Outbreak of Violence, 1955

One of the standard histories of the conflict is British journalist Nancy Crawshaw=s The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece. Crawshaw was a reporter for the Manchester Guardian for fifteen years, much of it during the 1950s. In this passage, Crawshaw describes the beginning of the terrorism that signaled the start of the Greek Cypriot revolt against British authority on the island.

In the early hours of 1 April the underground organisation EOKA made its existence known by a series of explosions in different parts of the island. Leaflets, signed 'The Leader Dighenis', proclaimed that with God's help and the support of all the forces of Hellenism the struggle to throw off the British yoke had now begun. Warnings under the same signature were sent to the police advising them on pain of execution not to interfere with EOKA's activities.

The EOKA Leader was satisfied with the early reports carried by the morning newspapers. The most spectacular success was an attack on the Cyprus Broadcasting Station led by Markos Drakos. His group of four men had gagged the watchmen and planted bombs near the transmitters. Other groups had thrown bombs through the windows of the Secretariat and at Wolseley Barracks. Official quarters estimated the total damage at ,60,000.. The fuller reports which reached Grivas later were, however, far from encouraging. As he had anticipated, the Nicosia group had achieved very little apart from the attack on the CBS. The Secretariat, with its unguarded buildings, was an easy target; and the bombs aimed at the signals room at the Wolseley Barracks had been thrown across the fence from safe range and fallen short of their objective. Elsewhere the position was worse. The bombs thrown in Famagusta had failed to explode. Afxentiou, the district leader, was a wanted man, the police having found a Greek army handbook on sabotage in his home. Modestos Pandelis, one of the newly trained saboteurs, had electrocuted himself by throwing a rope damp with dew over the high tension wires. Several group leaders, including Poskotis, had been arrested. Grivas was also disturbed by the political situation. Neither the Athens nor the Greek Cypriot press had shown much enthusiasm for the first revolutionary exploits. The Cypriot editors were, no doubt, inhibited by the colony's stringent press laws, but the same could not be said of the newspapers in Greece. Athens Radio, instead of bolstering the morale of the Cypriot fighters, had come out in favour of passive resistance and had allowed Sawas Loizides to broadcast a eulogy of his brother, Socrates. The possibility that political opportunists in Greece, especially the Loizides family, might exploit the Cyprus struggle to further their own careers was seldom far from Grivas's mind -- an anxiety which was not ill founded in view of the ruthless struggle for power and his own lack of standing in the Athenian political world. These misgivings prompted him to complain strongly to Makarios, who promised to send an envoy to Athens to make the necessary protests.

Alleged communist activities at this time provided Grivas with yet another source of anxiety, and he urged Makarios to republish the proscribed bulletin Enosis with a view to waging a journalistic campaign against them. It was rumoured that the Communists were planning to attack Lefka and that they were daily increasing their efforts to obtain arms and paying high prices which EOKA could not afford. One leader informed Grivas that in his area they were even masquerading as members of EOKA. Even in normal times Cyprus tends to seethe with rumours which are often alarmist in character. The wiser inhabitants quickly learn to discount them, and it was not surprising that the Colonel's repeated agitations made little impression on the Archbishop.

The first explosions were followed by a general revulsion against violence. However strongly some sectors of the Greek Cypriot com- munity might desire Enosis, few of them when it came to the point welcomed the prospects of prolonged rebellion, the disruption of normal life and trade. Shortly after the outbreak of violence the Arch- bishop ordered a cease-fire on the grounds that EOKA needed time to regroup. This appraisal of the military situation, which might more appropriately have come from Grivas, met with his strong disapproval. The EOKA Leader was convinced that any loss of momentum at this stage would be disastrous. But apart from minor incidents violence abated for several weeks.

The Aghios Georghios trial opened on 3 May at Paphos before a special assize court composed of the Chief Justice and two senior Greek Cypriot judges. The charge was amended in the first and second counts and as a result now carried heavier penalties, the words 'conspiring to advocate' in the original indictment having been replaced by 'advocating'.

