The Cypriot State(s) in situ
continued

The Official Frames
In terms of official positions produced from the local debates, the Greek Cypriot
side has generally emphasised the international dimension of the Cyprus prob-lem
(`a problem of invasion and occupation’), whereas the Turkish Cypriot
side has focused attention on the internal dimension (`a problem of ethnic
persecution’). In a sense one might expect the Turkish Cypriot regime to welcome
bicommunal meetings which strive to create understanding and tolerance precisely
as proof of the existence of a significant internal dimension. Still, the
demonising rhetoric against the past practices of the Greek Cypriots that it
puts forth means it has so far strongly opposed bicommunal encounters of
various sorts.
The official Greek Cypriot side fears so much the possibility of the Turkish
Cypriot state gaining recognition, and thus legitimising occupation, that reluctant
paternalistic acceptance and selective opposition to bicommunal meetings has
obsessively expressed this concern. But a more general objection towards such
meetings (which for tactical purposes remains officially unofficial) has sprung
from an attempt to deny emphasis on the internal dimension of the Cyprus
problem. After 1974, there was a major shift in Greek Cypriot historiography
towards the documentation of events of past co-existence and co-operation
(along with a tendency to downplay conflict and problems), creating a vision of
the past as characterised by `peaceful coexistence’. This has received widespread
public acceptance as it supports the notion of a future united Cyprus. [40]

But sometimes, even according to this logic, trust-building meetings can suffer. The
argument goes as follows: in the past we had no problems with Turkish Cypriots
and so not only is there no point in bicommunal workshops but rather these
workshops imply that there were problems, which is what the Turkish Cypriot
propaganda argues. In addition, these workshops can be viewed as an attempt
by various other external agencies and states to derail the Cyprus problem from
its essence (the international dimension, a problem created by the Turkish
invasion) and make it appear as an interethnic one.
If then the official stance of the Greek Cypriot side towards the issue of bicommunal events 
has been marked by considerable ambivalence by virtue of
the two aforementioned issues (rapprochement and recognition), the official
Turkish Cypriot stance has been much clearer. On one level, the Turkish Cypriot
authorities also need to appear to respect UN resolutions calling for bicommunal
meetings and contacts, and sometimes allow them. Yet, they clearly dislike such
efforts and officially sabotage them to a far greater extent than the Greek Cypriot
authorities do. The reason for this is obvious. The official Turkish Cypriot stance
is for a future solution which as far as possible ensures division, in opposition
to the integrationist Greek Cypriot official stance. If Greek Cypriots officially
talk of rapprochement and tend to emphasise past co-operation and co-existence,
Turkish Cypriots officially emphasise past animosity and stress the need for the
people to remain as far as possible separated in the future. The Turkish Cypriot
authorities present the Greek Cypriots as the major past aggressors, past and
current enemies. Thus bicommunal meetings are regarded as contact with the
enemies against which the `heroic Turkish Cypriot fighters shed their blood’ as
the stock rhetoric goes. The very idea that people may meet, discuss and try to
find common ways forward often sounds to official ears not only dangerous, but
positively abhorrent and treacherous. As much as the Greek Cypriot regime
worries about the possible recognition of the TRNC, the Turkish Cypriot regime
fears that bicommunal meetings lend recognition to the Republic of Cyprus as
the only (legitimate) state in Cyprus.

Local Assemblies in the UN Buffer Zone
Above we have outlined the historical and international dimensions of recogni-tion,
the problematic official positions of the two implicated ethnic groups and
how these are further refracted through the dominant political structures, namely
the major political parties. We now turn to have a look at how these discourses
have been employed, resisted and subverted by social actors, focusing here on
border locations. [41]

