Traditional intellectuals    Other sources of recruitment and moral support for the disloyal opposition were traditional intellectuals such as the philologists and, to a lesser extent, the theologians. Philologists had dominated the secondary educational system for decades. The accelerated tempo of modernization and secularization during the postcolonial years undermined their status, prestige, and power. Their dominant position in education was increasingly under severe criticism by antitraditional groups, such as the growing number of European-educated university graduates, who considered the traditional intellectuals anachronistic in their teaching methods and apostles of a morally obsolete and discredited yesterday.

The philologists, trained in the universities of Greece, were the teachers of Greek language and the guardians of traditional Hellenic- Byzantine culture on the island. The British left secondary education in the hands of the Greek and Turkish communities. High school teachers' were mostly trained in either Greece or Turkey, so secondary education was virtually in the hands of the ministries of education of Greece and Turkey.

Because of this structural setup, the philologists attained prominence and undisputed power within the secondary educational system of the Greek community. Philologists were in demand in all Greek high schools, as the teaching of Greek language and history was considered most important. Greek Cypriot students had to learn ancient, Byzantine, and modern Greek. Classroom time for the learning of the Greek language averaged between twelve and fifteen hours per week, not to mention the history courses which were also taught by philologists. As the demand for philologists grew, the number of Cypriots studying philology in Athens multiplied. The prestige of the philologists was at its height at the time of the declaration of Cypriot independence. The absence of any university on the island rendered them the most learned individuals on the island. As masters of the Greek language and guardians of the Hellenic tradition, they were always the major speakers at school events and festivals. They formed an effective vehicle of political socialization and for spreading Greek nationalism in Cyprus.

The dominance of the philologists was emphasized by the absence, until recently, of nonphilologists in the administrative structure of secondary education. All of the principal and assistant principals of the gymnasia were philologists. Thus, when independence was established, it was a philologist who headed the Greek Cypriot Communal Chamber and eventually was elevated to the Ministry of Education. A sign of the decline of the philologists' preeminence was the promotion to administrative positions within the Education Ministry of a number of European university graduates; this aggravated the insecurities of many traditional intellectuals. It was outrageous, according to the conservative opponents of the government, that one of the ministers of education, appointed in 1972, was not even a graduate of a Greek university. To the conservative opposition it was proof of the government's policy to undermine the purity of the island's Hellenic tradition. It was this concern that prompted Constantine Spyridakis, the philologist minister of education for the first ten years of the republic's life, to try to prevent the establishment of a university on Cyprus. He feared that such an institution would have the potential of undermining the traditional links with Mother Greece. A university for Cyprus, he said, was "premature," and, should the language of such a university be anything other than Greek, the results would be ethnically "catastrophic."[24] Spyridakis, in an article published after his retirement, stated his disagreement with Makarios's policy of continued independence and expressed the fears and concerns of traditional intellectuals:

(The government) . . .by declaring our target to be the for- mation of a unified and independent state alienates itself by necessity from our national destiny, which means that if any kind of agreement is reached, Enosis will be buried by our own volition. . . . We have discarded our ideals, which we did not discard during the Turkish and British occupation, and we are upsetting the course of our historical tradition. . . . Cyprus has never faced such a danger of national degradation as it faces today.... If a Cypriot state is established, especially one based on Turkish demands for special privileges, and if this state survives for a long time, it is certain that it will transform the presently existing ethnic unity between Cyprus and Greece and it will promote the formation of a Cypriot conscience rather than a Greek one, as happened, for example, with Switzerland. [25]

The rhetoric of traditional intellectuals like Spyridakis only strengthened the will of, and offered moral justification to, others who were ready to employ extreme measures to curb the path toward "de-Hellenization." Athens-trained high school teachers, particularly philologists, did try to undermine the legitimacy of the republic either through direct involvement with EOKA B or through propaganda in their classrooms. The seriousness of anti-Makarios activities was great enough to prompt the dismissal of many high school teachers for seditious activities, a measure the government applied rather late, only several months before the 1974 breakdown. This measure was contrary to the policy followed by the government during the previous thirteen years, when pro-Enosis critics of Makarios within the ranks of the secondary educational system were not only tolerated but, in some cases, were even promoted to higher positions in the administrative structure. Thus a week before the coup the government announced the firing of thirty-one high school teachers for "conspiracies to overthrow the legitimate government of the Republic." Seventeen, or more than 50 percent of the total, were philologists.[26]

Another group strengthening the ranks of the disloyal opposition was one of Greek-trained lawyers who felt barred from positions within the judiciary system of the republic. Their training in Greek law was considered inappropriate for Cyprus, whose legal system was based on the British legal system. Furthermore, the language of the courts was English, to the dismay of the Greek-trained lawyers, who were obliged to master the language if they entertained any ambition to rise within the legal hierarchy.

