In 1980-6 a number of initiatives were launched by the United Nations to bring about a peaceful settlement to the Cyprus problem. This was largely owing to the appointment in 1982 of Javier Perez de Cuellar as UN Secretary-General. Having served as the special representative of his predecessor in Cyprus in the 1970s, the new Secretary-General was fully aware of the complexities and intricacies of the protracted dispute and was eager to find a satisfactory solution. Here each initiative will be considered together with the response of the two Cypriot communities. There were no independent initiatives by any other organisation or country in this period, although deliberations took place over various UN initiatives concerning Cyprus between the two Cypriot communities and their mother-countries. These are also dealt with in this chapter, since they played a part in the peacemaking process. Meanwhile, the West and the Soviet Union generally maintained the same attitude towards the problem as they had in the previous years, although the United States showed renewed interest in a settlement; their positions will also be discussed.

The Interim Agreement' proposal

The first UN initiative during this period came from Secretary-General Waldheim in the fall and winter of 1980-1. This proposed an Interim Agreement between the disputants calling for, inter alia, the reopening of Nicosia's international airport to civilian traffic, the placing of Varosha under UN administration, and the lifting of some 70 per cent of the economic restrictions imposed by the Republic of Cyprus on the Turkish Cypriots.' The proposal was the result of a series of intercommunal talks, starting on 9 August 1980, under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General's special representative in Cyprus, Ambassador Hugo Juan Gobbi. The two communities were represented at the talks by George Ioannides for the Greek Cypriots, and Umit Suleyman Onan for the Turkish Cypriots. In an 'opening statement' produced by the Secretary-General and read by Ambassador Gobbi at the start of the talks, the common ground between the two communities was stated to be the following:

(1) Both parties have reaffirmed the validity of the high-level agreements of 12 February 1977 and 19 May 1979.

(2) Both parties have reaffirmed their support for a federal solution of the constitutional aspect and a bizonal solution of the territorial aspect of the Cyprus problem;

(3) Both parties have indicated that the matter of security can be raised and discussed in the intercommunal talks. It is understood that this matter will be discussed, having regard to certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community, as well as to the security of Cyprus as a whole;

(4) Both parties have appealed to the Secretary-General for the continuation of the intercommunal talks.'

The 'Opening Statement' also referred to four subjects to be discussed at the intercommunal talks on the basis of 19 May 1979 agreement:

(1) reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices, in accordance with the provisions of point 5 of the 19 May agreement;

(2) initial practical measures by both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions, in accordance with the provisions of point 6, which states that special importance will be given to this matter;

(3) constitutional aspects; and

(4) territorial aspects.

It was decided at the end of the formal opening session to adjourn the talks till 16 September 1980. It was also agreed that the contents of the talks be kept private and confidential. While they were in progress the two interlocutors met, almost weekly, under the auspices of the Secretary-General's special representative, at the UN conference area at the Ledra Palace Hotel in Nicosia. They tackled the four items mentioned above in succession till 2 April 1981, when they announced that they would reduce the number of meetings during May and June while elections were held in both parts of Cyprus." In his twice-yearly comprehensive report to the Security Council on all aspects of the UN operation in Cyprus, the Secretary-General stated on 27 May 1981: AAt the present stage, I have been given reason to believe that both parties may be prepared to make an intensive effort in the direction of a comprehensive settlement . . .@

The Greek-Cypriot attitude to the Interim Agreement' proposal.

The attitude of the Greek Cypriots to this proposal, and the negotiations that followed on 9 August 1980, reflected the views of the government of Cyprus at the time. Spyros Kyprianou, then president of Cyprus, though officially supporting the Interim Agreement (which also initially enjoyed the support of his foreign minister, Nicos Rolandis), rejected the proposal.

On entering into negotiations, the Greek Cypriots stated firmly that the procedure of the talks should on no account be interpreted as a modification of the two High-Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979. They also stressed that they were seeking a federal solution for the Cyprus problem, as envisaged in the 1977 and 1979 agreements. In their view, the federal state would comprise two federated states, one to be administered by the Greek Cypriots and the other by the Turkish Cypriots. The federal state, according to them, would be based on the accepted principles of federalism; there would be no border between the two regions and the central government would need to have sufficient power to ensure its unity. As a concession to the Turkish Cypriots, they accepted bi-regionality instead of multi-regionality which had been their original position. Subsequently the term 'bizonal' was used by the Greek-Cypriot side - the government of Cyprus - as a synonym for 'biregional' and in contrast to 'multiregional'. This term proved to be a controversial issue as the Greek Cypriots asserted that the Turkish Cypriot side had attached a different interpretation to the term than was originally accepted, as in an interview given by the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash:

The meaning of 'bizonal' is that I am a state that has territory as one of the two federated states. I am sovereign on many things within this territory. My sovereignty is absolute; no one can take it away from me.

It therefore seems that the difference between the two sides at this stage was that the Greek Cypriots wanted a federation and the Turkish Cypriots a confederation. This created a wide gap between the two sides because the implications of each solution was quite different. President Kyprianou said at the beginning of the talks: Our target is a solution to the Cyprus problem, a solution of biregional federation, in all its aspects ... the word bi-zonal refers in this case to the territorial aspect only. [...] It would be inconceivable to have a partition federation. [...] Therefore, it is not at all correct to say that we have accepted bizonality.  The different interpretations of the word 'bizonal' was the reason the Greek Cypriots could not agree to a settlement at this stage. 

The Turkish-Cypriot attitude to the Interim Agreement' proposal. 

