Party Politics in Cyprus, North & South

This interesting explanation of the dynamics of the many political parties was originally in Keith Kyle's main narrative, but has been taken out and linked here to shorten that narrative. 

Multiparty politics in both Greek and Turkish Cyprus have shared three characteristics: they both started with an emphasis on unity; in both they went on to an extreme clash of political philosophies which is reflected in minor differences of policy and in both there are regular expressions of the priority of the >Cyprus problem=, a priority that is not wholly observed. Greek Cypriot politics was specially affected by their first leader being an Archbishop who belonged to no party and by the previous existence and organizational strength of a communist party, AKEL, with close associations with the main trade union movement. Throughout this story it needs to be borne in mind that everyone concerned was acting in awareness that the Cypriot Communists could command the steady support of about a third of the Greek Cypriot people and sometimes more. The Turks talked about the danger of a Mediterranean Castro; the Americans would undoubtedly have felt easier could Greece and Turkey between them have found a way of eliminating altogether an entity which was non-aligned and had such a large communist vote. Moreover AKEL, under its longtime leaders Ezekias Papaioannou and Andreas Zartides, has been among the most loyal supporter of the Moscow line outside the Soviet bloc. There is no hint of Eurocommunism there.

In the 1950s AKEL was both banned by the British and terrorized by EOKA because it had provoked Grivas's dangerous wrath. Makarios by contrast did not lose contact with the communists, who got five of the 35 Greek seats in the first House of Representatives, which were otherwise bestowed on Makarios's various followers, loosely grouped in a Patriotic Front. There was no further election until 1970 when AKEL decided to fight nine seats, almost certainly a deliberate underestimation of its optimum strength, and won all nine, with an average vote per candidate greatly in excess of others in the field. Wherefore this modesty? The answer must lie in Moscow's policy priorities. Makarios was keeping Cyprus non-aligned and was blocking NATO's diplomatic initiatives. A communist victory or near-victory would have attracted undesirable attention. AKEL's policy towards the Turkish Cypriots has always been a conciliatory one, springing from colonial days when the communist-led Pan Cyprian Federation of Labour (PEO) had at least 4000 Turkish members. After 1974 both party and union have preserved such contacts, for example at international conferences, as seemed possible.

The election of 1976 followed the final break between Glafkos Clerides - - hitherto the second man in the Republic and invariable Greek Cypriot interlocutor in intercommunal talks - - and the President-Archbishop. It brought out the issues which operate still. Clerides and his new Conservative party, the Democratic Rally, were firmly pro-western and anti-communist. He argued that an agreement with the Turkish Cypriots was the only practical way of getting any of the refugees back to their homes and that such an agreement had been possible in the past and might well be so again. Most of Archbishop Makarios's associates joined together in a party headed by the former Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou. Kyprianou's thesis was that the Cyprus problem should be internationalized, that the main emphasis should be placed not on talking to DenktaÕ but on building up the moral and legal case against Turkish aggression and occupation on all international fronts. The struggle, they said, might be a long one but piling on the economic and diplomatic pressure was the way to get results. Clerides's technique had been too much one of offering concessions and not getting any real return (and indeed inviting rebuff as had happened on a recent occasion when Clerides had shown, without authorization, a draft Greek Cypriot proposal to Denktas in advance). There should be no leaning towards the West; nonaligned or Eastern help were all welcome. Clerides tended to be rather dismissive of the accumulation of favourable UN and other resolutions; but he was politically damaged by having accepted into his new party some former members of 'EOKA B' since the bitterness between Greek Cypriots which this moyement has generated was lasting.

Greek Cyprus still operated the first-past-the-post system in multi- member constituencies. Three partiesCKyprianou's DS, the communist AKEL, and the small middle-class socialist party EDEK led by Dr Vassos LyssaridesClinked arms to shut out Clerides, which they very effectively did since he got no seats for 25% of the vote. The system having been changed for one of reinforced proportional representation, the same protagonists confronted each other under different ground rules with much the same arguments for the 1981 election. The big difference was that Makarios was dead and Kyprianou was President. This time AKEL and Clerides's Rally fought each other to a stand off, each getting 12 seats. Kyprianou's Democratic Party (DIKO) came third, with eight seats, and Lyssarides's EDEK fourth with three.

This appeared to place Kyprianou in a weak position for the approaching Presidential election of 1983 especially because of a rift between him and AKEL, which withdrew its support from the Government because it had lost confidence in the President's handling of the Cypriot problem. In practice the views of Clerides and of AKEL, at the opposite ends of the political spectrum, seem remarkably similar on the issue which is supposed to have priority. But when it comes to the point AKEL could not take any course that would contribute to the election of a pro-NATO presidential candidate like Glafkos Clerides. Consequently it announced well in advance its endorsement of Kyprianou, whose re-election, when in due course it came, was thus entirely thanks to the communist vote. This caused considerable irritation in Athens, but not because the pro-NATO candidate was now going to be defeated. This, on the contrary, would have pleased Andreas Papandreou, who had now become the left-wing anti-NATO Prime Minister of Greece. But he was very much opposed to AKEL's dovish attitude towards the Turkish Cypriots, which he feared might now direct Kyprianou's strategy.

