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Coup D'état: July 1974
The trigger to all the trauma of the summer of 1974 was pulled on July 15,
when the Grivas circle of militants and Greek officers in Cyprus acted to murder
President Makarios and install a regime led by the EOKA veteran Nicos Sampson.
The coup had profound political consequences for the island, of course, but it
also reverberated through Cypriot society in manifold ways. Here, British
anthropologist Peter Loizos describes what occurred during the coup in the
village he studied for many years, Argaki.
Early on that same morning when people in Argaki, and all over Cyprus, turned
on their radios, they heard martial music, followed by an announcement that
President Makarios was dead, that a 'revolution' was under way, that the
military were in command and that a curfew had been imposed. For some, a small
minority of EOKA B activists; this meant that five years of intermittent
insurrection were about to be rewarded.
For the men of the coup, the first crucial act was to make sure that the
socialist militants, and other core followers of Makarios, were arrested or, at
the very least, disarmed. So, the orders of the day were the curfew, road
blocks, and the arrest of potential resisters for interrogation. If the Argaki
pattern was typical, one of the ground-rules seems to have been that arrests and
searches in one village were made by EOKA B men from neighbouring villages, of
whom, in the case of Argaki, Philia and Masari were the prominent ones.
Meanwhile, key Argaki EOKA B supporters were making arrests in other
villages.
The communists and socialists had been caught offguard - that, after all, is
axiomatic of a coup d'etat. One of the communist leaders in Argaki received a
phone call from Polyviou, a member of an armed group supporting Makarios, who
said, 'Bring the leftists down to Morphou, so we can demonstrate.' He thought
for a bit, but since he had received no order from the party, he refused.
Although individual communists seem to have fought alongside other Makarios
supporters, the party did not appear to have mounted any mass resistance. To
start with, they had no guns, whereas the socialist militants had some,
apparently as part of a semi-official agreement with Makarios under which many
of them had enrolled as special constables. The Argaki socialist group had some
machine-guns but as we shall shortly see they did not manage to use them.
We must infer that those first days were marked by great tension and anxiety,
each political activist maintaining a restless surveillance of certain others,
to ascertain if enemies were about to make hostile moves, and if it were to be a
time of killing. The villagers soon saw who favoured the coup from the way they
behaved. Some started openly carrying machine-guns 'to support the new
government' or publicly expressed their satisfaction with the way things had
turned out by what they said in the coffee shops. EOKA B supporters made
themselves available to the army for the task of rounding up possible opponents
and disarming them. Some men, including at least one who had married into the
village, went to enroll as policeman, to replace those police whom Sampson's
henchmen were dismissing or would dismiss. But, as we shall see, there were also
certain important gestures, acts of communication across party lines, which
played their own small part in shaping the reactions of Argaki people, although
they were powerless to influence events in the larger arena.
One of the keenest EOKA B supporters in Argaki was a man called Kajis (a
pseudonym) who in his youth had been mixed up in a gang war which had arisen
when certain men near Limassol had invented a Cypriot variant of the Mafia's
protection racket. In 1968 Kajis had boasted to me that a few years earlier,
when Greek and Turkish irregulars had been fighting, he had shot a Turkish
shepherd; he spoke as proudly of this as an English schoolboy might have done
about scoring a goal in an 'away' match. In recent years, he had been
passionately in favour of the Greek junta and Enosis. His close friend Gigas had
been murdered in 1963 and the suspect acquitted, which had probably pushed Kajis
further into his oppositional outlook.