Throughout the 1980s the Turkish Cypriots were under the leadership of Rauf Denktash, a fact very much reflected in the intercommunal talks and in the attitude of Turkish Cypriots to the Interim Agreement proposal. The fundamental issue for the Turkish Cypriot leadership was the nature of the federal government in any given proposal. It argued that 'federation must be built from the basis of the existing two de facto administrations and that Cyprus should be a "decentralised" or "weak", federation with provisions for slow and long-term progress to a customs union and centralised fiscal and economic policy-making.' Obviously, this differed widely from the Greek Cypriots' idea of a centralised federation, which Turkish Cypriots asserted was not a genuine 'federation', because a strong central government would have powers to override the units." This difference sometimes showed itself in a bitter fashion: at one stage Denktash called his opposite number Kyprianou 'a shortsighted Enosis puppet', lacking all qualities of seriousness, responsibility and understanding.

The 'Gobbi Initiative'

Despite the optimism of Secretary-General Waldheim, his proposed Interim Agreement did not produce the breakthrough he hoped for. However, it paved the way for another initiative devised by his special representative in Cyprus, Hugo Gobbi. The Gobbi Initiative of 22 October 1981 was officially sent to the parties in dispute a month later, on 18 November. Although this initiative also failed to bring about a peaceful settlement, it was significant in that it became a basis for later negotiations between the two communities. Indeed, all negotiations from October 1981 to January 1983 were based directly on it. No official release concerning this initiative was ever made, and all deliberations took place behind closed doors. These negotiations gave rise to the terms 'points of equidistance' and 'points of coincidence', the latter being those points where there was an approximate coincidence of views, and the former where a median position existed on various subjects between quite divergent standpoints.

On his appointment as UN Secretary-General, Perez de Cuellar found it useful to have frequent top-level meetings with the leaders of the two Cypriot communities. In April 1982 in Geneva, he met both Kyprianou and Denktash believing that the intercommunal talks were the best available method of continuing the negotiating process. He also maintained direct contact with the governments of Greece and Turkey, meeting their foreign ministers in New York between June and October 1982.

On 1 December 1982, the intercommunal talks were adjourned till 4 January 1983 for the annual recess; however, they subsequently suffered from the Turkish-Cypriots' disappointment with the Cyprus government's recourse to the General Assembly in May 1983, which led to Resolution 37/253 demanding 'the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Republic of Cyprus'. Nevertheless, the negotiations based on the Gobbi initiative allowed a number of proposals and counter-proposals to be exchanged between the two communities. Owing to the confidentiality of most of those proposals and their frequency, they cannot be outlined in full, but they dealt with the resettlement of Varosha, the promotion of goodwill gestures, the constitutional aspect and the territorial aspect.

The Greek Cypriot attitude to the 'Gobbi Initiative'. Because of the confidentiality of the negotiations, it is difficult to say precisely what the Greek Cypriot response was to every item in the Gobbi initiative, but the main obstacle was clearly the nature of the federation, particularly the interpretation of the term 'bizonality'. As the Press and Information Office of the Government of Cyprus (the Greek Cypriot side) put it, The Turkish Cypriot side insisted on partition through the establishment of two separate administrations under a loose federal system. Furthermore the Turkish Cypriot side indicated that it was not prepared to relinquish any significant part of the territory under occupation. The Turkish Cypriot leadership gave clear evidence of its intention to consolidate the faits accomplis rather than seek a solution, when in July 1982 it decided to grant Turkish Cypriots and settlers from Anatolia title deeds to Greek Cypriot property.

By resorting to the General Assembly the Cyprus government aimed in part to apply pressure on the Turkish Cypriot leadership; the resulting resolution was a reminder of the international standing of the Greek Cypriots, the strongest leverage they have had in the negotiations. The Turkish Cypriot attitude to the 'Gobbi Initiative'. The Turkish Cypriot response to the Gobbi initiative was in some ways different from that of the Greek Cypriots. The difference stemmed from the fact that Ambassador Gobbi approached the territorial aspect by tracing a line on the map of Cyprus with his finger, which allowed each side to interpret the 'Gobbi line' as it desired. The Turkish Cypriots were firm about their interpretation and were reported to have accepted that aspect, but there is no public record of the official response of either side.

In August 1983 a proposal, believed to have been drafted by the Secretary-General himself and usually referred to as 'the Initiative' (also as 'indicators', 'soundings', 'parameters' or 'aide-memoires') was officially sent to the disputants. According to its alleged text printed by a Cyprus newspaper, the Initiative made some fundamental proposals. First it suggested the idea of a rotating presidency whereby Turkish Cypriots could, like the Greek Cypriots, aspire to the headship of a reunified Cypriot state. Secondly, unlike in the 1960 Constitution, the legislature was to be bicameral rather than unicameral. The lower chamber was to have representatives of the two communities in proportion to their population, while upper chamber would host an equal number of representatives from each community. Each community would vote for its own members in the parliament. Thirdly, concerning the executive branch of a reunified Cyprus, the Initiative proposed a ratio of 60 per cent Greek Cypriots to 40 per cent Turkish Cypriots as against the 70:30 ratio in the 1960 Constitution. The amount of territory to be given back by the Turks would be 8-13 per cent, reducing the existing 37 per cent to either 29 or 24 per cent. What the Initiative amounted to, according to the newspaper, was that 'the Turks would hand back some territory now under their control, while the Greek side surrendered governmental powers now in their hands.'

The Greek-Cypriot attitude to 'the Initiative'. After initial signs to the contrary, the Initiative was eventually rejected by the Greek Cypriots, but not before it had caused a rift in the Cyprus government that led to the resignation of its foreign minister, Nicos Rolandis. Spyros Kyprianou remained in office following the presidential election on 13 February 1983. The ruling party, DIKO, complained that the proposal failed to recognise the three basic freedoms which are the inalienable rights of every human being - right to free movement, right of settlement and right to property - throughout the island for all Cypriots. The party argued that such rights are contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and could not be dispensed with in Cyprus. The 180,000 Greek Cypriot refugees, they said, should have the right to go back to their homes and live in their ancestral properties if they wished to do so. President Kyprianou himself was said to be lukewarm' towards the Initiative, while the foreign minister Rolandis was 'enthusiastic'. After much contention within the Greek Cypriot ranks, in which Greece allegedly played a part, the Cyprus government came out against the Initiative and Rolandis offered his resignation on 20 September 1983. This led to a public war of words between him and the Cyprus government, in which he allegedly complained that 'Mr Kyprianou [did] not want meaningful negotiations on the problem of Cyprus'.

The Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash flew to New York on 30 September 1983, and after talks with the Secretary-General on the Initiative expressed his wish to have a high-level meeting with President Kyprianou, to which the Greek Cypriot leader responded positively. The aim of the meeting, according to Turkish Cypriots, was to 'clarify the position of the two sides'. Barely a week later, however, the Initiative was stopped in its tracks by the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, on 15 November.  The TFSC (Turkish Federated State of Cyprus) of 13 February 1975 was thus changed to the TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus). The UDI dealt a devastating blow to UN peacemaking efforts, and provoked strong reactions from the Greek Cypriots and the United Nations. In his letter to the Secretary-General dated 15 November 1983, Denktash professed a conviction that the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will not hinder, but facilitate the re-establishment of the partnership between the two peoples within a federal framework',  adding that he 'sincerely desire[d] the continuation of Your Excellency's mission of good offices'.

The United Nations reaction to the UDI. However, in resolution 541 of 18 November 1983, the UN Security Council forcefully rejected the UDI stating that it 'deplores the Declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of the part of the Republic of Cyprus'; that it 'considers the Declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal'; and also 'calls upon all states not to recognise any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus'. The Security Council again asked the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices 'in order to achieve the earliest possible progress towards a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus'.

The Greek Cypriot reaction to the UDI. Not surprisingly, the Greek Cypriot response to the UDI was vehement. In an immediate statement on the day it took place. President Kyprianou claimed that the action 'not only complicated further the Cyprus problem but made it clear that the intention of the Turkish side was always to create faits accomplis and to create conditions for the secession of the occupied area from the Republic of Cyprus.'

The Greek Cypriots asserted that the UDI not only violated the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus but was also against the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and international law. Vienna 'Working Points' proposed by the Secretary-General After his Initiative had failed as the result of UDI by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar had meetings with the leaders of the two communities in the second half of November 1983, and in the same period also met the foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey, Messrs Haralambopoulos and Turkmen. In all his contacts the Secretary-General stressed to the parties the provisions of Security Council Resolution 541 and urged them to cooperate fully with him in attempting to bring about a peaceful settlement.

On 11 January 1984 President Kyprianou presented a document to the Secretary-General, containing six sections, as a proposal for a settlement. This plan, initially intended by the Greek Cypriot leadership to be top secret, eventually found its way to the press. It proposed the demilitarisation of Cyprus, an international force under UN auspices (with troops from countries not involved in the dispute) to maintain peace and security, international guarantees with no interested country as a party to the guarantee, and a genuine federation. It also allowed for territorial concessions to be made to the Turkish Cypriots allocating 25 per cent of the land to be under their control, provided that Famagusta in the east and Morphou in the north were returned to the Greek Cypriots. Finally, the document asked for a workable constitution, which the plan elaborated as follows:

(1) A Greek-Cypriot president and a Turkish-Cypriot vice-president; a council of ministers with 70:30 ratio of Greek Cypriots to Turkish Cypriots.

(2) Unicameral legislature preferred to a bicameral one; if the latter were adopted, a lower chamber with proportional representation of the two communities and an upper chamber with representation depending on the functions of the chamber.

(3) A federal supreme court, with equal representation of the two communities.

(4) The federal government to have powers over foreign affairs, international communications, passports, customs and tariffs etc.

(5) The three freedoms of movement, settlement and right to property to be secured throughout the country.

On receiving Kyprianou's framework proposals, the Secretary-General discussed a summary of them with Denktash. When Denktash complained that he should have been given a full text of Kyprianou's proposals, Perez de Cuellar said: I know that you would reject it totally, and it is not my purpose to give parties what they will reject; I try to find something that they could accept. That is why I did not give it to you.'

On 16 March 1984 the Secretary General met Denktash in New York, and during their discussions asked him to stop the consolidation of TRNC and refrain from seeking recognition for it. He also had talks with the Cyprus foreign minister, George lacovou, on 19 and 20 March. These meetings were intended to revitalise the intercommunal talks, which had been frozen since the Turkish Cypriot UDI, and were given substance by the following five-point plan (quoted verbatim):

(1) No further step to internationalise the Cyprus problem will be undertaken, and initiatives now underway will not be pursued.

(2) There will be no follow-up to 15 November 1983 declaration by the Turkish Cypriots, and initiatives currently underway would not be pursued.

(3) Both sides will make reciprocal commitments to the Secretary-General not to increase qualitatively or quantitatively the military forces in the island. They would also agree to a system of verification inspections by UNFICYP.

(4) The Turkish Cypriot authorities will transfer the Varosha area...to the Secretary-General, who will place it under interim United Nations administration, as part of the buffer zone controlled by UNFICYP. The transfer will be effected in phases over a period of six to nine months, to be agreed upon between His Excellency, Mr Denktash, and the Secretary-General and announced at the time of a high-level meeting.[...] It is understood that the area will not revert to the jurisdiction of the Greek Cypriots until a final agreement on a settlement of the Cyprus problem has been reached. No armed personnel other than UNFICYP will have access to this area.

(5) The parties will agree to accept a call by the Secretary-General for the holding of a high-level meeting and to the reopening of the intercommunal dialogue.