The Cypriot legal system was inherited from the eighty-two years of British colonial rule. Because the republic was founded on a compromise between the two ethnic adversaries, the language of the courts and the legal system remained English. At the founding of the republic there was hardly any opposition to the maintenance of the British system, since almost all of the active lawyers, both Greek and Turkish, were British trained. Furthermore, the English legal tradition was highly esteemed in Cyprus even by ardent advocates of Enosis. Law itself was a highly prestigious profession, and membership in the Inns of Court was the surest avenue to prominence. And there were many Cypriots with membership cards. Some of the more noted were: the Speaker of the House, Glavkos Clerides; the former minister of labor and later member of Parliament, Tassos Papadopoulos; the Chief Justice, Michalakis Triantafillides; the former minister of foreign affairs, Spyros Kyprianou; the representative of Cyprus at the United Nations, Zenon Rossides; the former minister of communications and later ambassador to Denmark, Titos Fanos; the constitutional expert, Kriton Tornarides; the former minister of justice, Stella Souliotou (to mention but a few). Rauf Denktash, too, is a British-trained lawyer.

But during the latter part of the 1960s and early 1970s, an increasing number of Cypriots were returning to the island with law degrees from Greek universities and demanding the Hellenization of the legal system. It is unacceptable, they argued, for Cyprus, a Greek island, to have a British legal system. They also demanded that the language used in court be Greek. Armed with the rhetoric of Hellenic patriotism, these lawyers emerged as a determined opposition against the legal establishment, which was totally controlled by the British-trained lawyers. Many were sympathetic to the EOKA B underground and became the defense lawyers of captured guerrillas. A few even joined the underground.

The problems of the legal profession were an expression of a wider problem confronting the government -- the oversupply of graduates with university degrees, particularly graduates from Greek universities. It was ironic that Cyprus, which did not have a university, should be faced with this problem. In spite of uncertain prospects for employment, the number of Cypriots studying abroad continued to increase. In a survey conducted by the Ministry of Education, it was found that in 1971 there were 11,573 Cypriots studying in 400 universities spread over 25 countries. Out of the total, 47 percent, or 5,440, were enrolled in Greek universities, and 19.8 percent, or 2,290, were studying in the United Kingdom. [27]

The increase in university attendance was caused by several factors. First, it was the result of the prosperity of the 1960s and early 1970s; second, education has always been highly valued culturally; and third, the political situation in Cyprus helped a large number of Cypriots to get scholarships in various countries. Greece, in order to strengthen ties between Cyprus and the mainland, accepted Cypriot students for university study without an entrance examination and without tuition. The bulk of Greek Cypriot students therefore studied in the universities of Athens and Salonica because it was much less expensive to get an education there. Other countries, too, offered assistance to Cypriot students. The smallness of Cyprus, combined with its pivotal position in international relations, helped a substantial number of Cypriots to get scholarships given by countries eager to obtain a foothold of influence on the island. Scholarships were given by Western countries such as France, West Germany, and the United States, and Communist countries followed suit. In 1967 an estimated 379 Cypriots were studying in Communist countries (110 in the U.S.S.R.); by 1971 some 829 were studying in these countries.[28] Alarmed by these statistics, some right-wing politicians argued that students were brainwashed in Communist universities and upon their return to Cyprus became agents of international communism. The secretary of SEK, the right- wing labor union, went as far as to urge the government to pass a special law rendering degrees earned in Communist countries invalid. Makarios, however, rejected the request.[29]

The discrepancy between the overall level of development of the island and the availability of individuals with university degrees was explosive for the government. Unavoidably, as the number of university graduates increased, some would begin turning against the status quo, exposing what they would consider corruption, inefficiency, and favoritism in the civil service. Those who felt the greatest strain came from the ranks of graduates of Greek universities. The major employer of the Greek educated was the Ministry of Education, which was patterned along the Greek educational system. But that ministry could absorb only a limited number of them as teachers in Cypriot high schools. The rest, like the Greek-trained lawyers, were confronted with a market that was more favorable to graduates from European universities, who were considered to be better trained and more qualified. An additional handicap of the Greek- trained graduates was their inadequate knowledge of English. Many government reports were written in that language. Therefore various governmental institutions, with the exception of the Ministry of Education, showed a preference for graduates of English-speaking universities. This tendency was particularly evident in the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Economics. The private sector, too, preferred the English-trained graduates, thus compounding the problems of the holders of Greek university degrees. English was a language frequently used in business, and, because much of the Cypriot economy was based on exports and imports, mastery of the English language was deemed essential.

Not all students and graduates of Greek universities were sympathetic to the aims of the disloyal opposition. Only a minority within these groups actually condoned or took part in the activities of the disloyal opposition. What is clear, however, is that those students and university graduates who joined the disloyal opposition came primarily from a minority within these groups and not from the graduates and students of European universities.

