Statement by the Minister of State and Acting Foreign Minister Fatin Zorlu at the London Conference on Cyprus, August 31,1955.

I would like to express our thanks to Her Britannic Majesty's Government and to Mr. MacMillan for having given us the opportunity to discuss political and military questions concerning the Eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus, and for having made it possible for the experts of three allied countries to have a frank and free exchange of views on such questions.

It is quite normal, and even necessary, that three governments which are bound to each other by military defense pacts and alliances should, especially when they differ on certain points, meet and discuss all problems relating to an area which is of common concern to them. Consequently, the Turkish Government accepted the invitation to the London Conference with great satisfaction and attended it with a maximum of good will. We are fully confident that the exchange of views which we shall have with the outstanding statesman of the two friendly and allied countries that we meet here will yield positive results, and that we shall understand each other better at the conclusion of these discussions. It is inconceivable that it should be otherwise, for the commitments which we share with Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and with the Royal Hellenic Government are so firm, and our interests are common to such an extent, that it behooves us to converse in the language of men who are all devoted to the same ideal. I am very happy to say that the Turkish delegation has attended the Conference with that conviction and confidence.

The invitation of Her Majesty's Government specifically mentions the Island of Cyprus among the questions of defense relating to the Eastern Mediterranean. When one considers the great importance of this island for Turkey I the wisdom of such a specific inclusion becomes apparent. Indeed, as we shall fully explain in the course of our discussion, this is an island which, above all things, is of vital importance for the defense of Turkey, to such an extent that it is impossible to calculate the defense potential and capacity of Turkey in case of war without taking Cyprus into consideration. I can say these words to my distinguished colleagues, the representatives of two allies, without reticence or fear of contradiction. Up to now we have considered the status of Cyprus as follows: At a time when the Turkish Ottoman state was faced with the gravest of dangers from Russia and when as a result of an unfortunate war she was constrained to relinquish a few of her Eastern provinces to Russia, she was in dire need of the help of a powerful ally, and consequently transferred the administration of Cyprus to her ally Great Britain, maintaining nevertheless the right of sovereignty on the island. The Treaty of Alliance which we concluded with Great Britain in 1878 stipulates that Cyprus is transferred to the occupation and administration of Great Britain, who undertakes to come to the aid of Turkey with all her might in the case of Russian aggression, in order that the British Government may be further enabled to carry out its commitments. This in itself is a clear indication of the importance of the Island of Cyprus in the defense of Turkey. Subsequently, when Turkey receded within the boundaries of her national pact with the Treaty of Lausanne, the Turkish Government felt the need of specifically determining the fate of Cyprus and, by Articles 20 and 21 of that Treaty, determined the status of the Island. According to Article 20 of the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkish sovereignty of Cyprus lapsed on the 5th November, 1914 and Cyprus was legally annexed to Great Britain as from that date. Article 21 of the same Treaty contains definite stipulations as to the conditions under which the people of Cyprus who were all Turkish subjects would assume Turkish or British nationality. By the terms of this Article the signatories have agreed that those of the inhabitants of Cyprus who do not opt to remain Turkish citizens could only become British subjects. In other words, the fate of the Island was exclusively a matter of concern between Turkey and Great Britain. It was thus agreed and consented to by all the signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne, and it was on those terms that the Island went to Great Britain.

Given these explicit terms, it would be inadmissible to consider Cyprus as an Island "the fate of which remains to be determined." To argue in that sense would be tantamount to demanding the revision of the Treaty of Lausanne. Nor, in the face of the explicit provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, is it appropriate to refer to any other Article of that Treaty. Nevertheless, in order to show how definite is the status of Cyprus and how justified the interest of Turkey in the Island, let us look at Article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne which is often mentioned in connection with this question.

Article 16 provides that the future of the territories detached from the Ottoman Empire are "settled or to be settled by the parties concerned." The phrase quoted above was not contained in the original draft submitted by the Allies. Instead, Article 16 contained as its second paragraph the following provision: "Turkey recognises and agrees to dispositions which have been or shall be made concerning the attribution, independence or any other regime of these territories or islands." Turkey rejected this paragraph, and in the counter-proposal which she submitted to the conference she completely deleted it. In explaining Turkey's objection to the paragraph in question the Turkish delegation declared: "Turkey is being asked to recognise and to agree to dispositions which will intervene in the future. It is obvious that Turkey cannot commit herself to accept dispositions the nature and scope of which are not known to her."