These proposals failed to win the support of the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

The Secretary-General's next move was to present on 7 August 1984 in Vienna, a set of ideas known as the Vienna Working Points to the representatives of the two communities, Messrs Mavromatis and Ertekun. According to press leaks' the Vienna Working Points consisted of the following items:

(1) Famagusta to be put under UN control and the eventual return of Greek Cypriots to their homes in that city.

(2) Reopening of Nicosia's international airport for use by both communities. This would be done under UN auspices but under Cypriot (both communities) administration.

(3) An immediate end to any further internationalisation of the Cyprus problem by the Greek Cypriots and a simultaneous stop to Turkish Cypriots seeking recognition for TRNC.

(4) Firm commitment by the leadership of both communities to the acceptance of the High-Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979.

(5) Agreement by both sides that a transitional government would implement any agreement reached and also work out the details of the federal constitution.

The Secretary-General was also said to have asked the two sides to consider four questions:

(1) Do the two communities agree to discuss the Working Points?

(2) If the Working Points are agreeable to both sides, would they therefore accept talks under his auspices towards an agreement?

(3) Should the talks prove successful, would the two leaders be prepared for a summit meeting?

(4) In case of agreement with the above items, would the first week of September be convenient to the two sides for the commencement of the talks'

After much domestic political manoeuvring, mainly by the Greek Cypriots, both sides responded positively. The way was now open for further progress through what were to be known as the Proximity Talks. The Greek-Cypriot attitude to the Vienna 'Working Points'. After the UDI by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, the Greek Cypriot's disappointment showed itself in various statements by the government of Cyprus. All the same, their overall attitude to the UN and its peacemaking efforts remained positive. Its most vociferous supporter was the communist party AKEL, operating south of the Green Line that marks the north-south divide in Nicosia between the two communities. At that time, the ruling party, DIKO, relied on AKEL's support in the parliament under a pact called the 'minimum programme'.

On 16 August 1984, after the questions had been put to the disputing parties by the Secretary-General for consideration, the foreign minister of Cyprus declared publicly that granting any more concessions to the Turkish Cypriot side would be tantamount to a 'slow death under the illusion of salvation'.  However, President Kyprianou consulted the Greek government as well as leaders of political parties at home on the Secretary-General's latest initiative. According to a Greek Cypriot daily, the president asked the Secretary-General to postpone a planned trip to Cyprus in September; it can only be guessed that Kyprianou was under conflicting pressure from various political groups that prolonged his indecision over the Working Points. His eventual positive response, however, merely meant that the Greek Cypriot side was prepared to discuss the Working Points but not necessarily accept them as they stood.

The Turkish Cypriots' attitude to the Vienna 'Working Points'. The Turkish Cypriot side gave a positive response to the Working Points and the questions put down by the Secretary-General. Their response, accepting the initiative, came first on 7 August 1984 from Ertekun and was later reaffirmed on 31 August.

On 10 September 1984 Proximity Talks began in New York. They were conducted in three rounds and led to the High-Level Summit of January 1985 in New York between Kyprianou and Denktash. They were held under the auspices of the UN and directly involved the Secretary-General, who acted as the go-between and met the two delegations separately throughout; they led to the Secretary-General devising a 'draft agreement' which was eventually refused. It should be noted that the Vienna Working Points, which had led to the Proximity Talks, did not bind the parties as to what the Talks should contain; rather they covered the whole range of issues related to the Cyprus problem.

The first round of the Proximity Talks began on 10 September 1984 and lasted for ten days till 20 September. The Secretary-General suggested three headings for discussion: confidence-building measures, the structure of the federal government, and territorial adjustments. He also proposed a re-commitment of the two sides to the High-Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979 and the points agreed during intercommunal talks' and recommended that the negotiations be kept confidential. This did not prevent leaks: two days after the start, a Greek Cypriot newspaper reported that the Secretary-General had proposed the reopening of Nicosia's international airport and the rehousing of the Greek Cypriots in the city of Famagusta under the heading of confidence-building measures and under UN auspices. The substance of the Cyprus problem and the structure of the federal government were also discussed. Every aspect of the problem, including the three freedoms of movement, settlement and ownership received the attention of the two parties. This first round was rather complicated, with discussion on every small detail concerning the federal government and constitutional matters. Perhaps a more general outlook at this stage would have served the purpose better; at any rate, not much progress was made and the negotiations halted on 20 September. The Secretary-General, however, described the first round as 'thorough and businesslike'.

The second round began on 15 October and ended eleven days later. The agenda was set by the Secretary-General and again, though meant to remain confidential, somehow leaked to the press. According to the leak, the agenda comprised two levels, one staling the points already agreed and the other describing the points to be agreed. The points already agreed by the parties included acceptance of the 1977 and 1979 High-Level Agreements, and the establishment at the earliest date of the federal republic of Cyprus, to be bicommunal in its constitution and bizonal in its territory. It also included acceptance of those constitutional points already agreed in the 1981-3 intercommunal meetings: international representation of the Republic to be the function of the federal government, sovereignty to be exercised by the federal government on behalf both federated states and their respective territories, and the agreement on single citizenship afforded by the federal government. Points to be agreed were the powers and functions of the central government such as federal finance, foreign affairs, international transport, post and communications, defence and security, federal health paper'." Kyprianou refused to sign it as it stood and the summit ended in failure.

According to the Greek Cypriot version of events, the summit was not intended to be a mere formality but rather a forum for further negotiations; they claimed that this had been made clear by the Secretary- General in advance64 and blamed the Turkish Cypriot side for refusing to negotiate the points contained in the 'draft agreement'. Meanwhile, Kyprianou's refusal to sign the agreement brought him much criticism at home; he had been under pressure from the right-wing DISY and the communist AKEL to be more flexible. The former foreign minister Rolandis launched an attack with an open letter to the President:

I am happy neither with the New York melodrama with its multitude of substantial statements, nor with the resulting confusion and misunderstanding... Have you not, by your actions at the proximity talks and after, opened the door for Denktash to create new fait accomplish [...] You have no right to play on the future of Cyprus the unacceptable tricks you have played on the political parties.