The Ledra Palace Hotel
Borders, whether of a de facto or de jure nature, are places of division but also
ones of contact. The UN Buffer Zone in Cyprus is no different. The Ledra Palace
hotel inside the Buffer Zone in Nicosia is the primary site where intercommunal
meetings have taken place. [42]
Cross-ethnic contact at Ledra Palace has taken many forms. Firstly, meetings of negotiators 
and political party leaders have taken place focusing on ``high’’’’ politics. Secondly, meetings 
of municipal leaders and town planners of Nicosia have occurred dealing with local issues. In fact,
the largest, longest running and very successful effort of bicommunal co-operation
took place through the jointly set up Masterplan for the development
of Nicosia. This was initiated by left-wing Mustafa Akinci (Turkish Cypriot) and
pro-rapprochement Lellos Demetriades (Greek Cypriot), as the municipal leaders
of the two communities of divided Nicosia.[43]
Thirdly, trade union leaders from both communities have met to discuss labour issues. 
Fourthly, numerous bicommunal meetings were organised by concerned citizens under various
rubrics: e.g. meetings of lawyers, educators, women, youth, artists, and others.[44]
The citizens’’ initiative at Ledra Palace created a large interlinked body of various groups 
from both sides that started to meet regularly. It even organised
events outside Cyprus, which involved people from the two sides, along with
groups from other places that faced similar problems (e.g. Israelis and Palestinians,
Catholic and Protestant Irish). All these initiatives gradually acquired a
more organised form at the end of the 1980s and then exploded during the 1990s
to encompass hundreds of people meeting in Ledra Palace encouraged and
facilitated by the United Nations.[45]
Local organisers also took advantage of the support and resources offered by other 
institutions, primarily the US educational institution Fulbright, the British Council, PRIO, 
the German embassy and others. Those participating in the citizens’’ initiatives tried hard to avoid the thorny
issue of recognition and defended their rights to meet with people of the other
community and to allow open discussion and reflection on Cyprus. The issue of
recognition was being continually thrust upon them from officials of the two
sides, or even sometimes brought up by members of the groups themselves. Yet,
with regard to the main issue discussed here, these numerous meetings on
various levels encompassing semi- and unofficial events did not in the least
affect either side’’s gaining of international recognition or of denying it to the
other, an outcome fully in line with the argument proposed above.
The primary aims of many citizens’’ groups were to meet each other (many
meeting someone from the other community for the first time) and create a
space for direct interpersonal and interethnic dialogue--an exchange of views
and experiences beyond the one-dimensional official discourses of either side.
Broadly speaking, by enunciating highly personal narratives, Greek Cypriots
tried to make Turkish Cypriots aware of the tragedy of 1974 for themselves,
while Turkish Cypriots of the severe problems and violence they were subjected
to in the 1960s. These issues have been officially silenced within each concerned
side. Concepts such as apology, forgiveness, relational empathy and mutual
acknowledgement were employed in such meetings in order to reach understand-ings
beyond those allowed by the dominant political discourses according to
which a critique of one’’s own side is treated as tantamount to treason. Many
participants thought that if political dialogue was restricted to official negoti-ation,
it was bound to proceed in a confrontational and antagonistic manner,
while such citizens’’ meetings provided an alternat ive ground for grassroots
initiatives to supplement or enable the procedures of ``high’’’’ politics.[46]
A sociological profile of this movement is unavailable, but the presence of
educated professionals was notable. Their impact, especially a direct one on
negotiations is difficult to assess. They have certainly created an awareness of
the existence of new voices and vocabularies that politicians may heed to. They
may prove invaluable in the case of a political solution in having developed a
significant substratum of relationships and for having covered much ground for
specific readjustments such as the rewriting of history textbooks. Partly due to
the problem of recognition, they have broken new ground for discussion on
issues pertaining to the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil
society, and multiculturalism, issues which are significant on their own merit
irrespective of whether the Cyprus problem is resolved.[47] The Village of Pyla
The mixed village of Pyla, beyond currently being a site of various meetings, is
highly revealing in itself of how implicated social actors may meet and also,
under certain circumstances, selectively employ the issue of recognition for their
own goals. Pyla is a village under UN administration with a population of 800
Greek Cypriots and 400 Turkish Cypriots and is unique of its kind in Cyprus by
virtue of being the only mixed village inside the Buffer Zone.[48]
The discourse of recognition is daily used and abused by the locals. For example, 
Turkish Cypriots living there have refused to pay electricity, water and garbage duties to the
Greek Cypriot authorities that provide these resources and services arguing that
they do not wish to recognise the Republic of Cyprus. In doing this, they took
advantage of the united network of provisions of such utilities that would have
made it impossible to cut off one community in the village. Greek Cypriots of
Pyla sometimes exploited the situation by receiving their own electricity via a
clandestine electrical cable from a neighbour Turkish Cypriot who did not pay
for it. At the same time, many Turkish Cypriots living there are employed on
the Greek Cypriot side and thus willingly apply for and take up scores of
necessary official Greek Cypriot documents (identity cards, nat ional insurance,
all kinds of certificates, etc.) that can allow them to conduct their financial
dealings with Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriot owners of fish restaurants took
advantage of the cheap supply of fish from the north that they abundantly sold
in their restaurants, which for a period were frequented by masses of other
Greek Cypriots (since the ``smuggling’’’’ of fish to the south has been branded
illegal). Greek Cypriots also ¯ ocked in Pyla to buy consumer goods such as
cigarettes, whisky, and leather goods sold cheaply in Turkish Cypriot shops.
This of course went against the Greek Cypriot authorities’’ attempts at imposing
a trade embargo on the Turkish Cypriot economy. While internationally they
were fairly successful in this, locally many goods passed through Pyla either to
Greek Cypriots who lived there, or to the more numerous others who went there
in order to eat or buy things.[49]