The Attorney-General, Mr Criton Tornaritis QC, described the case as one of 'unprecedented enormity, extreme gravity and of great public importance'. The accused were not being charged for the opinions they held or for the national aspirations which stirred them but for seeking to promote their aim by 'force and violence and armed resistance to lawful authority'. The essence of conspiracy lay in the parties' agreeing and combining to carry out a common criminal or unlawful purpose. There was seldom a witness to such agreement, but proof of this nature was not necessary. It was sufficient to show that the parties had adopted a line of conduct arising from a common intention. In addition to summarising the evidence submitted to the magistrates' court, the Attorney-General referred to the employment of an engine silencer on the caique in order to mislead the Greek Customs into thinking that it was on a fishing expedition when, in fact, the intention was to unload explosives in Cyprus. This suggested that all the accused on board were fully aware of the voyage's true purpose.

On the second day a witness from the Royal Navy's torpedo and anti-submarine section gave new evidence for the Crown. He described how during the second phase of the diving operations frogmen under his command recovered between 4 and 24 April eight boxes from the seabed. Their contents included two rifles, one machine gun, various types of pistols, ammunition and pieces of Greek newspapers. Cross-examined by defence counsel, the witness said that the search took place about 6,000 feet from the shore and that he thought the anchor near one of the boxes was suitable for a vessel of 50 to 100 tons.

On 5 May the Crown sought to connect the recent EOKA outbreak of sabotage with the caique case. But defence counsel argued that the evidence was inadmissible as the charge related to the events of 25 January and not to those of i April. The Court ruled that it should be excluded 'for the moment'. A witness for the Crown, the Inspector of Mines, admitted a mistake in his evidence during the preliminary inquiry. At the time he thought that the material in the black box on the caique was sulphur and potassium nitrate -- a highly dangerous explosive. Laboratory tests had since identified it as potassium chloride -- a substance freely sold in the market and used (as the caique captain had claimed in his defence) for starting engines. This flaw in the prosecution's evidence was, however, by now of little consequence. The case for the Crown had been greatly strengthened by the divers' finds since the hearing in the magistrates' court -- the weapons and ammunition being much harder to explain away than the dynamite. On the following day nine of the accused pleaded guilty to the main charge that on or about the 25th of the previous January they prepared or endeavoured 'by armed force or the show of armed force to procure an alteration in the government or the laws of the colony'. Two Greek seamen, Alevarakis and Christodoulou, pleaded guilty to a new charge -- the illegal importation of explosives. The Court discharged the Cypriot villagers Kyriakos Mavronikolaos and Michael Papantoniou who were arrested on the night of the crime some distance away from the boxes.

The Court dealt first with the nine men found guilty of using armed force against the Government.2 All the accused had stated, the Chief Justice said, that they acted out of 'a sincere love of freedom and their country', and in the case of the Greek subjects as 'a sacred duty' to help their brothers in Cyprus. The Court was not passing sentence for a technical breach of the law. The accused had seriously transgressed the law and a moral principle: 'no doubt blinded by eloquence in news- papers, on the radio and from the pulpit', they had lost touch with the realities of life in Cyprus -- a land of peace, prosperity, tolerance and justice. It was wrong to impose political opinions on such a state of society by force. It was useless for the accused to deny that they were morally and criminally liable.

Socrates Loizides had for many years 'engaged in war and revolution'. No doubt the fanatical opinions held by him were sincere but he had tried to introduce armed force and violence into Cypriot politics. It was difficult to know how far he was 'actuated by sincere ideology, and how far by vanity and personal ambition'. But the seriousness of the offence made it the duty of the Court to deter others and impose a serious penalty. Had his crime been against a Government that was not motivated by principles of humanity and mercy he would have paid for his conduct with his life. Anarghyros Melos had sought to import secretly by night arms and dynamite into a friendly country. Karadimas had come not solely as a member of the crew but as an agitator and revolutionary. In the case of Koutalianos his services during the Second World War, including the rescue of Allied personnel, had been taken into account.