Some of the international press, as well as some of the Greek Cypriot press, also blamed the failure on President Kyprianou: according to The Times of London, 'UN officials said President Kyprianou even questioned the basic tenets and principles of an accommodation.' However, some believe that Kyprianou had every intention of coming to an agreement after an acceptable framework had been negotiated between the parties, and this would seem to be confirmed by his acceptance of the draft agreement at the eleventh hour, with the condition that another summit be held to negotiate four issues: withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus, the three freedoms of movement, settlement and right to property, guarantor powers, and lastly the areas to be returned to the Greek Cypriots by the Turkish Cypriots. The last point was apparently of the utmost importance to the Greek Cypriot side, since 'Kyprianou evidently staked the outcome of the talks on the exact location of the land to be returned'.

It is difficult if not possible to determine for certain whether or not the failure of the Proximity Talks should be imputed to Kyprianou. He had expressed his reservations from the beginning and came to the summit with the aim of negotiating further. There was no immediate election in prospect for him at the time, which strengthened his position. What is certain is that his handling of the summit contributed to its failure and put good propaganda material into the hands of the Turkish Cypriots. As we shall see, Denktash was perhaps not enthusiastic for an agreement either, but if that is true, then Kyprianou played into his hands. . . .

The Turkish-Cypriot attitude to 'Proximity Talks'. On the surface, the Turkish Cypriot position in the Proximity Talks was clear. They accepted the Secretary-General's draft agreement 'as if the Greek Cypriots would do so too. If they did accept it, then negotiations could be expanded. It should be noted that they accepted the whole document without exceptions. Denktash said that he had been promised by the Secretary-General that 'not even a comma of this paper can be altered without your consent and I shall be there to see that this is so. [...] The document is to be accepted as a whole or rejected.' The sticking point was the question of the powers and functions of the central government, which the Turkish Cypriots insisted should evolve from the two existing regional administrations rather than the central authority devolving powers to the two regions. In their view the question of territory and the exact areas allocated for each federated state, though important, was to be decided after agreement on other issues and on the basis of economic viability, land ownership and security.

It is difficult to know whether Denktash was genuine in accepting the draft agreement. The 'working points' which had initiated the Proximity Talks seemed to some observers to favour the Turkish Cypriots' position on central government. Thus, basically, he had a good deal. But he was under pressure from Turkey to come to an agreement and to reject it could have proved costly to him. His wariness in the negotiations suggests that he accepted it only in anticipation that Kyprianou would reject it. One observer noted:

In the Greek Cypriot view...shared by some well-placed diplomats, Mr Denktash is more inclined to consolidate his secession than to give anything more than lip-service to the effort to find a federal solution.

If this was the case, Denktash played his hand well, refusing to accept Kyprianou's request for another summit on the grounds of the forthcoming Turkish-Cypriot elections. He had got out of a tight corner very successfully.

The 'Draft Framework Agreement'

Towards the end of 1985 and the beginning of 1986, the Secretary-General had meetings with both parties in London and Geneva to discuss points of convergence and tackle the points of divergence between the two sides' On 29 March , he presented a new Draft Framework Agreement, which was made public and was accompanied by a letter to the leaders of the two communities. The Secretary-General also sent copies to the permanent members of the Security Council as well as to Greece and Turkey. However, this initiative also failed to find an agreement acceptable to both sides. The 1986 Draft Framework Agreement was similar in many ways to the failed January 1985 summit proposals. However, it differed in tone on the uneasy formula equating the Greek Cypriots' concession over the powers of the central government with the Turkish-Cypriots' concession over the amount of territory they would part with. The issues of security and defence were left for later negotiations of new defence treaties. The legislature was to be the same as that proposed in January 1985, but important matters would require separate majorities for each community represented in the parliament. A working group was to be set up to discuss the three freedoms, and a timetable was to be agreed for the withdrawal of foreign troops. It was understood that the amount of territory to be given to the Turkish Cypriots was to be at least 29 per cent.

The Draft Framework Agreement was rejected by the Greek Cypriot side. The Secretary-General in his Report of 11 June to the Security Council regretted that, 'since one side is not yet in a position to accept the draft framework agreement of 29 March 1986, the way is not yet open to proceed with the negotiations I have proposed for an overall solution' ?" In response to suggestions by the Cyprus government about convening an international conference on the Cyprus problem, an idea for which he had no mandate, the Secretary-General said he had told Kyprianou that the Security Council was divided on the matter. Twenty-two years after the United Nations was first entrusted with the mission of bringing about a peaceful settlement for the island. The Cyprus problem had yet again proved impervious to his mission of good offices. The Greek-Cypriot attitude to the 'Draft Framework Agreement'. The bitter criticism the Greek Cypriot leadership faced at home for its handling of the New York summit eased somewhat with their acceptance of the 'draft agreement' of April 1985. This was viewed as a concession and following the Turkish Cypriot rejection of it, the Greek Cypriot leadership were reassured by the UN Secretariat that any new document would include only cosmetic changes and would not differ in substance. According to Greek Cypriots, however, the new Draft Framework Agreement ran contrary to such assurances. Their main objections were as follows:

(1) It ignored the criterion of the number of refugees to return to their homes, thus blocking the way to a fair settlement of the territorial problem.

(2) It accorded full political equality to the Turkish Cypriot minority of 18 per cent with the Greek Cypriot majority of 80 per cent without the corresponding balance in the government structure.

