Uneasy Truce: August 1964 to November 1967, continued

Between 11 August 1964 and 15 November 1967, records from various authoritative sources indicate that 109 Turkish-Cypriots are known to have been killed. . . . This number probably includes all Turk-Cypriots killed by Greek-Cypriots and the majority of Turk-Cypriots who were killed by members of their own community. Of these known deaths, 52 per cent were caused by Greek-Cypriots and 48 per cent were caused by Turk-Cypriots. Those deaths caused by Greek-Cypriots can be sub-divided into two categories, military incidents and civil incidents.

The first category includes all those Turk-Cypriot deaths involving government security forces (i.e. National Guard and Cyprus Police). It is thus estimated that 32 per cent of all Turk-Cypriot casualties for the period 11 August 1964 to 15 November 1967 can be labelled as military incidents. It should be noted that the majority of all Turk-Cypriot casualties in this category were incurred on 15 November 1967 during the National Guard and Cyprus Police assaults on Ayios Theodhoros and Kophinou.

The second category, civil incidents, includes those Turk-Cypriot deaths caused by Greek-Cypriot civilians. The motives for these murders were quite varied, although the majority of them were related to inter-communal hostility. Often the prevailing inter-communal tension was used as a convenient motive to justify rustling, or robbery during which the victim was killed. Probably 27 per cent of the deaths were accidents caused by Turk-Cypriots. Most of these involved poorly-trained Fighters cleaning or aiming loaded weapons. Another 14 per cent of the Turk-Cypriot deaths were intra-communal murders motivated by such things as domestic quarrels, or disputes over land-owner- ship. Finally, 7 per cent of the Turk-Cypriot deaths were intra-communal murders related to the inter-communal conflict. Such murders included the execution of informers, or the killing of rivals in struggles for local political or military leadership. Apart from accidents and military incidents, a pattern of vendetta killings can be traced in all other categories.

In addition to the 109 known Turkish-Cypriot deaths, 13 Turk-Cypriots who were reported as missing during this period are now presumed dead. The majority, if not all, of these deaths are believed to have been caused by Greek-Cypriots. Six of these incidents occurred during the month following the Kokkina battle when inter-communal hostility was particularly intense. Five Turk-Cypriots disappeared in the Greek-Cypriot area of Ktima on 25 July 1967, and their presumed murder formed part of an inter-communal vendetta which was then being waged in the Paphos District.

The pattern of Greek-Cypriot deaths is less complete since any reliable reports of Greek-Cypriot intra-communal casualties are not available. It is, however, known that during the period under review 15 Greek-Cypriots were killed by Turk-Cypriots. Five of these deaths were caused by Fighters, while the other ten were civil incidents. At least eight of these civil incidents fitted into a pattern of vendetta killings. During the same period, the Cyprus Police alleges that five Greek-Cypriots were abducted by Turk-Cypriots; four of these victims are believed to have been taken along the Green Line in Nicosia.

(a) Civil Incident

Within the group of civil incidents, four general patterns of violence stand out: theft, intentional provocations, spontaneous conflicts, and vendettas. In many civil incidents elements of not one, but several of these patterns can be traced.

Theft The rustling of goat and sheep herds was a major cause of local inter-communal tension among villages in the Maseru Plain and in the hills of the Paphos District. Rustling in these areas however had preceded the outbreak of inter-communal fighting and was carried on intra-communally as well.

A number of inter-communal murders occurred during robberies. It is probable that the existing inter-communal conflict was used by thieves to mask the real motives of their actions and to justify the degree of violence they used. The most publicized incident of this type occurred on 8 September 1966 when two Turk-Cypriots were killed and two others were wounded in the Paphos District, allegedly by Greek-Cypriot robbers. Three accused Greek-Cypriots were brought to trial by the Cyprus Police in 1967 but they were discharged on the grounds that no prima facie case had been established against them, even though two of them had earlier confessed their guilt to the police.[36]

Intentional Provocations It would be incorrect to deny that, during this period, some Turkish-Cypriot civilians were responsible for a number of shootings and bombings. Nevertheless, the vast majority of such civil provocations were the work of Greek-Cypriots. The motives for such undertakings were varied. Some incidents were obviously the work of youths seeking excitement; other acts were more sinister in intent, and were probably planned as a revenge or to provoke responses that would justify stern counter-measures.