Some Cypriot students in Athens became tools of the Athens junta and waged a propaganda assault on Makarios and his government. Thus, in the summer of 1969 during the school recess when a committee of such students, the junta-appointed leaders of the Cypriot Student Association, arrived on the island to conduct a tour of "enlightenment" in the Cypriot countryside, they preached Enosis and argued against the policy of continued independence.[30]   They concluded their tour with the issuance of a manifesto, which read as follows:

Let those who are handling our national case know that we shall return. We shall soon return and we shall be more ferocious. . . . We swear on the dead of Enosis [the dead EOKA heroes of 1955-59] and before God and men that we shall not stop the struggle. We have discovered that the people are ready to fight. Soon we shall all unite our strengths, and we shall become a volcano that will drown the anti-Hellenes.[31]

The union of Cypriot students in England and other European nations denounced the leadership of Cypriot students in Greece, calling them "illegal organs of the Greek junta and unrepresentative of Cypriot university students."[32] The campaign of the Greek students coincided with news reports that the enosist opposition was launching a new, invigorated, and intensified movement for union with Greece. Subsequent events corroborated this assertion.

The problem of discontented traditional intellectuals in societies undergoing modernization is by no means unique to Cyprus. An oversupply of traditional intellectuals in such societies is, more often than not, the norm. As a rule, they resent and oppose modernizing changes that undermine their status and power. What is perhaps unique to Cyprus is that the centers of training of these propagandists of tradition were outside the country in Greece. Prosperity and modernization caused an increase, not a reduction, in the number of traditional intellectuals who had a stake in the maintenance of the traditional forms that were being undermined by modernization. And while the number of traditional intellectuals was increasing, the traditional channels for upward mobility were closing, thus intensifying the feeling of frustration for many of them. This contradiction was the source of the problem of traditional intellectuals in postcolonial Cyprus. Moreover, traditional intellectuals were able to pose a significant direct and indirect threat to the government because of the presence in Cyprus of a powerful external force, the Greek junta, with which many of them were willing and able to align themselves.

Businessmen and professionals    Although the business community as a whole supported the government, because it formed a large portion of the status quo, a small minority of businessmen and professionals offered their services to the opposition. The business community could be classified into four categories in so far as their relationship and loyalty to the Makarios government were concerned. First, there were small shopkeepers and businessmen who were totally committed to Makarios and his policy of continued independence for Cyprus. They constituted the greater proportion of the business community, which as a whole dismissed the danger of communism as it did not consider AKEL a genuinely Communist party with revolutionary potential. A substantial number of small shopkeepers even belonged to one of AKEL's front organizations. Second, there were some very wealthy importers and merchants who, although they supported Makarios's policy of unfettered independence, were uneasy with what they felt was Makarios's undue tolerance of AKEVs influence in Cypriot politics. In addition, competition from the expanding cooperative movement, the untaxed church enterprises, and other communal institutions such as the EME created an atmosphere of discontent among some members of this sector of the business community, who complained that the free enterprise system was endangered. Third, a number of wealthy upper middle- class entrepreneurs were either untroubled by EOKA B's activities or even sympathetic to its aims without necessarily offering it active support. Nevertheless, their neutrality, noninvolvement, or sympathy for the underground must have given further encouragement to the rebels and their collaborators. Fourth, some wealthy businessmen and independent professionals joined the disloyal opposition and actively supported Grivas and his underground organization. This was evident in the composition of the ESEA (the political front of EOKA B). In its ranks there was no one on the government payroll. Among the 62 members of its organizing committee, there were 25 businessmen, 13 medical doctors, and 13 lawyers; [33] that is, 82 percent of the membership was drawn primarily from the upper middle class of businessmen and professionals -- a contrast to the total absence of participation by businessmen in the guerrilla movement of the 1950s.

The business community as a whole may not have been disloyal to Makarios, but the fact that businessmen comprised such a large element in the ESEA was a sign of the potential discontent of a larger segment of this social stratum should the fear of communism become widespread.

ESEA provided a legal cloak for the EOKA B guerrillas, thus offering an upper middle-class legitimation for political illegality and disloyalty to the republic; a well-known wealthy importer, Socrates Eliades, served as the financial liaison between the Greek junta and EOKA B. The funds sent from Athens for the maintenance of EOKA B were processed through him.

The involvement of businessmen and professionals with EOKA B was a new development in the history of Cyprus. The business and professional strata had generally opposed (albeit mutely) the Enosis movement in the 1950s when EOKA first was fighting the British. The merchant class not only had no economic or social reason to oppose British rule but in fact thrived under it. As long as England was in control, communism was not a threat. Independence removed this security. The legalization of the Communist party once independence was achieved and its successes at the polls alarmed some members of the big business community. Union with Greece now seemed to some to be the best guarantee against communism. Greece, under the military regime, had successfully eliminated the possibility of communism or socialism, whereas the Cypriot government was perceived as being maintained with Communist and leftist support. A characteristic incident that revealed the anxiety and fear of big business in Cyprus occurred on February 27, 1974, when Parliament debated the government's economic initiatives for solving the acute problem of inflation. A member of Parliament, a leading importer, stood up and argued that the measures were socialistic, based on a policy of "leftist orientation," and he asked whether it was the intention of the government to let the business world know in time so that it might transfer its enterprises to some other country.[34] The proposed government measures were denounced as stifling "individual initiative" and as contrary to the maintenance of a healthy economy. Since it was from the ranks of the business and professional community that Makarios recruited most of his ministers, an additional factor that may have caused some members of this social category to join the disloyal opposition was personal jealousies -- of paramount importance in a small society like Cyprus where political life is "personalized ."[35] Political decisions were determined to some extent by "who knows whom" or "who is a friend of whom." In the absence of viable political parties anchored in group or class loyalties (with the exception of AKEL), personal factors played a major role in the political process.