The branch of the Pancyprian Farmers' Union (PEK) to which the Cypriots belonged, the Chief Justice continued, had apparently long been 'a hotbed of sedition'. No doubt the accused and their fellow villagers were good farmers, good tradesmen and good people. But they had allowed themselves to be led away 'into a course of criminal conduct'. Those who had conditioned their minds bore a grave responsibility.

Loizides was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment; Karadimas to six; Melos to five; Koutalianos to four years. The Cypriots received sentences varying from four to three years. The two Greeks found guilty of the dynamite charge were sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment, the Court having taken into consideration their youth and the subordinate position they held on the caique.

The shortcomings of the first offensive were inevitably followed by a spate of recriminations and the search for scapegoats -- a regular feature of EOKA operations. One of the rebel leaders blamed 'Evaghoras', the sabotage instructor from Greece, for the failures in the Limassol area, alleging that he had not given the orders in time for the Troodos explosions and contrary to Grivas's instructions had used the public road with the result that an EOKA member was arrested. 'Evaghoras', moreover, had committed the unforgivable offence of going into business with a Cypriot firm in Limassol without the Colonel's knowledge. Grivas decided to expel his chief assistant for persistent absenteeism and disobedience. The situation, however, was complicated by the sudden arrest of 'Evaghoras'. As a precaution, Grivas quickly changed his residence. Despite an unconvincing explanation for his presence in Cyprus the police released 'Evaghoras' after questioning. Grivas, who had never become fully attuned to the easy-going mentality of the British authorities, concluded that his assistant had either already betrayed the Organisation or else the police were planning to follow him with the object of identifying his EOKA contacts.

The Colonel was faced with a dilemma. The dismissal of 'Evaghoras' might well have exposed EOKA to betrayal so long as he remained in Cyprus. The plans for the execution of traitors and unreliable members of EOKA had not yet fully matured. In the circumstances it was vitally important to get 'Evaghoras' out of Cyprus. A village mukhtar and a policeman were bribed with ,5 each to cooperate in producing faked identity papers. 'Evaghoras' left for Beirut at the end of April. The only difficulties were raised not by the British but unexpectedly by a Greek Consul on the Arab side who demanded full particulars concerning the EOKA man's real identity.

The Archbishop's observation that the rebels needed time to regroup, whatever its underlying motives, had been right. After six months of preparatory work EOKA was still hopelessly amateurish and in no position to wage a sustained campaign. The Colonel's request for two assistants from Greece to replace Socrates Loizides and 'Evaghoras' had not been met, so he was obliged to tackle the Organisation's expansion single-handed. The task was complicated by his ignorance of Greek Cypriot mentality which could possibly be explained by the fact that he had spent by far the greater part of his life in Greece, and as a result certain aspects of Cypriot national character came as a shock. Dedicated to the pursuit of Hellenism and indifferent to financial gain, the EOKA Leader found himself up against the strong trading instincts of the Greek Cypriot community. His stern philosophy that patriots must be satisfied with 'moral rewards' fell on barren soil. And before long some of the saboteurs began to demand payment. One man named his price for putting a bomb in a British cargo boat as ,100. Grivas, who seldom abandoned a principle, finally agreed with extreme reluctance on condition that payment would not be made until after the explosion had taken place.

The recruits were not lacking in enthusiasm and ideas but their concept of revolution was apt to be naive. One EOKA leader proposed that the rebels should capture the Chief Justice, Sir Eric Hallinan, who was regarded by the Greek Cypriots as the symbol of British imperialism, and with whom he was acquainted. But the terrorist had second thoughts. The colonial regime had its own paradoxes. It was impossible to reconcile Sir Eric's exalted position in the colony with the fact that he was a native of Southern Ireland, a country which had rebelled against Britain and which could logically be expected to support the cause of Cyprus. The early Cypriot recruits, moreover, when it came to the point shirked the assassination of officials they knew personally. The intimacy of the Cypriot community facilitated on the one hand certain facets of underground warfare, for example penetration and intimidation. On the other hand it was not without its psychological complications. At first few of the rebels were willing to follow EOKA's orders blindly. Most of them had yet to acquire the absolute ruthlessness which their leader demanded of them.