Turk-Cypriot villages or quarters along main roads were frequent targets for shots fired from passing cars. Sporadic bombings continued in the district towns, but it should be noted that the majority of these bombings were set by Greek-Cypriots in Greek-Cypriot areas. During the latter part of 1966 and early 1967 a number of booby-trap bombs, set in the vicinity of Ambelikou,[37] Lefka,[38] and Peristeronari,[39] killed two Turk-Cypriots and wounded two others. The most serious bombing incident occurred in Alaminos [40] on 12 August 1967, when five Turk-Cypriots were killed by an exploding booby-trap. A week later, two more Turk-Cypriots from the same village were wounded by a road-mine.

Spontaneous Conflict In certain areas, inter-communal fighting among civilians occasionally began by a sort of spontaneous combustion. The reasons for this spontaneous conflict varied from place to place, but a number of factors were common in each instance. The communities involved, >A= and >B=, lived in close proximity. The hostility between these communities was intense

and there was a past history of local inter-communal violence. Communications between the communities had broken down, and as a result neither side was clear about the feelings or intentions of the other. Finally, some dramatic incident which occurred within 'A' would be misinterpreted by community 'B' as an attack. Community 'B' would rush to its own defense but this action would in turn be misinterpreted by community >A= as an attack. Fighting then began and each side blamed the other for starting it. [41]

Incidents at Arsos illustrate this form of conflict. In June 1966, the Turkish-Cypriot Fighter leader of the mixed village of Arsos had slapped the face of a Greek-Cypriot youngster. The boy=s parents publicly threatened to revenge this insult. On 9 September the Fighter leader was murdered. On 11 September one Greek-Cypriot was killed and two others were wounded by shots fired by relatives of the Turk-Cypriot who had been shot dead two days before. General firing broke out between the communities ii the village. UNFICYP arranged a cease-fire. Firing again occurred on 17 and 18 September. These events created an air of inter-communal hostility that was subsequently reinforced by the establishment of a Cyprus Police station in the village to maintain order and to investigate the murders. Contacts between the two communities were severed. If children of the opposing communities met by chance, they fought, or taunted and threw stones at each other. On 9 April 1967, the brother of the murdered Fighter leader saw his uncle having coffee with some Greek-Cypriots. The young man was so upset by this fraternization that he fired a few shots into the air as he berated his uncle. When villagers of both communities heard these shots, they immediately assumed that they were under attack by the other community. A wild shooting melee broke out and lasted for several hours.

Vendettas An analysis of the civil inter-communal conflict reveals vendettas between Greek-Cypriot and Turk-Cypriot families, between Greek-Cypriot and Turk-Cypriot quarters of mixed villages, between adjacent Greek-Cypriot and Turk-Cypriot villages, and between the ethnic communities on a regional and island-wide scale.

The immediate causes of most inter-communal vendettas were directly related to grievances arising from the various casualties, refugee movements, and destruction of crops and properties which occurred between December 1963 and August 1964. However, the author's field investigations show that vendettas were also initiated by such incidents as rustling, land ownership disputes and public insults which occurred after August 1964. The events in Arsos, for example, illustrate how a vendetta sparked by an insult to family honour expanded until the feud was taken up by the two ethnic communities in the village.

There was an element of inter-communal vendetta fending in many mixed villages and in most district towns, nevertheless such feuding appears to have been most prevalent in the Paphos District. The most serious and wide-ranging vendetta occurred during the summer of 1967 in this district.[42] . . . .

The motive of the first murder is unknown and it has never been revealed to the public who the murderer was. In any case, since the victim was a Greek-Cypriot and since his body was found in the Turkish-Cypriot quarter of Polis, most Greek-Cypriots assumed that the murderer was a Turk-Cypriot and that his motives were >political= and not personal. The following day, a relative of the first victim killed one Turk-Cypriot and wounded two others near Mandria. The day after this incident, three Greek- Cypriots were murdered near Stavrokono. The Fighter leader of that village was the brother of the man killed near Mandria. On 25 July 1967, five Turk-Cypriots who were visiting the Greek-Cypriot quarter of Ktima were abducted and presumably killed by Greek-Cypriots. The murder of two Turk-Cypriots near Stavrokono on 29 July 1967 was probably to revenge the three Greek-Cypriots killed near there five days earlier. The murders of 6 and 11 August 1967 could have been a continuation of the vendetta, although there is some reason to suspect that they could have equally been motivated by long-standing local disputes. The last murder in the series was a direct reprisal from the original incident in Polls. Both the victims of Serials 1 and 8 worked at the Limnis Mines Company. The Turk-Cypriot who was killed on 18 August 1967 had been questioned by the Cyprus Police in connection with the murder of 22 July 1967, and this questioning could have been misconstrued by some Greek-Cypriots as an indication of involvement in the first murder.