It is, perhaps, pertinent to note in passing that, unlike other developing societies, Cyprus had no hereditary families that held political power. The embryonic state of the Cypriot political system, the

high rate of individual mobility during modernization, and the prevalence of a fundamental spirit of egalitarianism, which itself was a reflection of a relatively egalitarian social structure, prevented the growth of dominant political families. With the modernization of Cyprus, family members were differentially exposed to the various avenues of upward mobility. Thus it was common for a Cypriot who was very successful in the professions, in business, or in politics to have relatives in lower classes or status groups. A medical doctor could have a brother who was a manual worker, and a career diplomat could come from a family of shepherds and farmers. There fore, family domination of the political system was not possible, at least during the period under study. A leading government official for example, could not have helped his farmer brother or cousin become the director general of the Ministry of Agriculture. Makarios could not have legitimately elevated either his older brother or sister to a position in the government. His brother had been his personal chauffeur since his ordination as archbishop in 1950, and his sister played the homely and humble role of his personal cook. Neither of them functioned in any other important capacity in the archepiscopal and presidential palace. In fact their existence was hardly noticed. In the absence then of family political dominants or viable political parties, it was friendship and peer groups that to a considerable extent determined political action. We read, for example, in the weekly Kypros of May 31, 1976:

At 10:30 last night a meeting took place at the Attikon Theatre between Larnaca's deputy C. Christofides and his political friends. About 200 persons from all strata of society were present. There were scientists, businessmen, industrialists, employees, workers, the mayor of the town, and the chairman of the school board.

After the deputy's speech, during which he stressed the critical situation facing Cyprus, various opinions were expressed, and it was decided that "it was up to Mr. Christofides to decide whether he will remain an independent candidate for the coming elections or join one of the parties." (He was a former member of EDEK who left the party because of disagreements with Lyssarides).

This personalized dimension of Cypriot politics, although perhaps charming, was hardly functional for a society facing monumental social and political problems. I do not suggest that there were no ideological differences among various parties or politicians. Far from it, as surely the earlier analysis has shown. However, because the parties had not crystallized firmly into institutional forms, the ideological differences, personal whims, and passions of individuals played a greater role in the flow of events than would have been the case had the political party system been more mature and less amorphous. Strong parties could have served as restraining forces for psychologically oversensitive, "touchy" personalities anxious about their status, prestige, and personal honor, or what the Greeks call philotimo. In a society characterized by personalized politics, honor and prestige are as important values to be pursued as the material rewards that may accompany a ministerial position or accessibility to the seats of power and wealth. Hence the commonly told proverb in Cyprus, "polloi ton plouton emisisan alla ten doxan oudis" (many men have repudiated wealth, but none have turned away from glory).

Some formerly prestigious members of the business and professional community felt either betrayed or excluded from the power centers of society and consequently shifted their support to the disloyal opposition, the only opposition available. The former mayor of Nicosia, Themistocles Dhervis, was a prominent case. Another was former Chief Justice George Vassiliades, who was "retired" for his alleged critical attitude toward Makarios. A former leftist but noncommunist founder of AKEL in the early 1940s, Vassiliades was embittered; he eventually joined the opposition and was elected head of ESEA, the political arm of EOKA B. Another vivid illustration is the case of a millionaire lady of Nicosia, the richest woman entrepreneur in Cyprus, who for several years was the favorite of the establishment. Once a poor girl working in the bars of Regina Street, the Soho of Nicosia, she later married an American multimillionaire who owned a substantial number of shares in the Cyprus Mines Corporation. With her new wealth, she became a prominent member of high society. She was photographed with government officials, including Makarios, and her picture was repeatedly shown in the news. However, in spite of her generous donations to various institutions, she was unable completely to erase the stigma other earlier reputation. Eventually she was dropped from the rosters of high society and her picture no longer appeared on the front pages of local newspapers. This, more than anything else, allegedly led the millionairess to join the opposition and turned her into one of its wealthy patrons.

Personal frustrations and jealousies as well as differences in political opinions led to the withdrawal of support from Makarios and its transfer to EOKA B. However, none of these factors was strong enough to lead to widespread rejection of the regime. The bulk of the business and professional community remained loyal to it. Nevertheless, the disloyal elements that did exist played an important role in the regime's fall.