When it came to practical results it seemed, in the eyes of Grivas, that the Cypriots could do nothing right. 'Tselingas', a meddlesome priest, had to be reprimanded for interfering outside his area of duty; 'Dafnis' for his delay in attacking the Nicosia targets. Another saboteur had completely failed in his mission because he had tied the package containing a bomb intended for Government House to his bicycle which he was obliged to leave outside the building. Elsewhere an EOKA group had abandoned its attack because the driver refused to take the men as far as the target when, in the opinion of Grivas,the raid could easily have been made on foot. Even Afxentiou, the boldest and most enterprising of all the EOKA recruits, was unable to convince Grivas that an attack on Boghaz military camp was impracticable owing to the risk that the Turkish shepherds grazing their flocks in nearby fields would report the perpetrators to the police. The EOKA Leader seldom gave his subordinates the benefit of the doubt. Their explanations were usually branded as excuses; their hesitancy and ineptitude as cowardice. Weeks of frustration went by. In despair Grivas staked his hopes on the eventual return from Greece of a group of Cypriot students who, with the assistance of a committee headed by a Cypriot resident there, were receiving elementary training in the use of firearms.

Much of the Colonel's time during the early summer was spent organising the EOKA youth groups. Progress was surprisingly slow. The example of Paphos, with its historical background of lawlessness, had yet to be emulated in other parts of the island. Early in May, Grivas ordered the intensive recruitment of schoolchildren. Their duties were to include demonstrations, the distribution of leaflets and the surveillance of British agents. The most promising and reliable would eventually graduate to the fighter groups, and EOKA would be assured of a constant supply of recruits. The plan came up against many objections on the part of parents and teachers. The first worried about their children's safety; the second about the ultimate effects on discipline and education. The Communists were trying, with some success, to attract children to rival youth groups. Several of the early EOKA youth demonstrations were abortive. Dr Spyridakis, the headmaster of the Pancyprian Gymnasium, an impassioned enosist and author of several anti-British pamphlets, had gone so far as to chase the demonstrators off the streets and back to their classes, thereby defeating the EOKA Leader's main objective. On the orders of Grivas he was called up before the Greek Consul and required to give an undertaking that such intervention would not be repeated. A few days later, on 24 May, EOKA staged its first major youth demonstration. Five hundred schoolboys, mainly from the Pancyprian Gymnasium, stoned Government House. Troops had to help the police restore order. But this progress was not maintained. Many students informed the local leaders that they would not be able to take part in further demonstrations for the time being owing to the forthcoming examinations. Despite the warning to Dr Spyridakis, the teachers lectured students, recently fined by the courts for leaflet distribution, on discipline. More disturbing for Grivas was the fact that Makarios backed up Spyridakis on the question of school discipline. The Archbishop had justified this apparent lapse in patriotism with the argument that if demonstrations were to obtain international sympathy they must at least appear to be spontaneous.