This series of murders and abductions raised inter-communal tension to such an extent that in some areas of Paphos District the villagers were afraid to leave their villages to cultivate their fields and vineyards. In fact, UNFICYP had to organize convoys of essential commodities and escorts for doctors because people were afraid to travel.

The main factor contributing to the build-up of fear and inter-communal tension in the Paphos District were reports of missing persons. People visiting friends or on business trips were afraid to return home. Communications were poor and relatives feared the worst, yet only a minority of all persons reported missing were in fact abducted and murdered. It is therefore possible that some of the murders may have been to revenge >victims= who subsequently returned home alive and well.

The pattern of killings also indicates that groups assumed the responsibility for exacting a revenge without being aware that other members of their own community had already acted. As a result, the balance which the vendetta was supposed to restore was not in fact achieved. While five Greek-Cypriots were killed, eleven Turk-Cypriots were killed and two were wounded.

During August and September 1967, UNFICYP arranged meetings in the Paphos District at which the Turk-Cypriot and Greek- Cypriot mukhtars met to discuss the problems raised by these murders. These meetings helped to restore freedom of movement on the roads and enabled the villagers to complete their carob harvesting.

(b) Military Incidents

It was noted earlier that a second broad grouping of inter-communal incidents were those that could be labelled as >military=, since they involved the organized security forces of one or both communities.

During the period under review (i.e. 11 August 1964 to 15 November 1967) Turk-Cypriot Fighter organisations maintained a permanent force of about 5000 men.[43] In addition to the 650 man Turkish National Contingent, a small cadre of Turkish Army officers had clandestinely entered Cyprus to organize and command the Fighters. In January 1966, 512 Turk-Cypriot youths left the island for Turkey. These young men had been studying in Turkey when inter-communal violence began in December 1963. They had volunteered to return to Cyprus and had received some military training before being landed at Kokkina. In May 1967, 438 Turk-Cypriot High School graduates left for Turkey to attend university. The departure of these 950 youths represented a considerable reduction of potential Fighters, an exodus which indicated that the Turk-Cypriot Leadership probably believed that the Greek-Cypriots were not about to resume a military offensive.

While the full-time strength of the Fighters had apparently declined since August 1964, Greek and Greek-Cypriot forces continued to increase. By November 1967, the Greek Army in Cyprus numbered about 12,000, and the National Guard had approximately 16,000 Greek-Cypriot conscripts. At the end of August 1964, the most tense static armed confrontations were located at the perimeters of the Turk-Cypriot enclaves of Nicosia (i.e. the Turk-Cypriot quarter of Nicosia town and the Turk-Cypriot villages north of the town), Limnitis and Kokkina. Other major confrontations existed at Ktima and Larnaca. National Guard and CYPOL detachments were established in the vicinity of most other armed Turk-Cypriot quarters and villages, but these confrontations were 'minor= in comparison to those five already mentioned.

Between August 1964 and November 1967 these five areas of major static confrontations continued to be scenes of quite serious military incidents. However, the most critical military incidents of this period, those incidents which created crises in the pattern of inter-communal conflict, occurred in other areas. The underlying causes of military incidents in the static confrontation locations were related primarily to the nature of cease-fire lines upon which these confrontations were based. Military incidents in other locations were caused by a number of diverse, but interesting, factors, of which four stand out; the restriction of free movement, the attempts of both communities to assert control over certain Turkish-Cypriot centres, the installation of coastal defences, and continued attempts to resolve the inter-communal conflict through a decisive military victory.

Cease-fire Lines The frequency of shots across cease-fire lines reflected the prevailing intensity of inter-communal tension. However, the overwhelming majority of these shooting incidents were either accidental discharges or attempts by bored sentries to relieve the monotony of their watch.[44] If we consider those five areas of major confrontation which already existed in August 1964, it is probable that less than ten deaths were caused in these locations between 11 August 1964 and 15 November 1967 by deliberate shooting incidents. Of these casualties, at least half occurred in the very tense period immediately following the Kokkina battle of August 1964.