As spring turned to summer in 1974, Kajis knew that the coup was about to
happen, and was given orders to stand by. But he did not know the precise date,
until 15 July:
Monday I was sleeping, and a fellow came and said 'Get up - the
Revolution is on.= I got up, took
the car and went to the cache. Out came the automatics. I'd got six machine
guns, and I put them in the car and drove off to the coffee shop, leaving
the guns in the car outside. We waited and listened to the radio, different
stations. I heard Makarios was dead, so I went off to Morphou. That
afternoon, when Sampson had been sworn in, I went straight off to Nicosia. I
embraced Sampson, took some weapons, fifteen new ones, put them in the car
and went on duty under our senior man at Morphou. I took a police car and
some of our lads to Morphou, and we were given orders to start arresting
people. We were to co-operate with the army, which had taken command in
Morphou, to arrest the supporters of Lyssarides [the socialist leader]. Just
them, not the communists. To pick up anyone with weapons, whoever we knew
about, and anyone we suspected had guns, and bring them in. An order
came to arrest some people from Argaki, and I said to them, 'You must not
take any of the Argaki people, OK? OK!' We followers of Grivas, the men who
wanted Union, the EOKA B men. we knew where everyone stood. This one
is left-wing; so-and-so is with Makarios: that one's with Azinas, a
nationalist. We had a file on everyone and the goods on everyone. We had it
all written down, which groupings people were with and whether they had guns
or not.
In the week following the coup. Kajis came into his own, and the way he
described the events made this clear. He was from a family which had once been
wealthy, but his father, a figure of ridicule in the village, had squandered a
fortune. Kajis may have never enjoyed as much power and importance as he did for
the six days of the coup. There are two themes in his account, just below the
surface. One is the banality of having overthrown the legal government of the
republic, revealed in his casual throw-away 'all in a day's work' delivery. The
other is his wish to be seen as a man who was ready to get his fellow-villagers
out of any political trouble.
This was further demonstrated by Kajis' account of how. during the first days
of the coup, he went drinking with two 'best men' from his wedding. One of them,
my cousin Tomas, was a communist. . . The other, Andrikos; had once been in the
original EOKA and was a former drinking-companion of Sampson, although in recent
years he had taken a government post, and had stopped murmuring against the
establishment. Yet it is only superficially surprising that these two men would
sit drinking with Kajis, even so soon after the coup. Their parties were
formally opposed, but it had been long the practice in Argaki for friendships to
be maintained across such obstacles, and for drinking together, in public, to be
a way of expressing this intention. The act was a piece of political ceremonial,
which communicated the belief that village friendships could override and
outlast national antagonisms; this prob- ably helped reduce tension and anxiety
on all sides.
At this meeting Andrikos asked Kajis to take him to see Sampson. Kajis
replied that he knew what Andrikos wanted - the release of a man called Pipis, a
socialist sympathiser who had been arrested because of a personal quarrel with
an EOKA B supporter in his office. He was not regarded as a man likely to bear
arms. Pipis was a first cousin of Tomas, and married to Andrikos' sister. He was
also a godsibling of Kajis=. Kajis
assured the other two men that he would get Pipis released. I was able to
confirm that Pipis was arrested, and released after a few hours, but cannot be
sure how great a role Kajis played in this. He had every motive to do his best,
given the strength of the relevant relationships; but he also had every reason
to tell me a story which put him in a very good light, in the hope that it might
get back to the men involved, who might then help him in his hour of need.
Kajis had his own version of 'professional ethics', which emerged in another
episode. He claimed to have intervened on behalf of a pro-government militant
called Christos (a pseudonym) who was being held in the Morphou army camp, and
who had once protected him from arrest by the special reserves. This man was
thought to be the head of a small armed group, and he himself told me that when
he was arrested and marched through the streets of Morphou some of the EOKA B
supporters were delighted to have caught a 'big fish'. Kajis continued:
As I came back to the Morphou camp with a load of guns, Christos called
out to me: 'Hey, koumpare, I handed out guns to some people, and I'll give
you a piece of paper with all their names on, and you go and get them.'
