Turkish majority area, well over half of 95% of the city's current population would have to leave their homes. In Kyrenia, 30% to 60% of the population would have to leave and be replaced by Turks.

The impact upon land ownership would be no less severe, and would obviously be a major stumbling block in any partition plan. It would require compensation for Greek privately owned land in the northern areas of Cyprus, as well as extensive land exchange programs between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Because the Greeks own more land in the north than the Turkish Cypriots do in the south, land exchange would obviously be complicated no matter whose statistics one uses on current land ownership. The Government of Cyprus claims the 1960 Census shows some 20.4% of the total agricultural land in Turkish hands, while the Turkish Communal Chamber says arable Turkish land is 30%.

The discrepancy may not seem great in terms of total land tenure, but when the critical differences of land location, its level of development, and its crop, are added to land distribution patterns, exchanging land on an equitable basis would be difficult, if not impossible---regardless of what the actual total of land may be respective to the two communities.

Being a relatively small island, the economy of Cyprus is necessarily homogeneous and, even as it has prospered and grown remarkably over the past decade, it remains a fragile and developing economic system. Partition of this totally integrated economy would have disastrous consequences, and to partition it in an equitable fashion would try the wisdom of Solomon - - because it works, prospers, and grows only as a whole.

If the Attila line forms the basis of partition, it would include many of the principal foreign exchange earning portions of the economy on the Turkish side. It would include the copper mining region in the Morphou Bay area, the whole of the highly-developed agricultural Morphou plain (including the mostly Greek citrus industry), all of the perennial springs in the Kyrenia mountain range, most of the irrigated plain of the eastern Mesaoria, large areas of citrus groves in the Serrakhis river valley, large forest areas in the Kyrenia region (although two thirds were burned during the invasion), many of the best tourist resorts, and portions of Famagusta, including the largest port facilities on the island. In comparison, the Greek controlled area, although retaining a sizeable portion of the fertile Mesaorian plain, would contain a high proportion of uncultivable mountainous and forested terrain (the Troodos Mountain area), and undeveloped land.

Agriculture. Because Cyprus is basically an agricultural country, with approximately 47% of the land cultivated and well over half of the population engaged in some form of agriculture, partition would inevitably have a severe impact upon its agricultural sector.

For example, the fertile Mesaorian plain, the breadbasket of Cyprus, contains the bulk of the island's cultivable lands. Its principal crops are wheat, barley, vegetables, and citrus fruits. Extensive irrigation in the area is required during the summer dry season, and this has been developed over the past decade. If this plain is partitioned along the Attila line, it would place within Turkish control some 37% of all croplands, and provide the Turkish Cypriot community with more than half of the valuable irrigated crop land, and over half of the wheat cultivated areas - - to feed less than a quarter of the island's population.

The Morphou plain would also fall in the Turkish area, and as a result Turkish Cypriots would control two thirds of the best citrus growing region of Cyprus. These include the orange and grapefruit groves in the Famagusta and Morphou areas, and the lemon orchards near Karavas and Lapithos in Kyrenia. Citrus fruits represent the most important export of the island, valued at some $17.3 million in 1970 according to Cyprus Government statistics.

Turkish controlled areas would also have the second best potato growing region of Cyprus, along the Nicosia-Morphou road, as well as approximately half of the carob and olive producing areas. The value of potato exports, mostly to England, was almost $16 million in 1970. A breakdown of what partition of the Mesaoria plain would do to cultivation of cropland, is outlined in Table 3, based upon data from a 1956 British land utilization map and from a 1967 Government of Cyprus directory on Commerce.

Tourism. In recent years, tourism has grown as a significant foreign exchange earner for Cyprus, and it has almost been exclusively Greek Cypriot investments and management that have made it possible. Partition of the island, especially if Famagusta is divided differently than it is now. would also cut the tourism business in half.

The Greek controlled areas would retain many of the tourist and ski attractions in the western part of the island and in the Troodos mountains. But the tourist trade concentrated in the Kyrenia and northern coastal resorts would fall into Turkish hands. Loss of Kyrenia would be especially hard for Greek Cypriots, largely because of its flourishing, Greek-owned hotel business. In 1970) Kyrenia and Famagusta (now both in the Turkish occupied area), and Nicosia, together accounted for 82% of the tourist accommodations and are clearly the most significant aspects of the foreign exchange earnings of tourism.