The Cypriot students returned from Greece during the first week in May and Grivas immediately sent them to different sectors. He set up an extra command at Lefka and ordered the formation of three new mountain guerrilla groups in the areas of Lefka, Kyrenia and Amiandos- Kyperounda. Their training in the use of automatic weapons and explosives was entrusted to Ioannis Katsoulis, a reservist in the Greek Army working as a schoolmaster in the Cypriot village of Evrykhou. The paramount objective of the EOKA Leader at this time was to conserve the Organisation's limited resources and concentrate on dramatic action certain of attracting the world's headlines. An attempt to kill the Governor, Sir Robert Armitage, at the end of May was a failure owing to Cypriot inexperience in the use of time-bombs, detonated at this stage by a primitive and unreliable type of mechanism. The Governor went to a special film performance on Empire Day. Shortly after he left the cinema a coca-cola bottle filled with explosive wrecked several rows of seats. The assassination of General Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief Middle East Land Forces, also ranked high on the EOKA Leader's list of objectives. The General travelled every day between Nicosia and Kyrenia. Grivas, who intended to take part in the operation himself, had personally chosen a site for the ambush at Boghaz. But Makarios vetoed the plan and the rebels had to content themselves with throwing bombs at the General's house. In an order dated 28 June Grivas called upon the area commanders to hold sessions of self-criticism. He declared that even if the material results of the offensive were less than expected, owing to a lack of fire and impetus, its repercussions at international level and on British public opinion were rewarding. The world's attention had been drawn to the agitation in Cyprus against the British regime, with the consequence that Britain was now retracting its policy of 'Never'. He outlined the aims of the next offensive -- terrorisation of the police and the paralysis of the administration in the countryside as well as in the towns. The realisation of these aims, he anticipated, would result in the rapid demoralisation of the police force which, even if it did not actually help the rebels, would turn a blind eye to their activities; in the deployment of the army in security duties over a wide area, so that the troops would be exhausted and their morale lowered; and in the eventual intervention of the United Nations. Tactics would include the execution of policemen who were either out of sympathy with EOKA or who tried to hunt the rebels down, raids on country police stations, and ambushes against police patrols in the towns and in the countryside in order to deprive the force of freedom of movement. The EOKA Leader concluded with an appeal for the self-sacrifice and the disregard for danger which a great cause ought to inspire.

On 19 June EOKA opened its second major offensive with attacks on police stations in Nicosia and Kyrenia. Two days later an explosion outside the Nicosia Central Police Station in the Turkish area killed a Greek bystander, the first fatal casualty, and injured thirteen Turks and one Armenian. On 22 June the first mountain guerrilla group to complete its training, led by Renos Kyriakides, shot up Amiandos Police Station killing the sergeant in charge. Bombs were thrown in bars and at army houses and incidents occurred in many parts of the island. The rebels had again relied mainly on bombs. But the use at Amiandos of automatic weapons for the first time was an important development and the first serious indication that the Archbishop's control was dwindling. The second offensive had aroused the wrath of the Turks. Their leaders issued public warnings that a renewal of incidents in the Turkish quarter would lead to intercommunal strife, and to reprisals against the Greeks should any more Turks be injured. The deterioration in the island's security was serious. But Grivas was not yet satisfied. The Nicosia execution group had been guilty of cowardice; so far not a single traitor had been assassinated. Some EOKA members were culpable of negligence and inefficiency. 'Romanes' had failed to cut the telephone wires before attacking Aghios Epiktikos Police Station; 'Kimon' had lost a Sten gun when, without the EOKA Leader's permission, he was arrested trying to move it hidden inside a violin case to a new location. At the end of the month Grivas halted the offensive.

The summer found the Cypriots in a mood of political confusion. The first wave of terrorism amounted to no more than a token revolt and did not constitute a serious security problem. Nevertheless it had some impact on the attitudes of the Greek Cypriot population and of the Cyprus authorities. The struggle for Enosis in theory was one thing, but now that the rebellion had actually started its consequences were un- predictable. Many Cypriots were apprehensive and would have welcomed a face-saving formula such as an interim period of self-government with the promise of self-determination in the distant future. British officials, for their part, considered that a new political move was urgently needed to halt the deterioration in law and order. In London the Cabinet had been forced to reconsider its position over Cyprus since Greece had raised the question at the United Nations General Assembly in December 1954-. But the new constitutional proposals and the Cyprus policy statement were delayed owing to the forthcoming general election. On 26 May the Conservatives were returned to power. The new Foreign Secretary, Mr Harold Macmillan, hitherto uncommitted on the Cyprus question, favoured a new approach. This became public on 30 June when the following invitation was issued:

Her Majesty's Government have been giving further consideration to the strategic and other problems affecting alike the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. They consider that the association of the three countries in that area based on mutual confidence is essential to their common interests. Her Majesty's Government accordingly invite the Greek and Turkish Governments to send representatives to confer with them in London at an early date on political and defence questions which affect the Eastern Mediterranean including Cyprus.