Fathers of the church    By far the most serious threat to the legitimacy and power of the Makarios government came from Makarios's own colleagues in the church's hierarchy. In 1972 the bishop of Kition, Anthimos; the bishop of Kyrenia, Kyprianos; and the bishop of Paphos, Gennadios, urged on by Constantine Panayiotakos, then Greek ambassador to Cyprus and well known for his intense anti-Makarios sentiments, sent an ultimatum to the archbishop demanding his resignation as president of the republic. They based their demand on the precept that "under the laws of the Orthodox Church an Archbishop should not hold temporal power.@[36] It was the first time in twelve years of Makarios's rule that such an argument had been advanced by the church fathers. When Makarios ran for election at the inception of independence, the bishops supported him. Nor did they object to his second bid for the presidency in 1968. The bishops' rebellion in 1972 and their subsequent attempt to defrock Archbishop Makarios may be explained as follows: The fundamental structural changes in Cypriot society after the establishment of the republic had a negative impact on Enosis and on the traditional role of the bishops. The loss of enthusiasm for Enosis hit these gatekeepers of traditionalism hard, as their fate was integrally connected with Enosis as an ongoing, dynamic movement. The bishops were excluded from the main- stream of power and influence they once enjoyed. The overwhelming majority of the clergy, however, supported Makarios.

Churchmen close to Makarios, the archbishopric, and the Kykko monastery enjoyed economic power and influence, if not prestige, by virtue of their closeness to the seat of power. The three bishops, however, either failed or were unable to participate in the new secular role of the Makarios-dominated church institutions. Thus they resorted to Enosis as a means of reasserting themselves and salvaging their lost honor. But Enosis as an appealing ideology was by then questionable.

An argument could be made that one of the reasons behind the bishops' alienation from Makarios was their long suppressed personal jealousies and frustrated ambitions. All three bishops were much older than Makarios and virtually had no chance of ever ascending to the archbishopric throne. The increasing popularity and power of Makarios must have intensified the sense of frustration of the bishops, who could hardly have expressed their sense of discontent before the Greek military junta, but the local disloyal opposition backed by terrorist groups offered such an opportunity. The bishops' lost prestige was vividly described by a disenchanted high-ranking clergyman, once an aspirant to a bishopric post:People no longer respect the clergy. The churches are emptying and have become gerokomoia (homes for the aged). . . . Bishops, like priests, no longer command the respect they once enjoyed. Fifteen, twenty years ago, whenever a bishop visited a town, the people welcomed him like a prince. They strewed flowers in his way, they laid red carpets for him, they welcomed him with palm trees. And his word and opinion were taken seriously. Now he is completely ignored. [37] In 1970, three years after the junta took power in Greece, the bishops showed the first signs of restiveness and discontent. In February of that year, the bishop of Kition, Anthimos, in a public address denounced Makarios's policy on Cyprus and demanded that the enosist spirit be reawakened. The bishop charged that "those who are governing us today are not Greeks, and they do not think Greek."[38] During the same month, the bishop thundered that "the schools are infiltrated with teachers with doubtful Greek sentiments," and that "they are corrupting the youth in an attempt to create in their minds a Cypriot conscience."[39] In May the bishops demanded that the Ethnarchic Council [40] be restored to its original functions and that they, as members of the Holy Synod, should constitute an advisory board for questions of "vital national interest." In a meeting with Makarios presiding, it was agreed that such a board along the lines of the earlier Ethnarchic Council be reestablished. Makarios allegedly agreed after adamant insistence by the three bishops. The resurrection of the Ethnarchic Council had been proposed by DEK (the party of the opposition) only a few months earlier. However, strong reactions by the other parties and the press nullified the decision, and it was never carried out. The decision to resurrect the council was denounced as anachronistic, antidemocratic, and an insult to the people.

            The Holy Synod intends to become a superstate by neutralizing the government, the Parliament, and the popular will. . . .
            Why, then, have a parliament, parties, elections, and intercommunal talks? . . . The Holy Synod completely ignores present realities. . . . 
            The  Ethnarchic Council was an institution during colonialism when there was no elected government or parties to guide the 
            peoples' struggle. . . . What self-respecting Cypriot would agree to serve either as a member of Parliament or as a minister 
            when he knows that every one of his action will have to be judged and approved by the four churchmen? [41]

Two years later the bishops sent an ultimatum to Makarios demanding that he resign from his position as president of the republic, devote himself to the church, reestablish the Ethnarchic Council, and place himself at the head of the Enosis movement. Makarios at first responded that he was ready to quit his secular position if the Holy Synod insisted, but he urged them to reconsider their decision in light of the "critical situation" in Cyprus. The bishops insisted. After mass demonstrations, sponsored by the various parties and workers' and farmers' organizations, against the fathers of the church erupted, Makarios "bowed" to popular will and refused to withdraw. The bishops then proceeded to implement their threats, that is, to defrock Makarios. Political feelings in Cyprus were intensified, with the opposition praising the action of the bishops and the pro-Makarios forces ridiculing it and declaring it null and void. To the bishops and their supporters, Makarios was no longer "Makarios" but Michael Mouscos, the lay name he had discarded when he was ordained as a priest.

The events that followed demonstrated once more Makarios's strengths, both as a popular and powerful leader and as a skillful diplomat, in handling crisis situations. The bishops' weaknesses were immediately exposed. Their warnings to all financial institutions that Makarios's signature was no longer valid for ecclesiastical transactions were ignored. Gennadios, the "appointee" as the locum tenens of the church, was turned back by Makarios's auxiliary police when he tried to enter the archepiscopal palace.