This declaration clearly shows that Turkey not only finally determined the fate of certain territories, like Cyprus, which bad been detached from her, but also that she refused to undertake any previously undefined obligations with regard to the future concerning territories the fate of which was as yet uncertain at the time of the signature of the Treaty. Thus we see that the Treaty of Lausanne is quite explicit. If, in spite of these express stipulations, it were sought to reconsider the future of Cyprus, this, as I have just said, would be equivalent to attempting a revision of the Treaty of Lausanne. In other words it would be seeking to modify Articles 20, 21 and 16 of the Treaty which I mentioned above.

The fate of the Island can only be determined between Turkey and Great Britain, for at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne the parties concerned in Cyprus were only and exclusively Turkey on the one hand and Great Britain on the other. One of these is the country that relinquishes its sovereignty on the Island and the other the country that annexes it. There is no other party concerned as regards Cyprus. By the Treaty of Lausanne, Greece was a party concerned in the Islands mentioned in Article 12, just as Italy was a party concerned in the Islands referred to in Article 15 of the Treaty of Lausanne.

Such is the legal status of Cyprus and it was on that ground that we refused to recognise the existence of a "Cyprus Question." For we considered that if one is to embark upon the modification of the Treaty of Lausanne which is the foundation of a new political constellation and, from the point of view of Turkey, of a system of security, this would not be confined to Cyprus and that it would create a number of ponderous questions which would also enable Turkey to put forward certain demands. One cannot therefore help but be surprised that the "Cyprus question" has been created without due consideration of these grave consequences. We have always looked upon this problem, which it has been attempted to create in an artificial manner, as a domestic question of Great Britain. Yet, there must not be the slightest doubt that the limits of this conduct of Turkey will be determined by the turn of events. In order words, speaking frankly, so long as British sovereignty on Cyprus remains absolute there will be no change in our attitude based on commitments; but if there is any question of altering the status of Cyprus in this or that manner Turkey will consider herself primarily concerned, for, since the "abnegation" and "sacrifice" of Turkey in the matter of Cyprus was only in favour of Great Britain and under certain conditions, if there is any attempt to alter this situation, the Turkish Government will demand a return to the status prior to such abnegation.

By the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey waived her rights in favour of Great Britain. She consented to this renunciation in view of certain security considerations and of political conditions. Consequently, any attempt to transfer sovereignty on the Island or to alter its fate would represent a change in those conditions. From the point of view of physical geography, Turkey's interest in the Island is unalterable, and there is nothing more natural than that Turkey should reserve the right to reassert her interest in the Island according to new conditions.

Turkey is not only in her rights in making such a demand but she is also duty bound to do so. For the importance of Cyprus for Turkey does not arise from a single cause: it is a necessity which emanates from the exigencies of history, geography, economy and military strategy, from the right to existence and security which is the most sacred right of every state, in short from the very nature of things. May I be allowed to explain briefly the justification of this statement.

This Island which by its geographical structure is a prolongation of the Anatolian Peninsula, of which the soil is Anatolian soil, of which the climate is Anatolian climate, has, ever since the time it came under Turkish sovereignty, been attached to the motherland as any other province of Turkey, and has constituted an inseparable part thereof; indeed, in all the course of history the fate of Cyprus has remained attached to that of the peoples settled in the Anatolian Peninsula and has, in return, affected the fate of the peoples living in Anatolia. If the Island was once part of the Hellenic world, it was only because at that time Anatolia was within the orbit of ancient Hellenic civilization. If it once belonged to Byzantium, it was only because Byzantium held sway over Anatolia; if Cyprus was once under the dominion of the Latin Empire, it was only because at the time the Latins aspired to rule over Anatolia. In the same manner, when, previously and subsequently, the Caliphs began to extend their rule over Anatolia, they also ruled over Cyprus. It was also thus that the Ottomans established their sway on Cyprus. It is not therefore admissible to try to consider the Island of Cyprus from the point of view of the present day composition of its population. The number of Turks on the Island was sometimes a majority and sometimes a minority of the Island population and yet this was never taken as a criterion of whether or not the Island was Turkish, and for three and a half centuries Cyprus and the other parts of Turkey lived in a state of complete interpenetration. Consequently, today as well, when we take into account the state of the population in Cyprus, it is not sufficient to say, for instance, that 100,000 Turks live there. One should rather say that 100,000 out of 24,000,000 Turks live there and that 300,000 Turkish Cypriots live in various parts of Turkey.

The economic structure of the Island as well attaches it to Anatolia. Cyprus has never been able to sustain itself economically without external aid. It owes its present standard of living to being a part of Great Britain and of the British Commonwealth; the foodstuffs which it needs are produced in abundance in Turkey; and when, during the Second World War, the supply lines of Great Britain to the Island were severed, Cyprus lived on the resources of Turkey.