The various cease-fire lines throughout the island were for the most part drawn when the local tactical situation was unclear, and when the opposing sides wanted such lines to be delimited according to different criteria. It is, therefore, not surprising that the demarcation of these lines was often less than exact; such ambiguity facilitated the compromises needed to stop the fighting. In any case, the cease-fire lines were intended as temporary measures to keep the opponents apart until a political settlement erased or redrew such divisions. As the conflict dragged on, with no political solution in sight, the cease-fire lines assumed more significance. Disputes arose over the varying interpretations as to their exact locations. Ambiguities which had at first been accepted were no longer tolerated. Both sides sought pretexts to manoeuvre their armed posts forward and, as the intervening neutral zones contracted, the frequency of shooting incidents increased. The lines, which had been intended as a means of stopping fighting, subsequently became a cause of continued, though less critical, military incidents. There were literally thousands of confirmed instances of attempts by both sides to construct fortifications forward of the established cease-fire lines. The rationale for such movements was quite often divorced from any tactical considerations. In many instances these manoeuvres were a means of maintaining face, or a means by which local commanders could exercise their initiative or relieve boredom.

The situation near Pileri provides a most illuminating example of the manoeuvring along the cease-fire lines.[45] On 24 September 1965, the Fighters built and occupied a new post 1000 metres west (i.e. forward) of their established defense line near Pileri. It is probable that this move was undertaken on the initiative of a local Fighter leader. The post was of no tactical value but it did intrude into the previously accepted neutralized zone. Throughout the rest of 1965 and 1966 this post was the focus of a number of shooting incidents initiated by both, sides. UNFICYP strongly advised the Turk-Cypriot Leadership to order the withdrawal of this post. It was apparent, however, that the Fighter command was opposed to such a 'retreat' and the Leadership, even if it accepted UNFICYP=s advice, had no power to over- ride the policy of Fighter headquarters in matters of defense. The Fighters' position was that, even conceding that the post had no tactical value when it was first built, it had subsequently assumed a symbolic significance. If the post were now vacated, UNFICYP could not be relied upon to prevent the National Guard from occupying it. Such an occurrence would be construed as nothing less than a humiliating defeat for the Fighters, and would be a major loss of face for the entire Turkish-Cypriot community. The post remained.

Restriction of movement As we have previously stated, the critical military incidents of this period did not occur in those areas of major static confrontations, which were a legacy of the fighting between December 1963 and August 1964. One of the principal causes of these critical incidents was the restriction of free movement by both communities. There are several examples of this, but the situation near Chatos provides a most interesting case in point.[46]

A large number of Turkish-Cypriot villages located in the northern part of the Maseru Plain formed an ill-defined enclave centred on Chatos. Since December 1963, Greek-Cypriots avoided travelling through this whenever possible. The government was concerned lest the Turkish-Cypriot villagers of this region attempted to fortify their enclave and to block all roads through it. Up until mid-1965, however, the villagers had confined their activities to manning sentry-posts on the out- skirts of their villages, and the occasional harassment of Greek-Cypriot traffic was a matter of individual initiative. After that time however, more centralized control of the civil and military affairs of these villages seems to have been established. By September 1966 the Kythrea-Lefkoniko road was blocked by Fighters at Bey Keuy and Psilatos, and the Trypimeni-Vitsadha road was blocked by Fighters at Knodhara. In April 1966, the government began to build a road from Trypimeni to Vitsadha that would by-pass Knodhara. The Turkish-Cypriot Leadership protested that such a road was in fact intended to divide the enclave as a first step in the government's plan to over-run it. Fighters occupied positions along the route of the proposed road, and National Guard troops were stationed near Trypimeni. Shots were exchanged sporadically by these two forces. The most serious incident occurred on 19 May 1966 when about 500 shots were fired. The government warned that it would order the National Guard to clear the Fighter positions from the area; nevertheless, the Fighters remained, and the road was not built. Additional National Guard posts and Cyprus Police patrols were subsequently established until the entire enclave was encircled by a government cordon.

The villages of Mora and Melousha are located in what may be regarded as a southern extension of the Chatos enclave. The incidents which occurred in these two villages during the summer of 1966, were, to a great extent, a result of the inter-communal tension which had been generated in the area by the confrontation near Trypimeni and by the Fighter road-blocks on the Kythrea-Lefkoniko road. The National Guard and the Cyprus Police were determined to prevent any more restrictions to Greek-Cypriot freedom of movement, especially in this region.