'Right, koumpare, I said to him, 'You know we're friends. I'm not forcing
you. You can't say I forced you. You're giving me this paper off your own
bat, right? Then I'll go and pick the guns up.' He gave me this little scrap
of paper with nine names on it. Anyway, off we went and arrested all nine of
them. Eight of the nine handed over the guns straightaway, and so we didn't
take them in. If you handed over, you didn't have to go inside. Some Czech
automatics and two Martinis. One man had nothing. Said he was in Christos'
group but hadn't been given a gun. 'But look, we've got your name down here,
written down. Now you'll be for it. Right, it's inside for you.' He got
knocked about a bit, I dunno, there was a bit of blood running, we put him
in the car and took him inside. I'd got this police Landrover, and he was
inside when we got back to the camp. Christos called out to me. 'Hey,
koumpare', he called, 1 didn't give Andreas a gun, I forgot to tell you. I
wrote it down but I never took him one.' I said to him, 'Lucky you told me,
he'd have got hurt when he went inside. There'd have been consequences. You
telling me you'd given him one and him saying he hadn't. He'd have been
hurt.'
The point of his recounting this episode was undoubtedly to show that he felt
that innocent men should not be beaten up, even in a military coup; there was
even a note of apology for the amount of rough treatment Kajis himself had
handed this particular man 'in ignorance'. Kajis continued:
The thing that surprised me was about Gallos [a pseudonym] from our
village. I had no idea he was in a group, getting mixed up in secret
organisations. But the list said that fifteen days before the coup he'd been
seen in Platres, at the house of the socialist leader, Lyssarides. Really
strange. I said to a friend, 'We said we wouldn't pick up anyone from Argaki.
so I'd better go and get him by myself.' I went to the village and found
Gallos sitting in the coffee shop. 'Come over here, brother-in-law~ I said
to him. Some of his relatives were there. I said to them, 'I'm taking him
somewhere and then I'll bring him back again. Don't give it a moment's
thought.' We got in the car and set off.
'Well, brother-in-law, I never thought you'd be the sort of man to join
Lyssarides' group.' 'You know how it is', he said, 'Crystallos Tirkas kept
going on at me [to join the socialists], and me, well, I'm not really with
them. Bring me a piece of paper and I'll sign it, sign that I'm with Grivas.'
I said to him, 'We don't want you to do that, we simply want you to be a
fighter for Greece and Enosis. Look here, you've got a gun, give it to me.
and you won't have to go inside. I'll take you to your house, and that'll be
the end of it. Nothing will happen to you. We don't knock people about. We
just want to get in the illegal weapons so that the army can ta~e them over.
Your group leader told me he'd given you a gun.' He started crying.
'Brother-in-law, he didn't give me one. Crystallos had six guns and he
showed us how they work, but he hung on to them. I never saw a gun again,
and never laid a finger on one.' I took him inside, but of course nothing
happened to him. I took him and showed him to the captain. 'He didn't have
anything'. I told him. 'He's with us'; I said, and I sent him back to the
village.
Kajis also told me of another attempt he had .made to get an Argaki man
released, his old drinking-companion Patroklos, who had reputedly joined the
pro-Makarios forces as an undercover special constable, and was therefore a
sworn enemy of EOKA B. Kajis went to the central prison where Patroklos had been
detained, but found it under the charge of a mainland Greek officer whom he
didn't know, and who absolutely refused to release the prisoner. Kajis tried
very hard to persuade the officer that he himself had enrolled Patroklos in EOKA
B as a double agent, so that he really should be released. But he got nowhere
with this argument, which was in any case quite untrue. Kajis said he ran the
risk of being shot for his efforts, and he was anxious for it to be known how
hard he had tried, for later Patroklos, who was released through the agency of
another EOKA man, complained that Kajis hadn't really bothered himself, and had
failed to reciprocate past favours, which was a very serious charge in the moral
economy of the village.