I mentioned briefly above the extent to which strategic reasons bind Cyprus to Turkey. I would like to add here that Cyprus must of necessity, from the military point of view, belong either to Turkey proper or to a country which is as closely interested as Turkey in the fate of Eastern countries in the vicinity of Turkey. That is to say, if Turkey or one of the countries of the Middle East which are bound to Turkey by military commitments should be involved in war, Cyprus too should be at war along with them. The defense and the logistics of this area cannot be conceived otherwise. In case of war, outside assistance to the war potential of Turkey can only come through her Western and Southern ports in the Mediterranean. The Western ports of Turkey are unfortunately within the effective operations area of the potential enemy and Turkey at war can only be supplied through her Southern ports. The Second World War made this situation quite clear.

It is with that in mind that the whole system of infrastructure which will supply Turkey has been given its bases in Turkish ports like Antalya, Mersin and Iskenderun, and even the fuel supply of Istanbul is provided by a pipeline starting in the Southern ports. And all these Southwestern ports are under cover of the Island of Cyprus. Whoever controls this Island is in a position to control these Turkish ports. If the power that controls this Island is also in control of the Western islands it will have effectively surrounded Turkey. No country should be allowed to leave her entire security at the mercy of any one country, no matter how great a friend and ally the latter may be. I believe that the explanations I have given up to now have been sufficient to show why Turkey is so closely interested in Cyprus.

What is the argument advanced by those who deny Turkey's interest in the Island? They contend that, in so far as possession of the Island is concerned, historical, geographical, economic, military and contractual factors bear no weight whatsoever, and that the only thing that must be taken into consideration is that peoples should be given the right to self-determination. Let us for a moment, for the sake of argument, assume that this is so, and see whether such a principle is applicable in the case of Cyprus. One point must be stressed before all others: in the words of the well-known international lawyer Fanchille, "Whenever it has been attempted to apply the principle of self-determination without full comprehension and without the exercise of maximum care, it has always yielded harmful results and has been of no use other than contributing to international tension. Indeed, the misapplication of this principle may, on the one hand, bring about the creation of very small states and may, on the other hand, encourage certain unscrupulous states to covet the provinces and colonies of their neighbours. The principle of self-determination which in pure theory emanates from sublime thoughts and feelings, is very liable in practice to become a source of revolution and anarchy." Almost all international jurists are in agreement on that point. As Ch. Rousseau says: ". . . But, even as its defenders confess, this right could only be analyzed as a relative and conditional one. In fact, its legal construction comes up against the effect of economic, administrative and strategical obstacles which sometimes, and in certain border line cases, necessitate territorial dispositions contrary to the wishes of peoples." Professor C. H. Crozat, applying the above consideration to the legal status of Cyprus, arrives at the following conclusion: "If the question should arise of the abandonment of sovereignty on the Island of Cyprus by Great Britain, the question of the security of Turkey shall prevail over all other principles, even over the principle of the self-determination of the Cypriot people." To those who rely on the fact that the principle of self-determination is contained in the United Nations Charter it would be possible to reply with the following words of Eagleton: "The term self-determination was crowded into Article I of the Charter without relevance and without explanation, and upon that basis delegates are today making fantastic claims; their irresponsibility alienates Americans who have sympathized with the struggle of many peoples for independence. The concept of self-determination is not a simple one and it has always defied definition . . . There has never been a judge to pass upon its claims; indeed there has never been a law by which judgment could be issued; the textbooks of international law do not recognize any legal right to self-determination nor do they know any standards for determining which groups are entitled to independence." There is no doubt that the concept of self- determination often clashes with that of the sovereignty of states. Since it is necessary to find the right balance between these two concepts, where is the point of equilibrium to be established? Since no case in point can constitute conclusive precedent, how is this point of equilibrium to be found in each particular case? The deduction to be made is that the principle of the self-determination of peoples, whereas it served the noblest humanitarian aims of the late President Wilson of the United States, has also served the most nefarious purposes of Naziism and, as Sibert has said, sometimes the right of the "self-determination of peoples." It is certainly impossible to set aside realities based on historical, geographical and military exigencies on the grounds of such a perilous and indistinct theory.