(3) It provided for Turkish Cypriot vetoes on all matters both in the Executive and the Legislative, without adequate deadlock-resolving mechanisms.

(4) It provided for a separate international personality for the constituent members allowing them to act as sovereign states.

(5) It did not provide for an effective implementation of the three freedoms (movement, settlement, property ownership), which are essential attributes of citizenship in any state.

(6) It prescribed a predominantly confederal rather than a federal state.

On 20 April President Kyprianou wrote to the Secretary-General, citing three topics to be negotiated at a meeting between himself and Denktash: withdrawal of Turkish forces and settlers, effective international guarantees, and application of the three freedoms of movement, settlement and the right to property.

In a subsequent letter dated 10 June, he expressed his reservations as follows:

When confronted with the proposals of the 'draft framework agreement' the concept of the integrated whole on its own is not sufficient protection for our position, as the Greek Cypriot side would find itself bound by unworkable constitutional and other arrangements prejudicial to it, without benefiting from any corresponding obligation on the part of the Turkish Cypriot leadership with regard to all those matters which are of vital concern to the Greek Cypriots.

Other Greek Cypriot leaders were more direct, telling American reporters simply that the proposals should be scrapped.

The Turkish Cypriot attitude to the 'Draft Framework Agreement'. The Turkish Cypriot leadership's response to the Draft Framework Agreement was positive, possibly because it was now in a stronger position. During the preceding year, the Turkish Cypriot leadership had consolidated their declaration of a 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'. First, on 12 March 1985, their constitution was put to referendum and subsequently, on 23 June of the same year, parliamentary elections were held in the north of the island. These actions were essentially 'double edged'. On the one hand, they infuriated the Greek Cypriots and caused uproar among their press and politicians, boosting the position of radicals in the south. On the other hand, by opening up the prospect, however remote, of acquiring international recognition at some future date, they put pressure on the Greek Cypriots to grant further concessions. The Turkish Cypriots' earlier rejection of the 1985 draft agreement may have been the result of their unwillingness to negotiate before this process of consolidation had taken place. Whether the measures were taken merely to apply pressure on the Greek Cypriot side or to seek a separate political identity is still open to question. (Like President Kyprianou, Denktash was not immune to opposition at home, although opposition figures such as Ozker Ozgur, leader of the Turkish Republican Party were discriminated against quite strongly and suffered from persecution in the north of the island and hence tended to play a smaller role than their Greek Cypriot counterparts). In response to Kyprianou's suggestion of a summit to discuss the withdrawal of Turkish troops, guarantees and the three freedoms, Denktash told the Secretary-General: The Turkish Cypriot side is definitely against any new procedures envisaging any form of secret or 'shuttle' diplomacy or any kind of summit meeting prior to the Greek Cypriot acceptance of the 'Draft Framework Agreement'. Such new procedures would clearly fall outside the scope of the integrated-whole character of the 'Draft framework agreement'.

The issues that divided the two parties on the Draft Framework Agreement seem to have been precisely those that Kyprianou wanted to discuss. For Turkish Cypriots the only effective guarantee was provided by Turkey;86 Turkish troops could not leave the island before the establishment of the transitional federal government without threatening their security. Nor, in their view, could the three freedoms be practised throughout the island without some sort of regulation. For the Greek Cypriots the reverse was the case. The events of 1974 demonstrated only too clearly that Turkey was the only country which could not be entrusted with any guarantee status whatever and Turkish troops should leave as soon as the agreement was signed, since their continued presence only increased tension by threatening the security of the Greek Cypriot community. In any case, the three freedoms were the inalienable rights of any citizen of any country in the world, embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; why make an exception in the case of Cyprus? These fundamentally opposite views could not be reconciled in the context of the Draft Framework Agreement, although the three freedoms were the issue that promised further progress, as both sides did show some sign of flexibility on the subject.

In November 1986, in a meeting at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in London, Denktash reiterated his position concerning the Draft Framework Agreement, and said he would still be prepared to enter into negotiations with the Greek Cypriots on that basis.

OUTSIDE POWERS AND INTERNATIONAL PEACEMAKING IN CYPRUS, 1980-1986

The United Kingdom.
During the 1980-6 period Britain's general attitude to the Cyprus problem, except in 1983, can best be described as one of inactivity. After the Conservative election victory in 1979, the issue was not even referred to in the parliamentary programme, despite protests from the back benchers, which seemed to indicate lack of interest.

However, the government continued to support the United Nations peacemaking efforts. The government did respond decisively to the Turkish Cypriot UDI, requesting an urgent meeting of the Security Council and submitting a draft resolution (Resolution 541 of the Security Council of 1983) condemning the UDI and demanding its immediate withdrawal. . .

Greece.
The 1980-6 period continued to see the profound impact of Greek foreign policy over Cyprus, possibly greater even than in the aftermath of 1974 coup and the invasion. That is to say, the relations between Greece and Turkey affected the way Greece used its influence in Cyprus, to the extent that in 1986 the Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou was accused by the United States of using Cyprus as part of his anti-Turkish policy, and of being the source of Greek Cypriot intransigence in the intercommunal negotiations. Certainly, Cyprus was universally seen in Greece as an indication of Turkish intentions in the Aegean, with particular implications for the security of the Greek islands along the Turkish coast. The 1981 election of the Greek Socialist Party, PASOK had a direct Its leader, Papandreou, was less flexible than his predecessor. In February 1982 he became the first Greek prime minister to visit Cyprus, and later he supported Kyprianou in refusing to sign either the agreement at the summit of January 1985 or the Draft Framework Agreement of March 1986. This negative attitude can be imputed to the Greek government's view of Turkey as the main enemy of Hellenism generally and, by extension, of Greece itself. The close relations of the United States with Turkey on the one hand and the comparatively poor ones with Greece added to the Greek government's sense of insecurity in the face of an enemy that was militarily three times stronger than Greece. . . .It can hardly be disputed that for most of the 1980-6 period Greece

had difficult relations with the United States. It was the only EC country not to impose sanctions on Poland in the early 1980s when martial law was introduced there, and the only NATO country not to approve the deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles in Europe. Papandreou repeatedly stated his intention of closing all US bases in Greece by 1988 and refused to allow US marines to be resupplied at Greek ports. The reason Papandreou's government did not withdraw Greece from NATO altogether was that this would only have enhanced Turkey's strategic significance even further. Greece's poor relations with the United States made Greco-Turkish relations more confrontational in a situation where their common membership of the Atlantic Alliance afforded Greece the security of the big protector, the United States. Greek policy-makers were well aware that the United States could not afford to allow Turkey to engage in military conflict with Greece, hence their leverage with Cyprus.