If Kajis' account of these attempts to protect his Argaki friends is to be
believed, it reveals him as amateurish in his failure to see that the
bush-league subversive game that he and his EOKA B friends had been playing in
the Morphou region was transferred by the coup to a metropolitan stadium. The
men now making and enforcing the rules were ultra-serious, ultra-conservative
professional army officers, from Greece. They were not prepared to make special
exceptions for local drinking-companions. The game was now a deadly one, and its
name was civil war. Much later, an Argaki teacher sympathetic to the EOKA B
militants explained his subsequent disillusion with the anarchic conduct of this
period, which included assaults, robberies, and attacks on Turkish property. In
a proper coup none of this would have happened. In Greece in 1967, no one lost a
copper coin.' A 'proper' coup . . .
For a few villagers, perhaps 100 out of the 1,500, the coup was a 'joyous
day', the start of a 'revolution', the end of a 'tyranny'. One can only reflect
how words can be twisted into many gnarled shapes. Most villagers did not share
these reactions to the coup, and felt deep hostility to it, but although a few
were to find themselves caught up in resistance, most did not. The curfew
confined them to their houses, and although battles took place at points of
strategic importance in the island, villages were not the usual sites for
confrontations since their immediate control was of minor importance only. Few
villagers, even socialist militants, expressed much regret at having missed a
chance to resist, although some men, like Tomas, were retrospectively angry that
the government had not trained and armed them for such an emergency.
A number of socialists and other supporters of Makarios from Argaki were
arrested, but without bloodshed. Crystallos Tirkas, the Argaki socialist leader,
had been made to hand over his cache of machine guns, and the outstanding
shotguns and pistols in the village hardly posed an immediate threat to the
Greek army. There were other minor incidents that occurred in the village during
the week of the coup, trivial when compared with what happened elsewhere, but
which stuck like splinters in the memories of the villagers in their later
bitterness. For instance, Vassilis, a communist, complained to me that a young
EOKA B man had fired a few rounds in the air deliberately to intimidate him.
Another had been standing, gun in hand, outside his house, and when Vassilis'
wife had come out on to her balcony to see what was happening, had told her to
go indoors again. If she had been pro-EOKA, he'd have come upstairs for a
coffee', Vassilis said.
Andrikos was known locally to be an active supporter of Azinas, himself
staunchly pro-Makarios. Accordingly, a squad of soldiers, supported by several
EOKA B militants from a village near Argaki, came to his house and demanded that
he hand over his weapons. He gave them a pistol. He knew at least one of the
EOKA B men well. 'He was an old friend whom I=d
helped many times,= Andrikos told me.
The use of EOKA men from a neighboring village was characteristic of how
the local EOKA people wanted to do business - - people in Argaki did not want to
make these arrests themselves if they could avoid it, but at the same time, they
had to be done by men with good local knowledge.
I received a number of different retrospective accounts of how the coup
actually occurred. One young villager, Andreas Toumbas, was on duty as a police
guard at the Archbishopric, when it started:
I was at the Archbishopric. on 15 July 1974, guarding the President of
the Cyprus Republic, Archbishop Makarios. That day the Archbishop was away
at Troodos, and we knew that he would come from the mountains to the
Presidential Palace to carry out his presidential business, as he usually
did. I was on duty from 5:45 a.m. At about 8 a.m we heard the first shots
and we knew that a coup was on. We took up positions at the Archbishopric.
We hadn't expected a coup at this time. If, for instance, it had been the
day the Archbishop told the mainland Greek army officers to leave Cyprus, we
would have expected it. We would have been in better order and the coup
would not have happened. So, at 8:00 a.m. we heard the first shots and took
up our positions. At 8:30 we heard more shooting, and they said the military
are doing exercises. We had a radio link to HQ, and to all the other police
stations, and we heard over the radio that there was definitely a coup going
on. We started securing our position, to defend the Archbishopric, without
the soldiers noticing. About midday, army units started letting us have it
from long range. We were pinned down, and we couldn't see who was shooting
at us. We could only see the heavy gun which was firing at us. Well, then we
took our bazookas and other weapons, and went down into the street, towards
the flat rooftops, to repulse the coup. But we couldn't take on the army
properly, and they pinned us down until 8:00 in the evening. Earlier in the
day we heard the Archbishop over the radio from Paphos. He told us not to
surrender and to fight on, and that he would send reinforcements from Paphos.