On 23 July 1966, the National Guard protested to UNFICYP that Fighter positions were being constructed south of Mora which could threaten Greek-Cypriot traffic along the Nicosia-Asha road.[47] An UNFICYP inspection ascertained that no new positions had been constructed, although old positions were being repaired. The National Guard refused to accept this explanation and threatened to use force to stop this Turk-Cypriot activity. Consequently, the National Guard moved a company-sized force, supported by armoured cars, toward Mora. UNFICYP troops were interposed between the National Guard and Fighters, who had by that time manned their positions around Mora. Both sides withdrew when UNFICYP undertook to establish an observation post at Mora. Villagers accepted this post as a deterrent to a National Guard assault. The National Guard agreed since it was not prepared to force an advance through the U.N. cordon, and the government accepted that UNFICYP would ensure that the Mora Fighters would not re-occupy or extend their defences.

On 22 July 1966 seven Turkish-Cypriot hunters were arrested by the Cyprus Police near Arsos and charged with poaching.[48] On that same day, as a counter action, a Turk-Cypriot stopped a Greek-Cypriot bus passing through the Turk-Cypriot village of Melousha and threatened its passengers with a pistol. Other Turkish-Cypriots intervened and allowed the Greek-Cypriots to proceed.

Cyprus Police patrols normally passed through this village two or three times daily without stopping or displaying weapons. However, on 23 July, a patrol drove through Melousha and allegedly pointed rifles and machine guns at the villagers. The villagers then set up road blocks and determined not to let any more Cyprus Police patrols pass. UNFICYP then initiated negotiations with the leaders of Melousha, but in the early morning of 24 July 1966, while these negotiations were proceeding. National Guard troops arrived and took control of the situation out of the hands of the senior Cyprus Police officer. This force was probably the same one that had been employed at Mora a few hours earlier.

Without warning, a police patrol drove through Melousha firing indiscriminately and the village Fighters shot back. The National Guard threatened to clear the village but its advance was effectively blocked by a larger UNFICYP force. Negotiations continued. By that evening, the road-blocks were removed, the Fighters had left their positions, and the National Guard force was withdrawn.

Attempts to Assert Control The second major cause of critical military incidents between 11 August 1964 and 15 November 1967 seems to have been attempts by both communities to assert their control over certain Turkish-Cypriot centres. We have already seen that this was one of the causes of the confrontation which developed on the perimeter of the Chatos enclave. Limassol provides another example.

Although serious inter-communal fighting had occurred in Limassol during February 1964, a disengagement of forces had been arranged without recourse to cease-fire lines. The Greek-Cypriots promised not to blockade the Turkish-Cypriot quarter, while the Turk-Cypriots promised that their Fighters would not openly display weapons or uniforms. Members of both communities were to have freedom of movement throughout both quarters of the city. In fact, a rather different situation evolved.[49]

The Turkish-Cypriot quarter consisted of two concentric zones. In its inner zone. Fighters openly paraded in uniform and carried their side-arms in the streets, and uniformed Turkish-Cypriot police patrolled. Very few Greek-Cypriots entered this zone. In the outer zone. Fighters did not normally appear in uniform or display their weapons; they did however discreetly occupy posts in houses or shops overlooking the streets entering this zone from the government-controlled part of Limassol. In this outer zone Turkish-Cypriot police patrolled sometimes in uniform and sometimes in plain clothes. A larger number of Greek-Cypriot civilians entered this zone than the in- ner zone. Uniformed Cyprus Police patrols would occasionally pass through parts of the outer zone without stopping; they did not try to enter the inner zone. A number of National Guard observation posts were established overlooking the Turk-Cypriot quarter.

During the period under review, the Turkish-Cypriot policy seems to have been to expand this inner zone. The government for its part attempted to exert its control over the outer zone and to force the contraction of the inner zone.

In the months preceding the summer of 1967, uniformed Fighters began to appear on the edge of the Turkish-Cypriot quarter and to abuse passing Cyprus Police patrols. In retaliation, the government tightened its enforcement of the entry of strategic materials into the Turkish-Cypriot quarter, and Cyprus Police patrols were increased around the quarter. In July 1967 the government made attempts to collect taxes from residents of the Turkish-Cypriot quarter. Inter-communal tension rose. On 24 August 1967 some Turk-Cypriots hurled stones at a passing Cyprus Police patrol. Shots were exchanged, and the local government authorities called in the National Guard. UNFICYP negotiated a cease-fire after five hours of indiscriminate shooting. The magnitude and nature of this incident, and particularly the speed with which it escalated to a point where it threatened to run completely out of control, shocked the leaders of both communities.