The Foreign Secretary stated in the House of Commons that the discussions would take place without prior commitment or a fixed agenda and would range widely over all the subjects involved. The careful phrasing of the Foreign Minister's statement and of the invitation, the almost casual inclusion of Cyprus as a secondary item within the context of a much broader problem, could not disguise the fact that the British Government had made a drastic break with the traditional colonial line that the domestic affairs of territories within the jurisdiction of Her Majesty's Government could not be discussed with foreign powers.

The affairs of Cyprus had for centuries been settled over the heads of the people. The fact that the Cypriots were not invited to the conference was in keeping with past history. This time, however, the question of reaction in Cyprus could not be completely overlooked. Shortly after Macmillan's statement Lennox-Boyd left for Cyprus. This was the first visit by a Secretary of State for the Colonies since 1878, and the occasion was marked by the first meeting between a Governor and the head of the Cyprus Church since the 1931 riots. British officials and their advisers alike viewed with concern the possibility that Greece and Turkey might be given a role in future administration. But Lennox- Boyd's primary aim was to convince the Greek Cypriot leaders that the proposed conference was a genuine attempt to break the deadlock. The Colonial Secretary saw Makarios for two hours, met the mayors and Turkish representatives, and received a protest from the secretary of AKEL against a ban on a mass rally planned by the communists.

Turkey immediately accepted the invitation. But Greece was hesitant. The reactions of the Greeks were mixed. In Greece Slavophobia and hostility towards the Turks are endemic. Encircled by neighbours they dislike, the Greeks tend to develop a sense of psychological isolation and physical insecurity if estranged from their Western allies. Bulganin's visit to Yugoslavia in May helped to revive on the one hand the old nostalgia for the traditional friendship with Britain and on the other resentment at the inflexibility and tactlessness recently shown in the face of Greek susceptibilities by British statesmen over Cyprus. The Greek newspapers, almost without exception, criticised the extension of the invitation to Turkey and the omission of the Cypriots and branded the proposals as a trap designed to forestall the forthcoming debate on Cyprus at the United Nations and to procure the indefinite postponement of self-determination. Kathimerini, the influential Athenian newspaper, which usually supported the Papagos Government, urged that the presence of Greece at the talks should be contingent on a prior settlement over self-determination. The Athens branch of the Ethnarchy pressed the Greek Government to go ahead with its appeal to the UN on the grounds that it could easily be withdrawn should the outcome of the London conference prove satisfactory to the Greek Cypriots. The British Government's delay in fixing the date, the final decision to hold the conference as late as 29 August confirmed Greek and Cypriot suspicions that the main objective of the British move was to frustrate the Greek appeal to the UN.

The British invitation was from the start an embarrassment for the Greek Government. Acceptance was bound to raise a barrage of criticism at home; rejection would have alienated international opinion and possibly prejudiced future appeals to the UN. Greece finally accepted the invitation on 1 July. This news brought Makarios on a sudden visit to Athens where he denounced the British proposals as a 'trap' and joined the Greek Government's critics in condemning its failure to submit the Cyprus appeal in time for the main agenda. The British Government, although recognising that Greece might be compelled to raise the Cyprus question at UN, hoped that it would be able to withstand the Archbishop's pressure. The idea that a priest from a distant province should in any way direct their country's policy was repugnant to many Greeks. But Greece was entering a new phase of political uncertainty. Papagos was ailing; his Government faced mounting unpopularity. The people had expected much from his Greek Rally and were disillusioned by the party's failure to implement its electoral promises and by the unequal distribution of wealth. With the possibility of elections in the near future the politicians were reluctant to antagonise potential supporters and the press. Its position weakened still further by Britain's choice of dates for the London conference, the Greek Government finally gave way to demands that the appeal should be submitted in time for the supplementary agenda of the UN General Assembly.