Overall the Greek impact on peacemaking in Cyprus during this period was negative because of its bad relations with Turkey. As the stronger of the two countries, Turkey could not be allowed to extricate itself from Cyprus unscathed, depriving Greece of a useful stick with which to beat its old adversary; if nothing else, the issue could be exploited to block or reduce the US administration's aid to Turkey.

Turkey.
Turkey's involvement continued on the same level as in the post-invasion period, dominated as before by the island's strategic importance and by the security of the Turkish Cypriots. In 1980 Turkey was suffering from chronic domestic violence: the monthly death toll had reached 200, double that of 1979, and there were said to be at least forty-seven terrorist factions roughly split between leftists on the one hand and separatists and religious or right-wing extremists on the other.'"' In September 1980 a military coup took place and martial law came into force; civilian rule was not restored till December 1983. This confusion had a negative effect on the peace process.

After the military takeover, General Evren, the new head of state, sent a message to the Turkish Cypriot leadership which described Cyprus as 'the daughter of the motherland' and 'an integral part of Turkey'. On a visit to the TRNC in 1986, Turkey's prime minister Turgut Ozal remarked: 'The moment I set foot here, I felt myself in one of the provinces, towns and villages of Turkey. There is no difference.' Such statements reinforced suspicions in Greece and among Greek Cypriots of Turkish intentions, making the granting of concessions by the Greek Cypriots even more difficult. The tendency to treat Cyprus as part of Turkey also drew criticism from Turkish-Cypriot politicians; when Ozal visited northern Cyprus, he came, the opposition leader Ozker Ozgur said, 'not ... as a guest but as if he were the owner of the TRNC.'

Turkey's control over the northern third of the island has indeed been extensive and multifaceted. In 1984, as in other years, Turkey provided two-thirds of its budget. Militarily it has had full control since 1974, with some 40,000 troops stationed there, while in terms of communication it has been the only route to the outside world for northern Cyprus because of the international boycott of the TRNC. Even in Turkish Cypriot internal politics Turkey continued to play a dominant role in the 1980-6 period for instance interfering directly in leadership elections in Denktash's National Unity Party. As Turkey was the only country to extend recognition to the UDI, there can be little doubt that during this period it could have influenced Denktash, despite claims that he enjoyed considerable autonomy.

However, like Greece, Turkey did not view the Cyprus problem in isolation but as an important bargaining counter in its differences with Greece over the Aegean. Also, as Turkey's relations with the West improved further in this period, it could be exploited for the fulfilment of its ambition to join the European Community, for example by offering concessions in exchange for a more welcoming posture. During the 1980-6 period, however, there was no move on either of these fronts, and Turkey therefore lacked any motive to yield on Cyprus. The only factor that might have persuaded it to make a move on the Cyprus problem was its dependence on the West, and the impact of the problem on the assistance it received from that quarter. For instance, in March 1984 the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to withhold $215m in military aid unless Turkey handed over control of Famagusta to the UN.' However, such measures were ineffective: 'if they have tied the aid to concessions on Cyprus', the Turkish prime minister reported, 'then they are dreaming.'

Perhaps the failure of such measures can be attributed to the strategic importance of Turkey and Turkey's own awareness of its significance. Besides controlling naval traffic through the Bosphorus, it straddles the air routes connecting the Soviet Union to the Middle East and is ideally placed to support Western intervention in the Persian Gulf. " The latter became particularly important after the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the consequent loss by the United States of an important ally;'" any undue pressure over Cyprus carried the risk of distancing Turkey from the West, which the West could not afford. A visit by General Evren to Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia in 1982, together with a visit to Moscow by the Turkish foreign minister earlier in the same year, had shown that Turkey was capable of forging closer ties with the East. So Turkish policy-makers could be confident that sticking to their guns over Cyprus would not greatly jeopardise assistance from the West, particularly as the Reagan administration had adopted a pro-Turkish policy.

Overall, the 1980-6 period was disappointing where the Turkish attitude to peacemaking in Cyprus was concerned. Although officially it paid lip-service to intercommunal negotiations" its actions tended to go in the opposite direction. Certainly, Turkey knew well in advance about the UDI and supported it,' 13 in spite of the fact that it effectively ended the 1983 UN Initiative.""* Cyprus was too important an issue for Turkey to yield on without gaining concessions in the Aegean or over EC membership. It could not add to the insecurity of a ring of Greek islands threatening its Western coast by withdrawing its troops from a large island a mere 40 miles away where, moreover, communist influence was strong.

One Turkish diplomat said to a Greek counterpart in the late 1980s, 'We have won in Cyprus, it is just a matter of time for you to realise it.'