Coastal Defences After August 1964, the Greek Army in Cyprus and the National Guard concentrated most of their resources on preparations to repel a Turkish invasion. The government believed that those Turk-Cypriot controlled areas near the most likely invasion beaches were a threat to the island's external security. On the other hand, the Turk-Cypriots believed that a number of anti-invasion fortifications posed a threat to the security of some of their villages and quarters. This situation arose at Temblos, Ghaziveran-Lefka, and Larnaca.[50-52] However, the most serious of such incidents was at Famagusta.

In January 1965 the government began to construct fortifications for the seaward defense of Famagusta harbour.[53] The harbour formed the eastern boundary of the main Turkish-Cypriot quarters in Famagusta. As the harbour defences were manned by the National Guard, Fighters started building new barricades within their own controlled areas. In turn, the National Guard took up additional positions around the Turkish-Cypriot quarters not directly connected with harbour defense. Tension rose and eventually precipitated shooting incidents on 2 November 1965 in which a Turk-Cypriot was killed. Additional National Guard troops were moved into Famagusta, and laid seige to the Turkish-Cypriot quarters. Although a cease-fire was agreed to on 5 November 1965, shooting continued sporadically for the next few weeks, and a second Turk-Cypriot was killed. The government the] relaxed its blockade of the Turkish-Cypriot quarters, and on 6 December 1965, both sides agreed to remove all fortified positions around the perimeter of the Turkish-Cypriot quarters, with the exception of the harbour defences.

Attempts to Achieve a Decisive Military Victory The fourth, and perhaps the major cause of the critical military confrontations which developed after 11 August 1964 was the continuation of attempts to resolve the inter-communal conflict by a decisive military victory. Greek-Cypriots alleged that this was the policy of Turkey and the main justification for the Greek and Greek-Cypriot force of about 30,000 men was to prevent this.[54] On the other hand, it is clear that the commander of these forces General Grivas, had continued to maintain that enosis could and would be achieved by force of arms. This attitude was not held by most Greek-Cypriot leaders, and this divergence of opinion was the basis of bitter conflict within the Greek-Cypriot community.

The incidents at Mora and Melousha in July 1966 had already indicated that General Grivas was prepared to use an inordinate amount of force. On 15 November 1967 the implications of his policy were effectively demonstrated at Ayios Theodhoros and Kophinou;[55] however, the events leading up to the battle of that day illustrate the tangled web of the Cypriot intra-communal and inter-communal conflict. In November 1966, a Turkish Army captain, who used the nom de guerre 'Mehmet', was appointed the Fighter commander of the Ayios Theodhoros region, west of Larnaca. He proved to be an impetuous leader, one who acted contrary to the policy directives of both Central Fighter Headquarters and the Turkish-Cypriot Leadership, and one who believed that Turkish-Cypriot >rights= could only be won by militant confrontation.

The effects of Mehmet=s policies soon became evident through- out the Turkish-Cypriot centres of the Ayios Theodhoros region. The limited recognition that Turk-Cypriots had conceded to government authority was stopped; fraternization was punished; Greek and English road-signs were replaced by ones written exclusively in Turkish; Greek-Cypriot freedom of movement was restricted; new Fighter positions were established. As a result of these actions, National Guard troops moved into the area and an UNFICYP force was interposed between the front lines of this new confrontation. Tension in the region was maintained not only be shooting incidents between the armed forces of both Cypriot communities, but also by a fracas instigated by Mehmet against local UNFICYP units.

Since December 1963, Greek-Cypriot police patrols had regularly passed through the Turkish-Cypriot quarter of Ayios Theodhoros on their way to and from the Greek-Cypriot section of that mixed village. During the summer of 1967, the government temporarily suspended these patrols because of the local inter-communal situation having become very tense, and because there was no suitable alternative road into the Greek-Cypriot quarters of Ayios Theodhoros which avoided the Turkish-Cypriot part of the village.