Makarios then announced that the decision of the bishops to defrock him was void; according to church laws, they lacked the authority to do so. Choruses of loyal theologians and clergymen attested to the validity of Makarios's claims. Only a Supreme Synod of Makarios's peers (other archbishops) and Orthodoxy's patriarchs, the most important of whom are the patriarchs of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, had the authority to judge whether he had violated canon law in his capacity as a secular head of state. Thus Makarios invited all the patriarchs to come to Cyprus in the summer of 1973 and mediate the schism within the church. One by one the holy fathers arrived, save for the patriarch of Constantinople.

The patriarchs concluded, as expected, that Makarios violated no church law and that it was the bishops who were at fault. The latter refused even to meet with the patriarchs, whom the opposition press called "agents of the Arabs and of Islam"-- they all came from Arab countries with which Makarios had excellent diplomatic relations. On July 14, 1973, the Supreme Synod concluded its deliberations by declaring the bishops guilty of schism. The bishops were then defrocked after they adamantly refused to meet with the patriarchs and apologize for their earlier action.

Makarios, then backed by strict security precautions, proceeded with the election of new bishops -- the higher clergy in Cyprus, including the archbishop himself, is elected by popular vote. Before the elections he created two additional bishopric seats. Thus their number was increased from three to five, and the territory over which each bishopric could have ecclesiastical jurisdiction and power was reduced. The Kyrenia seat was divided into two parts, one for Kyrenia and one for Morphou. The seat of Kition was divided into one for Limassol and one for Kition. With these changes the relative territorial ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the archbishopric and of the Paphos seat increased considerably. Paphos was Makarios's birthplace where he enjoyed his most monolithic support. In any case, the new bishops were totally devoted to Makarios. They were first designated by him as his favorites, and in a plebiscitarian manner the populace voted unanimously to affirm his choices.

The crisis in the church increased Makarios's power and brought all of the church's wealth directly or indirectly under his control. He informed all financial and commercial institutions that the signatures of the defrocked bishops were void and henceforth not to be honored in any financial transactions. A sale of land by the bishop of Kyrenia, which was transacted a few weeks before the defrockings and which amounted to ,100,000 Cypriot, was annulled. Examination of the records of the bishopric of Kition revealed some unaccounted for expenditures that were later traced to the terrorist organization EOKA B. The church institutions were in fact financially supporting paramilitary groups; the archbishopric and the Kykko monastery, the wealthiest institutions, offered their support to the loyalist forces, and the Kyrenia and Kition bishoprics offered theirs to EOKA B.

The opposition relentlessly exploited the schism within the church. A number of "Catacombs," or makeshift churches, appeared all over the island as places where Makarios's opponents met on Sunday mornings and conducted religious services performed by the defrocked bishops and the few clergymen who remained loyal to them. These "Catacombs" served as a focus of anti-Makarios propaganda and as a source of constant friction between the supporters and opponents of the government. The destruction of several of the "Catacombs" by loyalist extremists brought outcries against "establishment violence" and intensified political tensions on the island.

Makarios's authority survived this crisis, but the social turmoil generated as a result of the defrockings further polarized the society and prepared the psychological atmosphere for EOKA B's violent activities. Once again the church, in pursuit of a stable traditional order, became unwittingly a major source of internal instability and tension, a repetitive phenomenon from the very beginning of British rule. It was only through continuous crises that the church was able to control events in Cyprus in one form or another during this period when its authority as a political institution had receded under conditions of normalcy. Take the political instability away, and the entire edifice of ecclesiastical power would have collapsed. Given continuing instability, however, there were too many secular political centers, including the parties, particularly the leftist parties, that postponed the inevitable confrontation with the church as an institution because of the threats from the far Right. Attacking the church would have implied an attack on Makarios, the fountainhead of resistance against the Greek junta, Turkey, and all other foreign intruders. In the meantime, the commercialization of the church institutions proceeded unhindered. Authority was transformed into economic power. The disloyal forces, including the fanatical Grivas and the various foreign intruders, were the best allies of Makarios and his church from the point of view of maintaining their power and influence. I do not suggest that Makarios was consciously engineering the various crises to maintain himself in power. But the objective consequences of the perpetual Cyprus crises maintained the church (the archbishopric, Makarios, the Kykko monastery, the bishops) at the center of society.

Whether Makarios consciously or unconsciously failed to initiate solutions that would have eradicated instability and thus the power of the church is a question that only a psycho-historian can attempt to answer. But the onslaught of foreign intrusions was of such magnitude that such speculations are, for all practical purposes, peripheral in understanding the real causes of the collapse of the Cyprus republic. There were enough strains in Greek Cypriot society resulting from the clash between traditionalism and modernism, on the one hand, and between socialism and capitalism, on the other, to generate a disloyal opposition which aided foreign powers to penetrate Cypriot society and bring down the state. This will become even clearer when we examine the nature of recruitment into the ranks of EOKA B. In essence EOKA B reflected the configuration of the disloyal forces, the only significant difference being that this was a violent underground organization which, in cooperation with the Greek junta, succeeded in overthrowing Makarios.