Much as they use the situation to their advantage, the people of Pyla also
have been constrained by official policies on both sides revolving around the
issue of recognition and as to `who’ is in control of the village. To that extent,
even the smallest issue (e.g. the raising of a flag, the size of a minaret) can be
blown to enormous `national honour’ proportions, sometimes by the villagers
themselves, but most often by concerned outsiders. During 1998, for example,
the paving of a road by the authorities of one side created enormous friction
locally but also wider concerns as it was presented to imply the acceptance of
the authority of one side. Another example concerned a 1986 policy of the Greek
Cypriot authorities by which it was decided to allocate free plots in Pyla for the
housing of locals, especially young families, who might wish to live in the
village. This area, where now numerous houses have been built, is known as
`New Pyla Village’. Turkish Cypriot inhabitants were also interested and the
United Nations took an interest in how these could become available to the
Turkish Cypriot villagers too. Nevertheless, despite protracted negotiations and talks 
during 1993-1994 with the Greek Cypriot Larnaka District authorities that
were in charge of the project, this did not become feasible. Despite the attempts
of the United Nations to act as a mediator, the issue with regard to Turkish
Cypriots being given plots floundered on the issue of recognition. The Larnaka
District authorities wanted a straightforward application from Turkish Cypriots
while the latter refused to apply in this manner. At times the negotiations went
into minute details and possibilities as to whether, for example, it would be
possible for a form to be filled in by Turkish Cypriots and then given to the
United Nations to be delivered to the Larnaka District authorities, or even if the
Turkish Cypriot applicant could accompany the UN official there but it would
be the latter who would actually hand over the form. In the end no agreement
was reached.[50]

A similar issue emerged after the allocation to Turkish Cypriots of a plot in
order to build a soccer field. The plot lay inside the Buffer Zone and was
designated as `government land (halitiki)’ and the United Nations first received
the consent and agreement of the Greek Cypriot authorities in order to allow
Turkish Cypriots to proceed with their plans to build the soccer pitch. In this
case the Greek Cypriot Larnaka District Office did accept the Turkish Cypriot
application through the United Nations and it was felt that it had all been
settled until later a report appeared in a Turkish Cypriot newspaper in 1996
accusing the village Turkish Cypriot authorities of signing a document produced
by the Greek Cypriot authorities for the lease of the plot. The Turkish Cypriot
village headman (muhtar) along with the president of the soccer club denied this
arguing that they had only taken permission to proceed from the UN authorities
responsible for administering the Buffer Zone. [51]