We held out until 8:30 that evening but, when we saw the soldiers around the
iron gates of the Archbishopric, moving to surround us, we put up a white
flag, a white handkerchief it was, on a bit of a stick. We put it up in the
air to show them we wanted peace.
Because it was night-time we shone a torch on the bit of cloth, for the
soldiers to see, that they should stop shooting. But they didn't stop. We
got their commander on the radio, at HQ, and he told us he would arrange for
the shooting to stop. But it still didn't. We said, 'they're out to kill the
lot of us', so me and another fellow decided to come out with our hands up.
That's what we did, and luckily, they stopped. We said, 'We surrender', and
they said, "Everybody out of there'. Then they came out, the soldiers
surrounded us, and the officer told them to stop shooting as we'd given in.
They had us all outside, hands on our heads and they searched us. They
told us to stay there, and, after twenty minutes, we asked them for water
because we were tired and thirsty. The officer said 'OK., have a drink', and
then we asked for cigarettes and they gave us those too, we had a sit-down
while we waited to see where they would send us. Then they made us sing the
National Anthem, and shout, 'Long live Sampson." The threat of their
guns forced us to say what they wanted. After midnight army vehicles came
and took us to the central prison There was a captain there, and as we got
out of the lorry, one at a time he kicked us. As we went into the cells he
told us to take our clothes off from the waist up. We took off our clothes,
and were half naked.
They dealt with us one at a time, hitting us. As we were being dealt
with, a captain came up and asked us, one at a time, our names and where we
were from. When my turn came I told him who I was and that I was from Argaki,
Morphou, and he said to me, 'I know you.' He said "What are you up to?
Your brothers were with us but yet you. where did you get your crazy ideas
from?' He was trying to say that my brother, Kyriakos, sympathised with EOKA
B, but not me. So he gave me a kick and pulled my hair, just as he did with
the others, and went on down the line.
Later they took four of us and put us in a cell at the central prison. We
were so tired and hungry that as soon as we got inside we fell asleep until
morning. In the morning I was hungry and asked for something to eat but they
didn't give us anything till four o'clock that Tuesday afternoon. and then
just a koulouri [biscuit]. There had been forty-five of us at the
Archbishopric, and all the police stations gave in before we did. Our post
was the last to fall. Most of the people with me were in civilian clothes
and so they were able to escape, but I was in police uniform and couldn't
escape because I was afraid I'd get shot and killed, you see.
Another young villager had become a member of the Tactical Reserve Police,
which had been specially recruited to deal with the EOKA B insurrections of
recent years. He told me how during the coup his unit had been involved in the
fighting, and how a man firing a Browning machine-gun had been wounded. Their
commander called out to my informant, 'Hey, do you know how to use it?', to
which he replied. 'Not me, sir. All I know how to do is cook!' In fact, he knew
perfectly well how to fire the gun, but when he told me this story, he did so
without the least embarrassment, rather with a certain pride at his own
quickness of wits.
His unit, about 150 men, finally surrendered, after their commander had been
captured and told them over the two-way radio to give in. First they were made
to lie on the ground, but he was not afraid, because there were so many of them.
Then he was taken to prison, where he saw an Argaki boy, an EOKA B supporter, to
whom he said 'Hallo - what's going on?' 'Hub! You didn't want to know me before,
did you?', replied the boy, and cold-shouldered him. Later he saw another Argaki
EOKA B sympathiser, who was a warder, and who said to him curtly, 'You're lucky
to be alive.' Inside the prison he saw several other Argaki boys who were either
prison officers who supported the coup, or EOKA B volunteers, who were helping
them. He was twice beaten up. The second time was by men who before the coup had
been imprisoned as EOKA B suspects, and had now been released to help their
comrades. They formed a double line, and beat him and other pro-Makarios
supporters now in their hands.