Social-demographic characteristics of EOKA B    During 1973-74, the most critical period preceding the coup, the government of Cyprus used the newly formed auxiliary police to arrest and prosecute members of EOKA B after that organization stepped up its campaign of undermining the republic. The arrests were routinely reported in the press, where the name and often the occupation, age, and place of residence of the arresters were given. The following analysis is based on a file of these press reports kept from July 1973 to July 1974 as a means of locating the social bases of recruitment into the terrorist organization. Although not all of those arrested were necessarily members of EOKA B, on the basis of my field research it is fair to assume that a large number were. An examination of the information in the press reports of arrests will allow us to make further inferences about the nature of the disloyal opposition and the internal forces that brought down the Makarios government.

The total number of individuals who were arrested and charged with offenses against the state, ranging from possession of arms and ammunition, conspiracy to overthrow the government, armed attacks against police stations all the way to actual and attempted assassination, was 914. . .

On each dimension of age, occupation, and place of residence, these recruits differed in a number of significant ways from the recruits of the first guerrilla organization that fought the British in the 1950s. First, the age distribution was quite different. Whereas the members of EOKA were primarily in their teens and early twenties, averaging twenty-one years of age, the members of EOKA B were on the average twenty-nine years of age. More importantly only 2 percent of the members of EOKA B were under the age twenty and only 26 percent under the age of twenty-five. Furthermore, 40 percent were over the age of thirty, the bulk or 34 percent of the total, ranging from twenty-six to thirty years of age. Thus 74 percent of all the individuals in the sample were over twenty-six years of age, with the median as well as the mean age of twenty-nine.

Second, the majority of EOKA B recruits (60.3 percent, or 499 out of a total of 827) were residents of villages, which reflected the ratio of rural to urban population of about 60:40. It will be remembered that during the 1950s the overwhelming majority of the EOKA recruits were residing in the cities, particularly Nicosia, although originally they came from the rural areas. . . Of the urban recruits (39.7 percent), the majority came from Famagusta (11 percent), Limassol (12.6 percent), and Larnaca (7.1 percent), whereas only 6.7 percent were residing in Nicosia, the capital. This observation is particularly interesting when we take note of the fact that Nicosia constituted 18.2 percent of the total population of the island, whereas Famagusta had only 6.7 percent, Limassol, 8.1 percent, and Larnaca, 3.4 percent. In other words, Nicosia, although twice the size of the other three cities combined, had only a small fraction of the recruits. Most terrorist activities took place in Limassol, Famagusta, and to a lesser extent, Larnaca. In addition, the overwhelming majority of the rural recruits were residing in villages near these three cities. And, according to the data, a large number of those residing in the urban areas were originally from the rural areas.

Third, unlike the first EOKA, 32 percent of whose recruits were high school students, there were only two persons in that category in the EOKA B sample. And most significantly, 25 percent, or 95 of the total number of 376 in the EOKA B sample, were policemen (or discharged policemen) and Cypriot officers in the National Guard, an indication of the unreliability of the security forces and their role in the overthrow of Makarios. It will be recalled that a large number of policemen were former EOKA comrades and friends of Georkajis, who were embittered after his assassination and consequently turned against Makarios. Furthermore, the national guardsmen in the sample were part of the most anti-Makarios group and were members of the handpicked (by the Greek junta) officer corp. It was the group most intensively subjected to nationalist, proenosist propaganda. [The table below] also indicates that all segments of the Greek Cypriot population were represented in the terrorist organization. In the first EOKA there were virtually no recruits from the professional and business sectors, a consequence of the youthfulness of the recruits. Yet in the EOKA B sample they were sizably represented, 11 and 7 percent respectively. 
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Occupations of accused and convicted members of EOKA B

                                                                                                    Number                 Percent

Government employees
Policemen (65) and military officers (30)                                            95                         25
Civil servants                                                                                     22                          6

Office and sales personnel (white collar)                                             74                         20

Blue collar (technicians)                                                                      57                         15

Professionals (mainly lawyers, journalists, teachers)                             41                         11

Merchants and shopkeepers                                                               27                           7

Farmers                                                                                             27                            7

Personal services                                                                               23                             6

Other                                                                                                 10                            3

Total                                                                                                 376                        100
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Why these differences between the first guerrilla organization and EOKA B? Although more systematic research on the recruitment pattern will be necessary before any definite conclusions can be drawn, the present data provide tentative answers, which lie in the nature of social change during the post-independence period.

The most crucial development that could explain the changes in the recruitment pattern was the creation of a National Guard in 1964, immediately after the outbreak of intercommunal fighting. All Greek Cypriots born in 1940 and thereafter were obliged to serve up to two years in the army, where they were systematically subjected to virulent, violent, nationalistic propaganda. The army became the most serious breeding ground for future terrorists, as most of the political propaganda that the draftees were subjected to was not only pro-Enosis but primarily anti-Makarios and anti-leftist. For ten years (1964-74) thousands of Greek Cypriots were processed through this institution, which was organized and controlled by Greek officers sent for that purpose to the island by the Greek government. Thus the first draftees, who in 1964 were twenty-four years of age, were well into their middle thirties by 1973-74.