Eventually, the stadium was built and is currently in use. Still, it has been a continuous 
source of friction between the three sides, the United Nations, Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot
authorities as to who has jurisdiction and the ultimate decision-making power
over the Buffer Zone and how issues like building permits should be resolved.
Interestingly, the peculiar status negotiated in Pyla has led to the avoidance
of employing the two Cypriot state flags, i.e. those of the Republic of Cyprus
and of the TRNC. All the other national flags of the world can be raised and in
fact are being raised occasionally in tourist restaurants and souvenir shops. The
only other exception concerns the `motherland’ flags of Greece and Turkey that
are allowed to fly one each constantly at the two local primary schools, and in
the rest of the village for only six days every year, three for each side on
commemorations. In other words, Pyla has become a site where the competing
claims to statehood of the two Cypriot regimes are by their own consensus
sidelined. Paradoxically, while trying to avoid the employment in Pyla of the
other side’’s symbol of sovereignty, the two Cypriot regimes have accepted to
display the symbols of sovereignty of their ``motherland’’’’ states, thus in effect
betraying their own claims to independence.
Life in Pyla goes on with, without, and despite, recognitions. More importantly,
the contacts of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in this village since 1974, even since
1983 when the TRNC was declared, have been taking place on a daily basis, 
frustrating or endorsing rival claims but without effecting the implied recognition
scenario the two sides officially proclaim. Cross-ethnic contact in this Cypriot
microcosm tells a quite different story to the official one.’