Forestry. Although the timber resources of Cyprus provide less than 30% of its timber requirements, the forests represent a key resource in the island's economy. Partition would mean that the northern area, which contains some 197 square miles of timber, or about 29% of all state and privately owned forest land, would be in Turkish hands. Roughly one-third of the island's timber output would be reserved for less than a quarter of the population.

Mining. The Turkish occupation of the Morphou Bay area brings within its control the U.S.-owned Cyprus Mines Corporation, the island's largest copper producing company and another significant foreign exchange earner. According to information in Nicosia, this copper mine's output in 1970 totaled some 18,000 metric tons, a substantial drop from the peak years of the 1960's, and it would, officials say, decline further unless there are new investments of capital equipment. All other mining areas would remain in Greek held territory.

Industry. Officials indicate that this branch of the economy would be least affected by partition, largely because there is little heavy industry on the island aside from the mines. Light industry is largely concentrated around Nicosia, and the southern port cities, and remain in Greek controlled areas. The significant winery industry, almost wholly Greek-owned, is in the Limassol areas and would be in Greek areas under a partition plan.

5. THE HAZARDS OF ECONOMIC PARTITION

Over the past decade, the economy of Cyprus has grown at a remark- able rate, and it has become one of the most dependable members of the International Monetary Fund, and one of the highest rated recipients of United Nations Development Program funds. Indeed, Cyprus has prospered and has developed economically at a far better rate than its neighbors, including Turkey and even Greece. It has one of the highest per capita incomes in the Eastern Mediterranean - - nearly three times that of Turkey.

However, this prosperity and economic performance has been based upon the integrated economy of the whole island. What political partition would mean in economic terms is anyone's guess - - even if the intention is not, as Turkey says it is not, to divide the island's economy. But how a political partition line can be drawn without also dividing or disrupting the economy of the island, is clearly one of the most troubling questions confronting negotiations over the fate of Cyprus.

The results of the Turkish invasion have already, in less than three months, wrecked havoc with the economy of Cyprus. As already noted, the losses from physical damage and dislocation, caused by the military activity since July, have already run into the millions. But as serious as the economic effects of Turkish occupation have been to date, consequences of partition may be even more damaging. Every indicator suggests that Cyprus could not easily recover economically from a permanent political partition - - certainly not in the near future, and perhaps not for many years to come.

6. COSTS OF THE INVASION TO TURKEY

Whatever sense of national fulfillment and political triumph Turkey may feel over its action on Cyprus, it clearly has come at considerable cost. According to the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, the invasion and occupation of Cyprus adds heavily to the already substantial problems of Turkey---of a 35% inflation rate, an unofficial unemployment rate of 20%, and a potential reduction of foreign exchange earnings from remittances of a declining number of Turkish migrant workers in Western Europe. Now the costs of the Cyprus occupation are added, which, according to official estimates in the field, will total some $1 billion by the end of this year.

Nearly 10% of Turkey's military force is now stationed on Cyprus, and there have been heavy logistical and support requirements. Civilian "technicians" and others have also gone to the island. Moreover, there were considerable losses during the invasion. According to responsible military sources in the field, the performance of Turkey's armed forces during the first phase of the invasion was very poor. Although Turkey apparently employed a basic plan its general staff had drafted and perfected over a period of several years, military observers say there was poor operational planning, inadequate communications, and a near total failure of joint operations among Turkish air, sea, and ground forces.

As a result, through tactical errors Turkey lost an estimated 15 aircraft during the invasion. It sank one of its own destroyers. Casualties were considered light, but included some 300 men killed and another 500 wounded. Had there been any substantial Greek Cypriot forces and tanks in the northern part of the island, casualties undoubtedly would have been considerably higher. One military observer suggested, for example, that because the Turkish airborne assault came at too high an altitude, a better organized and equipped Greek Cypriot army could have easily eliminated an entire Turkish airborne regiment swinging helplessly in the air.

Currently stationed on the island are some 40,000 main force Turkish troops, with more than 200 tanks. There are some naval vessels around the island, but the presence of aircraft is limited until airstrips can be improved and extended.

Recent field reports suggest that Turkey is digging in to stay on Cyprus. Unconfirmed reports indicate that the Turkish army has already erected barriers along the ceasefire line, and has established extensive fortifications across the island. And as a "Berlin wall" divides Cyprus, Turkish currency, laborers, equipment and goods pour in from the mainland to fill the vacuum created by the isolation of the north from the island's economy.

From the report, ACrisis on Cyprus,@ A Study Mission Report prepared for use of the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 93^rd Congress, 2^nd session, October 14, 1974.

U.N. Report on the Refugee Situation in 1999