The major sphere of political socialization into Greek nationalism shifted from the high schools to the National Guard. During the anti-British campaign of the 1950s the segments of the population most exposed to nationalist ideology were the high school students. They were systematically socialized into accepting the ideals of Greek nationalism by the teachers of Greek philology, who dominated secondary education during the colonial era. Thus Grivas methodically exploited the patriotic enthusiasm of the "passionate youth" by directing most of his recruiting efforts toward that most receptive age group.

During the 1950s only a fraction of the Greek Cypriot population attended high school. Thus only this segment of the population was at that time systematically exposed to intense patriotic propaganda. But once the National Guard was established, all the segments of Greek Cypriot society were equally exposed to nationalist ideals. Furthermore, in contrast to the National Guard, the high schools (during independence) were controlled by the Cypriot government. Unlike the draftees in the National Guard, high school students were not subjected to anti-Makarios and antigovernment propaganda. And as the proportion of European-educated teachers increased, the students were no longer monolithically subjected to the traditional rhetoric of the philologists. This could explain why there were only two arrests of high school students and only 2 percent of the EOKA B recruits were under the age of twenty. In other words, most of the participants were veterans of the National Guard. Thus an important factor in the recruitment pattern, both in the first EOKA and in EOKA B, was political socialization. It was from groups intensely exposed to nationalist indoctrination that most of the recruits earner It should also be noted that as far as the present data are concerned, the bulk of the EOKA B recruits could not have participated in the first EOKA of the 1950s. Only fifty-one, or 16 percent, were over the age of thirty-five. And only individuals over that age group could have participated in the guerrilla war of the 1950s. However, some of the leaders of EOKA B were former members of the earlier underground . . ., and Stavros Syros; the latter was an officer in the National Guard and was considered second in command of EOKA B. But few as they were, these former EOKA heroes took leadership positions in EOKA B and served as symbolic links between the first and second guerrilla movements. Furthermore, with their experience and connections they were instrumental in recruiting younger members into the new underground organization.

It must also be mentioned that as the process of economic modernization advanced rapidly after independence, the countryside was drawn into the political arena and therefore became extensively exposed to the social issues emanating from the cities. Through the mass media, commuting, and the creation of rural organizations that were linked to and controlled by their urban counterparts, the countryside became an integral part of the urban sociopolitical order.[43] Yet, although the overall rural/urban ratio of recruitment into EOKA B reflected the population ratio, some parts of the island, like the Famagusta and Limassol areas, were more vulnerable to political extremism. Why the difference? Although no immediate data are available, it seems that these areas were experiencing greater economic development due to tourism, agricultural exports, and industrial development. A large number of the recruits came from the rich Kokkinochoria area near Famagusta, such as the villages of Oroklini, Ormidia, Milia, Achna, and Paralimni. These villages were becoming wealthy rapidly mainly because of agricultural exports (the potato-growing area of Cyprus) and partly because of commuting (for employment in the industrial and tourist areas of the nearby cities). But in rapidly changing societies, some become rich faster than others, while some may even lose their higher status, power, and wealth. Jealousies and hatreds that result from such differentials in individual upward mobility may find an outlet in political extremism. These observations are consistent with the generally accepted premise in sociology that rapid economic change is a de-stabilizing process giving rise to discontents among some segments of the population that feel for a variety of reasons left out of the mainstream of society.[44]

In addition to the differentials in the rate of change that may have played a major role in the recruitment pattern, the Famagusta and Limassol areas were less controlled by Makarios as compared to the rest of the island. In the Famagusta region [deleted] was the EOKA sector chief during the 1950s along with his friend Pavlos Pavlakis, another former EOKA chief. Papafotis had contacts there that enabled him to reestablish the new guerrilla organization on the remnants of the old one. Furthermore, the Limassol and Larnaca districts were the ecclesiastical seat of the bishop of Kition, another bitter opponent of Makarios. The bishopric functioned as an organizational nucleus of EOKA B in that area, and several of the employees of the bishopric were found in the sample of EOKA B. On the other hand, in the Nicosia and Paphos districts Makarios's power was unchallenged, as he controlled both the archbishopric and the Kykko monastery, the richest church institutions. Thus it seems that the geographical pattern of recruitment was the result of a combination of differences in rates of economic change plus the existence of institutional and personal networks of influence and control.

When the greater portion of the citizenry supports the status quo, as was the case in Cyprus, such discontents normally do not endanger the stability of society. However, minorities of malcontents become a threat to the established order when they are encouraged, organized, and financially supported by foreign powers that have an interest in overthrowing the political order of the country. Such was the case in Cyprus. . . .

From Kyriacos C. Markides, The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic (Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 76-121 (chapter 3).

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