Unchairing the State, Rethinking Recognition
The discourse of state-government recognition in Cyprus has been intense. On
the one hand, it has been officially perceived from both sides as constituting an
inescapable necessity, the realpolitik approach in promoting their respective
claims and interests internationally. The rules of the international legal system
privileging sovereign statehood over non-state actors enhance the possibility
that ethnic disputes follow this particular direction and develop the relevant
rhetoric for effective political contest. On the other hand, the discourse of
recognition has been locally popularised for domestic political gains, especially
party politicking. It has been employed by both regimes as a means of prohibiting
or strictly regulating cross-ethnic contact that in effect normalises ethnic
division both on the ground and as mentality. In doing so, the two sides
misappropriate the international law of implied recognition and continue their
historical reifi cation of each other. By denying or giving specific `recognitions’
of the other, Cypriot regimes of power thus naturalise what they do or say about
each other.
However, what has been less discussed between those articulating arguments
concerning recognition is both the character of sovereign statehood in general
and Cypriot statehood in particular. In contemporary political science, there
have been important developments challenging both the necessity-primacy of
the state and the hardcore interpretation of statehood. There are works that
have shown the conceptual and practical inadequacy of statehood, especially as
globally applied in the post-colonial period, often to delimit the richness of
political and economic life as well as provide order or administer justice. Other
works show the increasing power of non-state actors, not only in influencing
political decisions, but in successfully redefining global issues.[52]
The European Union, to which Cyprus aspires to enter, is an organisation where state sovereignty
is daily negotiated over a wide range of issues. Still, both regimes in
Cyprus seem to conduct their debate within conventional conceptions of the
state which define it as a fixed and absolute political phenomenon. Little
attention is paid to the historical-colonial contingencies that led to the creation
of the Republic of Cyprus as well as to how both sides contradict their sovereign
claims by willingly handing over functions of sovereignty to their `mother’
states (especially over matters of defence and governmental decision-making).
The public debate has now slowly begun to extend to how the post-earthquake
Turk-Greek love affair when combined with the European Union can largely
redefine the national-state claims the ideologues have so fervently defended. In
terms of cross-ethnic contact, the official policy of the two sides may therefore
change in the future, especially following the positive climate of the EU Summit
in Helsinki, but this still begs the question of why strict cross-ethnic control has
been considered of paramount national interest for so long. Moreover, it is most strange 
that governments have been negotiating or aspire to negotiate
membership to the European Union while pursuing policies that directly or
indirectly prohibit such contacts from taking place. It is also diffi cult to under-stand
why the `Europe of the people’--while officially supporting such contacts--
has not made them conditional from the very beginning upon states
considered for membership to the Union.
This has been happening, on closer inspection, not only because the technical
language of recognition has been problematically applied, but also because the
politics of assiduity has been one dimensional. Assiduity need not be rejected
but can be reinvented by reflecting on how the state as code of recognition of
the other is only one among many possibilities. Reflecting as such requires a
mental shift into recognising the other not as an infi nite totality but in its radical
alterity, less as an object of knowledge and more as an ethical encounter to
which we need to respond in ever-changing, ever-inventive ways. Emmanuel
Levinas has suggested how this responsibility to the other strikes one as ethical
call especially in and as face-to-face contact. [53]
What is denied in not allowing cross-ethnic contacts, beyond dialogue and co-operation, is 
also personal experience or recognition of the other as face. But not of a face that becomes
content, of which things have been said, a correlate to being and knowledge.
The face Levinas has in mind is a face that obligates one to realise that one is
always with-an-other, and so to look beyond the interests of oneself and respond
to the call to do justice. The recognition of the other as face then, unlike the
assiduous ones tied to international sittings and standings, works to free `the
neighbour’ from national inscriptions, from the restrictive and simplistic masks
of states.
This is not to suggest a new code but rather to point out the existence of
different cultures of recognition erased or marginalised in giving state recognition
its primacy. In a way this is what some of our hosts (Israelis and Palestinians
alike), only belatedly realised as they told us during an earlier presentation of
this paper. Indeed, their record until recently on individuals meeting across the
ethnic-national divide has been nothing to be proud of. In both camps, with
varying intensity, political stigmatisation, imprisonment, and even assassination
was the normalised order of the day for decades. Totalisations and demonisations,
missed chances and dialogues, criminalisation of ordinary human contact,
have been what they now slowly begin to recognise as the unfortunate, biased,
and ideological discourse through which they framed knowledge about each
other. Ironically--and hypocritically---it was through the face-to-face encounter
that they criminalised for reasons of state recognition that the peace initiative for
state recognition was brokered in Oslo. Still, past Israeli and Palestinian official
practice of demonising the other do not simply disappear but are currently
encountered by both sides as a major problem in attempts to shift public opinion
that has remained a victim of its own propaganda. In other words, the so-called
realist policies presented as necessary for effective political contestation cut both
ways and now return to haunt their faithful pursuants.
By this--to reiterate--we are not suggesting that state recognition has no political 
implications or can be lightly given in the case of Cyprus or elsewhere.
We, rather, seek to put state recognition into perspective, challenge its monopolisation
of international cognition and political discourse, and so open up
debate about other forms and cultures of recognition. For it is becoming increasingly
evident that state recognition is not the self-determinat ion panacea it is
commonly presented to be, but can instead be self-totalising and other-totalising
with disastrous implications for multiethnic societies. Claims to statehood can
and have become, in cases like Cyprus, more than often an instrument of
domination. To that extent, the issue of state sovereignty is less whether it will
be recognised by, divided or shared between, Turkish and Greek Cypriots, but
rather how sovereignty as a territorial ideal should not be used in ways that
discriminate against or take control over the lives of either ethnic group. The
record and the discourse of both regimes of power has been--in this respect
too--very disappointing.

The current UN Secretary-General in a recent report to the Security Council
on his mission of good offices in Cyprus succinctly described the problem:
In the decades during which it has resisted efforts at settlement, the
Cyprus problem has become overlain with legalistic abstractions and
artificial labels, which are more and more difficult to disentangle and
which would appear increasingly removed from the actual needs of both
communities. [54]
Perhaps, at some point in the future, the cognition uses to which the state is
currently put will figure as absurd as the past uses of chairs--utilised by
`civilised’ colonialists to separate themselves from squatting natives, or by
13th century Spaniards to differentiate themselves from Muslims, animals and
women.[55]

From Global Society, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2001.

Notes