It must be said that, so far, Papandreou seems to have worried unduly. AKEL appears to have got very little in return for its indispensable electoral support. The free market economy, of course, is untouched but although the communists say they are happy with Kyprianou's performance on domestic issuesCthere has been some progressive social legislationCon the conduct of negotiations they appeared throughout 1983 and at least until the framework proposals of January 1984 to have got no satisfaction whatever. Since, however, the system is a presidential one the initiative remains substantially in the hands of Spyros Kyprianou.

By the time that the Turkish Cypriots had decided to hold elections on 5 July 1970 to coincide with the Greek Cypriot elections to the House of Representatives, Rauf DenktaÕ had established himself as the outstanding personality and natural leader of the community. At that stage he was opposed to party politics; and it was not until December of the same year that even a marxist opposition party was formed, the Republican Turkish Party. Parties were not encouraged until after the proclamation in 1975 of the Turkish Federated State of Kibris. The constitution that was adopted provided for both a President and a Prime Minister; the President's powers were not extensive but that has not prevented Rauf DenktaÕ remaining the dominating personality under that title.

DenktaÕ was first elected in 1976 by a vote of 76.6 per cent from an electorate which in total size resembled that of a single British constituency. The conservative National Unity Party (NUP) which drew together DenktaÕ' s companions in the leadership of the struggle, dominated the first 40-member Assembly. However there was not too much unity in the National Unity Party. There were many resignations from office and from party, and two changes of government. The economy was not flourishing after the first two or three yearsCthe projected 7% annual growth rate assumed for the first Five Year Development Plan had been not remotely approached Cand there were many conflicts between the old guard of the NUP and young graduates back from Turkey, including Rauf DenktaÕ=s son Raif. The principal opposition parties were both left wingCthe Communal Liberation Party of Alpay Durduran and the Republican Turkish party. Before the elections of 1981 young Raif DenktaÕ tried but failed to get an >alternative list= of candidates adopted by the NUP who would be a contrast to what he regarded as old style patronage and clientage.

The election campaign was fought at a worrying period economically. The opposition parties argued that Rauf DenktaÕ should not get away with blaming all failures on the >Greek-Cypriot economic embargo=; North Cyprus would have done better if there had not been false priorities in the use of scarce foreign exchange for the benefit of a few local capitalists. Both left-wing parties advocated greater flexibility in negotiating with the Greeks. Durduran in particular wanted interim measures of North-South detente such as harmonization of investment policies, regular trading relations and joint activities by professional bodies, to smooth the way for a settlement. In the result DenktaÕ himself just managed to retain an coverall majority, being re-elected by a vote of 51.7%. But the NUP did not. In the new Assembly it faced, with 18 seats, one left-wing opponentCDurduran's CLPCwith 13 seats plus the otherCthe RTPCwith six. It was a hung parliament with two minor parties holding the balance. There was great difficulty in forming a stable administration and in December 1981 a motion of no confidence was carried in the NUP Government. But in the end DenktaÕ avoided having to call the left to office. His son, Raif DenktaÕ, with a group of contemporaries, formed the Social Democratic Party (SDP) at the end of 1982, arguing that the Government should cut down the underemployed bureaucracy and allocate many more resources to investment in the manufacturing sector. He thinks the economy is developing on unsound lines and wants to avoid the leftists having a monopoly of this criticism. His party has also proposed a Constituent Assembly (25 politicians from each side of the line) to meet in public in the Ledra Palace Hotel, which is in the UN buffer zone, to debate the form of the future Federal Republic.

For a full year before the >declaration of independence= of North Cyprus on 15 November 1983 the senior DenktaÕ had been talking about the merits of such action and opposition members had been mocking him on the grounds that he was a prisoner of Turkey which would never let him do it. Thus when he finally did it the ground was swept out from under the opposition's feet; the Assembly, confronted without notice with the proposition of >independence= endorsed it unanimously. DenktaÕ taking the view that once this vote was taken the existing constitution was no more, rushed through a measure, without the two-thirds majority or the popular referendum required, by which the awkward 40-member Assembly was instantly increased by 30 seats and called a Constituent Assembly. Twenty of these new seats have been filled by nominees of various organizations and ten by DenktaÕ himself. Among the constitutional provisions rendered inoperable in this fashion is the one that limits a President to two consecutive terms. DenktaÕ appointed a non-party Prime Minister and, distancing himself still further from the NUP, announced that he would run for the new Presidency as an Independent.