Christos Kaourmas, an officer who had worked in the prison for several years,
was quiet and usually kept out of politics:
On Monday 15 July, the coup. By chance some of my workmates came to the
village and said to me, 'Let's go to work because they've been in touch with
us from the prison and told us to come on duty.' So we set out in the
afternoon. When we got to Yerolakkos, the police station had not yet been
captured by the putschists. The police stopped us. There were lots of people
there, civilians with guns to help the police. They stopped us. At first
they thought we were Sampson's people, setting out with the idea of helping
him in Nicosia, so they set about us really ferociously, and fired bursts
over our heads, to make us tell them the truth. They locked us up in the
police station for about an hour, and then they let us go back to our
villages, because Nicosia had fallen to the coup. If we'd gone on ahead they
might have killed us. So we went home.
Tuesday morning I woke up, and listened to the radio. It told all the
police and security forces to go to work. So I set off too. There were a lot
of checkpoints on the way to the capital. As soon as I got to the prison I
saw that all my workmates had been put under lock and key. They locked me up
too. Later, a few EOKA B blokes showed up who knew who I am and who I'm not.
They knew that I'd never been mixed up in armed groups, political parties,
or situations of any kind. They called to me to come out and start work. So
about ten o'clock this is what happened. They let most of the warders out.
except for ten or fifteen who'd been [politically] involved in the
situation. At the same time as this was happening they were bringing into
the prisons lots of Makarios' people. They kept them with their hands up
with the Greek Army officers standing by.
There was an officer there who was really decent. We don't have to
condemn the putschists all the time, [by saying] that they did this and they
did that. In this one situation I saw a second lieutenant in the reserves
(they'd called up all the conscripts) who had got something personal against
one of the Makarios men. and as soon as he saw him brought inside he started
assaulting him. but the Greek officer in charge wouldn't let him and struck
him, saying 'That isn't right, it isn't humane behaviour.' You see it's
always been the rule in the prison that whoever is the government of the
day, the prison laws are observed. And there was relative order in the
prison during the week of the coup. They were bringing in men who had been
knocked about, and wounded men too; but as soon as they got inside the
prison gates, they all calmed down, and no one suffered a thing while
inside.
That Tuesday I got sick and went off to the hospital, where it was quite
a different matter. I saw a bloke there who'd been a prisoner charged with a
homosexual offence. He was a reserve officer and as soon as the radio
announcement about calling up the reserve came through this man was put in
charge of the Danish hospital, which later became notorious. He gave orders
that the wounded supporters of Makarios should be left unattended and
priority should be given to the soldiers and pro-Grivas people. There were
lots more with the same view. Once, by chance, some policemen brought one of
their mates into a ward occupied by soldiers, and this officer cursed the
policemen, wounded anc all, for intruding. The soldiers always had to have
priority. It was like that for four or five days. He was half-crazy; but he
was second-in-command. A vile man.
The Friday afternoon we heard that an invasion was imminent. Rumours
started to get around -- they'd landed at Famagusta, in Kyrenia, and there
was general chaos. I got up, to leave the hospital; I said to the doctor,
'Doctor, I'm off.' It was complete chaos in there, bedlam, not the slightest
order. He said to me, >off you
go then.=
I went off to the prison. I found a fellow-villager, Kyriacos, the [a
senior warder]. I asked him if he was going to the village, would he take me
in his car? Since I was sick and couldn't stay. The doctor had given me sick
leave. Kyriakos said, 'I can't go to the village now. Anyway, there=s
all kind of trouble afoot. And if anything happens to you on the way, they'd
put the blame on me. OK? OK. Stay here and go tomorrow evening.' So I
stayed. About quarter to five that morning some of my workmates were coming
off duty, and came into the room where I was sleeping. One had a radio in
his hands and he turned it on and found Bayrak, the Turkish-Cypriot
propaganda station. It was giving out that the Turks were on their way to
liberate Cyprus. As soon as they'd woken me with this, I heard the planes
start bombing Eldyk, the Greek Army HQ, across the road.