In September the patrols were resumed, but Fighters set up road-blocks which forced the government again to suspend Greek-Cypriot police movements into Ayios Theodhoros. By this time, Mehmet's harassment of UNFICYP officers and his persistent disregard of directives from Larnaca and Nicosia could no longer be tolerated by his superiors. He was replaced by a Turk-Cypriot administrator who was closely controlled by the Leadership. Nevertheless, despite the removal of Mehmet and a considerable reduction of the hegemony which the Fighters had enjoyed in the local Turk-Cypriot community, it was clear that the Turk-Cypriots of Ayios Theodhoros were determined to continue blocking Cyprus Police patrols from passing through their quarter.

The significance of this freedom of movement dispute had, by this time, grown beyond the local issues which had caused it. The dispute, for both sides, now symbolized to them the essence of the entire inter-communal conflict: i.e. the government's determination to enforce its authority throughout the island, the Turkish-Cypriot community's intention to protect itself by controlling Greek-Cypriot access into Turkish-Cypriot centres. Had the events at Ayios Theodhoros occurred earlier, when they would have had to compete for public attention with a number of other incidents and political initiatives, there is little doubt but that they would not have attracted the same amount of publicity. As it was, negotiations over the movement of a Greek-Cypriot police constable through a few short streets in a small Cypriot village were carried out both in Nicosia and New York, and involved the most senior officials of the United Nations, Turkey and both Cypriot communities.

The Turkish-Cypriot Leadership sought to make freedom of movement through Ayios Theodhoros conditional on the removal of some government restrictions on Turkish-Cypriots elsewhere in Cyprus. However, while the government was becoming impatient with the protracted negotiations, it was not willing to break the dead-lock by offering any concessions. General Grivas was frustrated by the failure of the Cyprus Government's sanctions policy and political manoeuvring to bring enosis any nearer to reality, and seized on the Ayios Theodhoros dispute as an opportunity for militant action. In these circumstances, the Turkish-Cypriot Leadership was willing to drop the issue and to agree to a face- saving, unobtrusive resumption of the patrol after several months. The government, for its part, informed UNFICYP on 13 November 1967 that it was not willing to bide its time any longer and that government troops would take such action as was necessary to ensure that freedom of access to Ayios Theodhoros was restored to the Cyprus Police.

During the morning of 14 November 1967, UNFICYP observers reported large-scale National Guard infantry movements in the Ayios Theodhoros area. UNFICYP did not know, however, that under cover of darkness on the night before. National Guard field artillery had been deployed and zeroed in on the Fighter positions around Ayios Theodhoros and the nearby Turk-Cypriot village of Kophinou.

During that morning the Greek Army in Cyprus and the National Guard had evacuated all their major camps throughout the island and had camouflaged themselves. Anti-aircraft gun detachments had been deployed in Nicosia. There is no doubt that these precautions were in case the Turkish air-force decided to intervene as it had in August 1964.

During the afternoon of 14 November, two heavily armed Greek-Cypriot patrols were sent through the Turk-Cypriot quarter of Ayios Theodhoros; on the morning of 15 November, a third one went. That afternoon, when yet a fourth patrol approached the Turk-Cypriot quarter, shots were fired at it by Fighters. Government forces immediately returned the fire. Within twenty minutes Greek-Cypriot troops were attacking the Turk-Cypriot quarter in battalion strength, supported by artillery, mortars and armoured cars. The quarter was quickly over-run.

Once this attack was under way, the National Guard launched a similar offensive on Kophinou. Most of the shooting died down after a few hours but it was not until six o'clock the next morning, 16 November 1967, when the Greek-Cypriot forces were withdrawn.

Twenty-two Turk-Cypriots were killed and nine were wounded. Nineteen of the dead were probably Fighters, but the other three were elderly civilians. Greek-Cypriots reported their casualties as one dead and two wounded.

The magnitude of the offensive and the speed with which it was carried out clearly indicates that the National Guard operation was planned. There is no doubt that determined efforts were made to provoke a Turkish-Cypriot reaction so that the offensive could be justified. The hand of General Grivas was obvious. The government's complicity is less clear. It can be assumed that President Makarios had supported Grivas since elements of the Police Tactical Reserve were among the attacking troops. It will be recalled that this police para-military force had been specifically recruited and organized to be under the control of President Makarios, to partially offset the power General Grivas maintained through his command of the National Guard and the Greek Army in Cyprus. It is, however, unlikely that Makarios expected Grivas either to provoke the incident as he did, or to mount such an unnecessarily large operation.[56]

From Richard A. Patrick, Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, 1963-1971 (Dept. of Geography, University of Waterloo, 1976), pp 101-136.         

Notes to Chapter 4                                            Chapter 3 from this book