The proposals for the conference did nothing to ease tension in Cyprus itself. The attitude of the Greek Cypriots varied from scepticism to indifference. Many of them resented the fact that Cyprus would not be represented. In official British quarters it was contended that the Greek Cypriots had only themselves to blame -- that their obstinate refusal to accept a constitution deprived them on this momentous occasion of any means of representation. This argument, designed to highlight the advantages of self-government, impressed no one. On the contrary, it added to the prevailing cynicism. Cyprus was not lacking in elected bodies. The presence at the conference of a small Cypriot delegation headed by the Archbishop was a practical proposition which might well have helped to alleviate a legitimate grievance.

The first week in August brought forth a general strike organised jointly by the nationalists and the Communists. But for the rest of the month the Tripartite Conference became the main target of the political agitators. Six days before the London talks were due to start the Ethnarchy Council convened an extraordinary general meeting of the Pancyprian National Assembly in the cathedral of St John, a Byzantine building no larger than a very small village church. The cathedral was crammed. The first wave of violence had attracted correspondents from afar. The nationalists came from all over the island, many of them interrupting holidays in the mountains or by the sea to return to the sweltering heat of Nicosia.

The Ethnarchy Council's object in convening the meeting was to obtain public endorsement for the policy of 'immediate self-determination' in the light of the British approach to Greece and Turkey. The meeting was tense, the speakers excitable, and the Archbishop made several appeals for calm. One by one the nationalist representatives -- bishops, farmers, trade unionists, citizens from every walk of life -- held the floor, their long speeches interrupted only by tumultuous bursts of clapping and cries of 'Enosis'. Any public meeting in Cyprus, whatever its basic purpose, was likely to turn into a forum for grievances against the British administration. This session of the National Assembly was no exception. The Government's educational policy, the curfew at Agros, the lack of a social insurance scheme all came under fire. The future of Cyprus was at stake but the endless digressions from the main issue and the excessive length of the speeches, even by local standards, reflected the inherent parochialism of Cypriot political life. The Archbishop's speech opened on an optimistic note: >The wind of freedom blows forcefully from distant Asia to neigh- bouring Africa, overturning and sweeping away everywhere the effigies of slavery.= If the Tripartite Conference did not result in a settlement which met with their demands the Cypriots would march, he said, their faith undiminished, to the United Nations. The Archbishop called upon Britain to hold bilateral talks with the Cypriots or with Greece and then plunged into a lengthy indictment of British tyranny.

The Bishop of Kyrenia demanded, as usual, 'Enosis and only Enosis', and sent greetings to 'Dighenis' and Socrates Loizides. Polykarpos Ioannides, secretary to the Kyrenia bishopric, opposed all compromise and criticised the sedition laws. Michael Pissas, leader of the right-wing trade unions (SEK), called for a more strongly worded resolution than the formula drafted by the Ethnarchy Council. The Abbot of Kykko courageously advocated a compromise. Several speakers urged the Ethnarchy Council to send a telegram warning delegations attending the London talks that any settlement contrary to the wishes of the Greek Cypriots would be rejected by them.

When it came to dealing with the demands of the extremists, the Archbishop showed a cautiousness and moderation which was in sharp contrast to the inflammatory content of his own statement. He resisted suggestions that the Ethnarchy Council's draft resolution on self-determination should be revised to include the word 'unconditional'. He refused to be drawn into a controversy over the military bases, insisting that it was a waste of time to discuss matters which were at present purely hypothetical. The meeting, which ended with the Greek national anthem, went off without disorders, but produced nothing new. The resolution on self-determination was a foregone conclusion. And the door to negotiation and compromise, although not widely open, was at least left ajar.

Two days later the left-wing trade unions (PEO) held a mass rally in the Alhambra Cinema to register a unanimous protest against the Tripartite Conference.