The transport planes started bringing the [Turkish] parachutists in and
they started jumping. The [EOKA B] men in control started giving out weapons
immediately, arms which had been stored in the prison, to the warders they
knew were with them. They were giving out guns until 7 a.m. and still not a
single order came through. The prisoners were still locked up, and they
didn't let them out. There must have been 2,000 or 3,000 in the cells, when
normally they would have been 650.
About seven o'clock the order came through to let the prisoners out. We
opened up and for a moment you could see the corridors and streets filling
up with men who didn't know whether they were laughing or crying. The planes
were bombing us and the parachutists were coming down, and pretty soon they
starred letting us have it with mortars. I was pinned down -- I couldn't
even put my head out. That's how it was to be till Monday. No bread. No
water. Nobody had any taste for combat. You waited there saying, here comes
a shell which will land in the midst of us and that'll be that. That's how
it was for three days.
During the six days between the start of the coup and the Turkish invasion,
men loyal to President Makarios continued to put up a resistance. A few police
units, some armed socialist militants, and some communists who found weapons
fought on with rifles and machine-guns, which were all they had to use against
tanks and artillery. As with Hungary in 1956, and Chile in 1973, they were
crushed in spite of their bravery. It is conceivable that a rapid mass
mobilisation of armed civilians might have deterred even professional soldiers
equipped with heavy weapons - such a mobilisation is said to have sustained the
elected Bolivian government in November 1978.
The invasion by Turkey stopped the miniature civil war between the Greeks in
Cyprus, and so it is impossible to say how long it would have gone on, and how
many lives would have been lost in it. If the putschists had succeeded in
destroying organised resistance quickly, there would undoubtedly have been
torture and executions for many months afterwards. There were man) old scores to
be settled; and the fighting of that first week had created many new ones. In
the area between Paphos and Limassol, where there was strong resistance, the men
of the coup are said to have buried some of Makarios' supporters alive, and to
have put out the eyes of others.
There is one terrible image of what might have happened in Cyprus, which
comes down to us from a much earlier period in Greek history. Thucydides
describes the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, in the year 431 BC. It started
in the city-state of Corcyra, the present-day island of Corfu, or Kerkira. as it
is called in modern Greek.
... the Corcyrans continued to massacre those of their own citizens they
considered to be their enemies. Their victims were accused of conspiring to
overthrow the democracy, but in fact men were often killed on grounds of
personal hatred or else by their debtors because of the money that they
owed. There was death in every shape and form.
And as usually happens in such situations people went to every extreme
and beyond it. There were fathers who killed their sons; men were dragged
from the temples or butchered on the very altars: and some were actually
walled up in the temple of Dionysios and died there . . . To fit in with the
change of events, words, too, had to change their usual meanings. What used
to be described as a thoughtless act of aggression was now regarded as the
courage one would expect to find in a party member: to think of the future
and to wait was merely another way of saying one was a coward: any idea of
moderation was just an attempt to disguise one's unmanly character: ability
to understand a question from all sides meant that one was totally unfitted
for action. Fanatical enthusiasm was the mark of a real man, and to plot
against an enemy behind his back was perfectly legitimate self-defence.
Anyone who held violent opinions could always be trusted, and anyone who
objected to them became suspect.
From this, at least, most of the Greek Cypriots were spared. But the cost was
very high: the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey, and the loss of many people and
much territory in war.
From The Heart Grown Bitter (Cambridge University Press, 1981),
chapter 4.
copyright Cambridge University Press and reprinted with the
permission of Cambridge University Press.
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