Reaction to the 1955 London Conference

The conference convened by Harold MacMillan to deal with the mounting problems in Cyprus might actually have caused more difficulties, not only for Britain, but for all the parties involved. Here, journalist and historian Nancy Crawshaw explains the reaction in the region itself  in The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece.

The affairs of Cyprus had for centuries been settled over the heads of the people. The fact that the Cypriots were not invited to the conference was in keeping with past history. This time, however, the question of reaction in Cyprus could not be completely overlooked. Shortly after Macmillan's statement Lennox-Boyd left for Cyprus. This was the first visit by a Secretary of State for the Colonies since 1878, and the occasion was marked by the first meeting between a Governor and the head of the Cyprus Church since the 1931 riots. British officials and their advisers alike viewed with concern the possibility that Greece and Turkey might be given a role in future administration. But Lennox- Boyd's primary aim was to convince the Greek Cypriot leaders that the proposed conference was a genuine attempt to break the deadlock. The Colonial Secretary saw Makarios for two hours, met the mayors and Turkish representatives, and received a protest from the secretary of AKEL against a ban on a mass rally planned by the communists. Turkey immediately accepted the invitation. But Greece was hesitant. The reactions of the Greeks were mixed. In Greece, Slavophobia and hostility towards the Turks are endemic. Encircled by neighbours they dislike, the Greeks tend to develop a sense of psychological isolation and physical insecurity if estranged from their Western allies. Bulganin's visit to Yugoslavia in May helped to revive on the one hand the old nostalgia for the traditional friendship with Britain and on the other resentment at the inflexibility and tactlessness recently shown in the face of Greek susceptibilities by British statesmen over Cyprus. The Greek newspapers, almost without exception, criticised the extension of the invitation to Turkey and the omission of the Cypriots and branded the proposals as a trap designed to forestall the forthcoming debate on Cyprus at the United Nations and to procure the indefinite postponement of self-determination. Kathimerini, the influential Athenian newspaper, which usually supported the Papagos Government, urged that the presence of Greece at the talks should be contingent on a prior settlement over self-determination. The Athens branch of the Ethnarchy pressed the Greek Government to go ahead with its appeal to the UN on the grounds that it could easily be withdrawn should the outcome of the London conference prove satisfactory to the Greek Cypriots. The British Government's delay in fixing the date, the final decision to hold the conference as late as 29 August confirmed Greek and Cypriot suspicions that the main objective of the British move was to frustrate the Greek appeal to the UN.'

The British invitation was from the start an embarrassment for the Greek Government. Acceptance was bound to raise a barrage of criticism at home; rejection would have alienated international opinion and possibly prejudiced future appeals to the UN. Greece finally accepted the invitation on 1 July. This news brought Makarios on a sudden visit to Athens where he denounced the British proposals as a 'trap' and joined the Greek Government's critics in condemning its failure to submit the Cyprus appeal in time for the main agenda. The British Government, although recognising that Greece might be compelled to raise the Cyprus question at UN, hoped that it would be able to withstand the Archbishop's pressure. The idea that a priest from a distant province should in any way direct their country's policy was repugnant to many Greeks. But Greece was entering a new phase of political uncertainty. Papagos was ailing; his Government faced mounting unpopularity. The people had expected much from his Greek Rally and were disillusioned by the party's failure to implement its electoral promises and by the unequal distribution of wealth. With the possibility of elections in the near future the politicians were reluctant to antagonise potential supporters and the press. Its position weakened still further by Britain's choice of dates for the London conference, the Greek Government finally gave way to demands that the appeal should be submitted in time for the supplementary agenda of the UN General Assembly.

The proposals for the conference did nothing to ease tension in Cyprus itself. The attitude of the Greek Cypriots varied from scepticism to indifference. Many of them resented the fact that Cyprus would not be represented. In official British quarters it was contended that the Greek Cypriots had only themselves to blame -- that their obstinate refusal to accept a constitution deprived them on this momentous occasion of any means of representation. This argument, designed to highlight the advantages of self-government, impressed no one. On the contrary, it added to the prevailing cynicism. Cyprus was not lacking in elected bodies. The presence at the conference of a small Cypriot delegation headed by the Archbishop was a practical proposition which might well have helped to alleviate a legitimate grievance. The first week in August brought forth a general strike organised jointly by the nationalists and the Communists. But for the rest of the month the Tripartite Conference became the main target of the political agitators. Six days before the London talks were due to start the Ethnarchy Council convened an extraordinary general meeting of the Pancyprian National Assembly in the cathedral of St John, a Byzantine building no larger than a very small village church. The cathedral was crammed. The first wave of violence had attracted correspondents from afar. The nationalists came from all over the island, many of them interrupting holidays in the mountains or by the sea to return to the sweltering heat of Nicosia. The Ethnarchy Council's object in convening the meeting was to obtain public endorsement for the policy of 'immediate self-determination' in the light of the British approach to Greece and Turkey. The meeting was tense, the speakers excitable, and the Archbishop made several appeals for calm. One by one the nationalist representatives -- bishops, farmers, trade unionists, citizens from every walk of life -- held the floor, their long speeches interrupted only by tumultuous bursts of clapping and cries of 'Enosis'. Any public meeting in Cyprus, whatever its basic purpose, was likely to turn into a forum for grievances against the British administration. This session of the National Assembly was no exception. The Government's educational policy, the curfew at Agros, the lack of a social insurance scheme all came under fire. The future of Cyprus was at stake but the endless digressions from the main issue and the excessive length of the speeches, even by local standards, reflected the inherent parochialism of Cypriot political life.

The Archbishop's speech opened on an optimistic note: >The wind of freedom blows forcefully from distant Asia to neighbouring Africa, overturning and sweeping away everywhere the effigies of slavery.=

If the Tripartite Conference did not result in a settlement which met with their demands the Cypriots would march, he said, their faith undiminished, to the United Nations. The Archbishop called upon Britain to hold bilateral talks with the Cypriots or with Greece and then plunged into a lengthy indictment of British tyranny.