It was not to be expected that the proposed conference would in any way influence the ideas of Grivas. His contempt for political negotiations and his blind faith in violence were too deep-rooted to allow for change. The Colonel went ahead with preparations for the next major offensive, which he intended to launch in support of the second Greek appeal to the UN General Assembly due in the autumn. Early in July he moved to the Troodos area to supervise the training and the expansion of the mountain guerrilla groups. He first stayed at Kakopetria in the house of Ioannis Katsoulis. Throughout the summer the Archbishop continued to oppose the deployment of guerrillas expressing the view that EOKA lacked adequate funds and that he doubted the wisdom of embarking on guerrilla warfare, the outcome of which was unpredictable. Grivas, unimpressed, went ahead with his plans. The timidity shown by the Cypriots in previous operations was, however, a serious obstacle to the creation of a dynamic revolutionary force. Despite the fact that his capture or death would have brought the revolution to a standstill, Grivas decided to take part in future operations and finally based himself on the Pitsilia sector. He was convinced that his personal example of self-sacrifice in the face of extreme danger was necessary to inspire the fighters with courage and enterprise. The fact was that in the presence of the EOKA Leader the guerrillas would find it impossible to shirk their assignments.

By the end of the summer the EOKA Leader's preparations were complete. Guerrilla and sabotage groups had been formed in the countryside and the towns, food storage places arranged in the mountains and plans drawn up for the ambushing of military vehicles. The shortage of dynamite had been overcome mainly through the regular cooperation of workers employed in local mines, which were under Greek ownership and management. But the shortage of arms remained acute, especially as no help was forthcoming from Greece. Makarios had consistently opposed the build-up of arms on any scale in Cyprus and had turned down suggestions that they should be imported from Egypt giving as a reason the British blockade. But it is difficult to decide whether this reflected his considered opinion or was simply an excuse. At the end of August a small consignment of arms from abroad arrived in a suitcase with the connivance of EOKA members in the customs at Limassol.

During the long weeks of preparation general incidents declined, apart from minor bomb explosions in different parts of the island. Grivas, however, put into effect the plan for the terrorisation of the police. In the early stages EOKA had greatly benefited from the weakness of British security. The worst lapses so far had occurred in the British Consulate-General in Athens and the Immigration Department of the Cyprus Government. Their negligence had been responsible for the two legal entries of Grivas into Cyprus, and the one entry of the deputy-leader of X, Zafiris Valvis. It was, however, incredible that the authorities, eight months after the seizure of the Aghios Georghios, should have failed to place under observation such an obvious suspect as the schoolmaster Ioannis Katsoulis, with his record of military service in the Greek Army. They were also slow to suspect Azinas. For reasons of climate and geography the Cypriots have little to learn from a study of agricultural conditions in Greece. His numerous journeys to Athens could hardly be explained by his position as Secretary-General of the Panagrarian Union of Cyprus (PEK); its subversive activities were in any case notorious and its links with Greece essentially political. A handful of Greeks in the Cyprus police had, nevertheless, done excellent intelligence work. With the help of information from Greece the Aghios Georghios conspiracy was uncovered, and all the participants caught red-handed. On the outbreak of the rebellion most of the key men in EOKA were quickly identified and many of them arrested. EOKA could not afford to allow these successes to be repeated. In the first week of July selected members of the police force received new leaflets from Grivas censuring them for failing to heed his original warning and threatening them with execution. Attacks against police stations and individual members of the force were intensified. Several attempts on the lives of policemen during July were abortive owing to the hesitancy and inexperience of the execution groups. But in August Zavros, a special constable with three brothers in the regular police force, was shot dead while on duty. The incident was quickly followed up by the murder of Kostopoulos and Poullis, both members of the Special Branch. Poullis was shot dead on the eve of the Tripartite Conference in broad daylight in Ledra Street, which was crowded after the mass rally held by the left-wing trade unions at the Alhambra Cinema.

From The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece, by Nancy Crawshaw (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), pp. 114-129.