The United States.
In the 1980-6 period the US attitude to the Cyprus problem showed a marked difference compared to the past, with Washington being more active in trying to bring a peaceful end to the conflict. The geo-strategic significance of the island had been enhanced with the advances of Soviet influence in the region and the corresponding decline of US influence in the early 1980s. The minimum requirement for the State Department was that the Cyprus problem should not be allowed to escalate into a Greco-Turkish war since both countries were members of NATO. The change in emphasis arose out of three considerations associated with Cold War diplomacy: helping the US build a stronger NATO, Cyprus being within the Western sphere of influence; alleviating the prospect of a Greco-Turkish conflict; and removing domestic opposition to further military aid to Turkey, which Congress held responsible for the impasse. An example of this was seen in 1984 when the shift in US policy over Cyprus manifested itself in the High-Level Summit of January 1985 between the two community leaders in New York. Earlier, on 22 November 1984, President Reagan had sent a letter to his Turkish counterpart. General Kenan Evren, asking him to apply pressure on Denktash for more flexibility.'2' Partly as the result of this the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus met in January 1985, for the first time in six years. The United States also showed interest in the UN peacemaking efforts, sending a State Department counsel, Edward J. Derwinski, to Cyprus to help out. The US government rounded off these diplomatic moves with the offer to Cyprus of a $250 million grant in the event of a breakthrough. All this was applauded by the Greek Cypriots.

As before, US policy during this period was dictated by Cold War considerations: containment of the aggressive Soviet military and politi- cal posture in the region required careful and firm planning. According to a report in 1984, the Warsaw Pact forces could 'operate anywhere in the Mediterranean, endangering the security of sea lines of communication which are of vital importance to the NATO nations in the Southern Flank.' In planning and implementing an effective strategy to combat the Soviets in the area, Cyprus played an important part, through its location and the relatively large size of its geographical area and its population on the one hand, and its ability to create tensions on the other.

To be in a position to bring about a solution to the Cyprus problem, the US government had to have good relations with the two mother-countries, Greece and Turkey, whose influence in their respective communities in Cyprus was considerable. A factor was the presence in the United States of about 1.25 million Greek Americans and 54,000 Turkish Americans, although the influence of the Greek lobby in Washington tended to be outweighed by Turkey's strategic significance as one of the two NATO countries (Norway being the other) to have a border with the Soviet Union, with 630,000 soldiers ready to fight under Alliance command. But while Turkey enjoyed support in the Pentagon, the presence of its troops in Cyprus in violation of international law caused the State Department to support Greece.

During the 1980s US relations with Turkey warmed, with President Reagan's election and the coming to power of the military government in Turkey, both of which led to a strengthening of military and commercial ties. . . .

The amount of US aid to Turkey increased dramatically between 1982 and 1983, and trade between the two countries also grew substantially."' All this meant that the United States had more influence in Turkey, which helped to bring about the 1985 New York summit between the two Cypriot leaders.

US relations with Greece took a turn for the worse following the election of the socialist government in 1981, reaching their nadir in June 1985 when the US government issued travel advice to its citizens warning that it no longer had faith in the Greek government's anti-terrorist efforts, and considered Athens airport unsafe for travellers. Ironically, this warning acted as a spur to improved relations between the two countries, and the following month the warning was withdrawn. However, US relations with Greece during the first seven years of the 1980s never had the significance and warmth of those with Turkey. In view of America's willingness to use its influence with Greece and Turkey and its encouragement and support for UN efforts, why was the Cyprus conflict not settled in this period? Without its support no solution could have been envisaged. The answer to this question is twofold. First, the extent of US influence in Greece and Turkey should not be overestimated, and secondly, the American perception of the Cyprus problem suffered from certain inadequacies.

The amicable relations between the United States and Turkey in 1980-6 were mutually beneficial: the United States strengthened the Atlantic Alliance, and Turkey built up its military and its poor economy with American aid. Any worsening of relations would have been detrimental to both countries; thus US leverage with Turkey over the Cyprus problem was limited, and 'heavy-handed pressure could backfire'. As for Greece, the socialist government of Papandreou was not particularly amenable to pressures from the United States, and there too, US influence was limited. Another limiting factor was US policy-makers' perception of the Cyprus problem as basically an intercommunal dispute rather than, as Leigh Bruce put it, the result of 30 years of shortsighted policy and manipulation by outside powers - Great Britain, Greece, Turkey, and the United States. Underestimating the international aspect, perhaps the most important aspect of the Cyprus problem, hampered US efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement to the conflict. However, none of these factors - the limited influence of the United States with Turkey and Greece, and its perception of the Cyprus problem as primarily an intercommunal one - altered the fact that the United States was the only actor with sufficient leverage to influence all the parties to the problem. Meanwhile, its support for the UN peacemaking efforts, though half-hearted at times, was more forthcoming in this period than in the preceding ones. The UN was still a forum where the Soviet Union could become a party in the making of a Cyprus solution, and as such it was viewed with some concern by the United States. . . .

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During the 1980-6 period, the United Nations was more active in taking various initiatives to solve the Cyprus problem than in the preceding years. It can also be said that the United States was more supportive of these efforts of the UN than previously. Nonetheless a Cyprus settlement proved as elusive as ever. Intercommunal mistrust was more evident in the negotiations at this time than in previous years. The fear each side felt towards the intentions of the other was paramount in the 1980-6 negotiations. However, on balance the Turkish Cypriot side was less flexible than the Greek Cypriot side towards the peacemaking efforts.

With active US engagement in this period, the chances of a settlement were increased. However, Turkey's reluctance to apply sufficient pressure on Denktash contributed to the stalemate. Correspondingly, the hardline stance of Greece on the issue also had much to do with the failure. It seemed, somewhat strangely, that Greece, Turkey and the two communities in Cyprus were all unwilling to take any major steps towards a settlement. Perhaps they preferred to keep what they had rather than commit themselves to a settlement process, which in the end might prove unsatisfactory.

From Cyprus and International Peacekeeping (Routledge, 1998), by Farid Mirbagheri.