There are definite cases extant where, by international decisions, for instance geographical and military considerations have been made to prevail over the concept of self-determination. One of the best-known cases in point is that of the dispute over the Aaland Islands between two very friendly neighbouring countries, where, in spite of the fact that the majority of the population was of Swedish origin, the League of Nations awarded the Islands to Finland. May I also remind you that the assignment of Western Thrace to Greece by, the Treaty of Lausanne was not made by way of application of the principle of self-determination, since the majority of the people there were Turkish

Was it not Eleutherios Venizelos himself who said during the Lausanne Conference that the principle of self-determination was not one that should always receive primary consideration where it was a question of assigning a certain territory to a certain state? We are not against the principle of self-determination. On the contrary we are all for it. If this is not sufficiently evidenced by the fact that we have solemnly affixed our signature to the United Nations Charter wherein this principle is enshrined, I would like to mention that we have reaffirmed that principle as a confirmation of the United Nations Charter in the final communique of the Bandung Conference only a short while ago. What we are trying to avoid is that the principle of self- determination should become an element of injustice, unsafety, insecurity and trouble.

If one applies the above-mentioned considerations to the particular case of Cyprus, one arrives at the following conclusions: The application of the principle of self-determination in that Island clashes, first of all, with the right of sovereignty of Great Britain derived from the Treaty of Lausanne and, at the same time with the right of Turkey to ensure her own security; and, for the same reasons, in case British sovereignty comes to an end, Cyprus cannot be taken in hand as an entity separate from Anatolia.

As for the question of self-government, we cannot say that we are against that either. But here again we must point to the necessity of avoiding its heedless application from becoming a source of trouble.

There are at present two principal groups living together in Cyprus, one of which, namely the Turkish community, has for years been subjected to violence and intimidation incited by the Church of Cyprus which, by the way, is exerting all manner of pressure, including excommunication, over the Orthodox population of the Island in order to drag them to political activities and to bring about "Enosis." As a result of this an atmosphere of antagonism and hostility has been instilled between the two communities. Consequently, before thinking about giving the inhabitants of the Island the right to share internal government, it is obvious that one must wait for the return of absolute peace and quiet in Cyprus. For self-government can only be considered for communities and groups that get along well with each other and do not bear antagonism towards each other. What the people of Cyprus need, therefore, before self-government, is a period of stable peace and calm. Violence must be prevented, the Church must refrain from dabbling in politics, otherwise we might be faced with an even more serious situation than today. We see many instances in the recent past where self-government granted inappropriately and inopportunely has brought bloodshed in its wake. What we are all trying to achieve is not the triumph of vague principles but, first and foremost, the safeguard of the destiny and even of the lives and property of a people living in a given geographical area and in whom we are closely interested.

These remarks should not be taken in any way as casting an aspersion on the maturity of the people of Cyprus. Yet, one has to remember that noble principles that must be revered in the abstract, can lead one to grave international blunders when applied without regard for existing circumstances.

Even when the circumstances change in Cyprus and the climate eventually becomes suitable for self-government as explained above, it must still be borne in mind that, on such a small parcel of land where live two different communities who vary in so many ways, the guiding principle should not be the consideration of majorities and minorities, but rather the granting of full equality to the two groups.

The purpose of all this explanation that I have given is to bring about a clear understanding of the so-called "Cyprus Question," and to make it possible for us openly to face our differences and to find the right road of agreement which will serve the real interests of all three countries. The cooperation among three countries closely concerned with the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly with the Northern Area of the Eastern Mediterranean, and who are all members of the Peace Front, has been disturbed. The "Cyprus Question" is responsible for this. There is no sense in ignoring this fact. We have tried to expound the views of Turkey on this question along the lines of the statement made by my Prime Minister, which has been fully endorsed by the entire population of Turkey, including all political parties. Turkey believes that the status quo should be maintained in Cyprus. If this is to be upset then the Island should revert to Turkey. It should be made quite clear that any attempt to change the status quo by roundabout means is not compatible with the desire to keep friendship with Turkey intact. Those who wish a change in the status quo should take that point into consideration. Otherwise the trust and confidence of the Turkish people will be shaken. The people of Turkey cannot conceive in any other way the fate of an Island which is of vital importance for the defense of their own soil. Geek-Turkish friendship, cooperation and alliance is based on a political agreement in principle established by the Treaty of Lausanne which has liquidated a whole past full of antagonisms. This agreement implies that Greece has once for all abandoned her claims based on the "Megali Idea." and that in return Turkey has accepted the boundaries laid down by the Treaty of Lausanne. Today as well, the Turkish Government, moved by the same strong conviction, deems essential the continuation of this friendship and its safeguard from all disturbanceCnot only for the common benefit of Greece and Turkey, but also for the peace and security of the world and of the Mediterranean. It is therefore loath to abandon moderation in its entire political conduct. The claims that are now being put forward in connection with the "Cyprus Question" cannot be reconciled with our mutual rights which we must all respect and with our common duty to maintain and safeguard friendship; and they are engendering grave misgivings as to the future. If I have given full vent to these misgivings before you, Mr. President, I do not doubt that you will attribute it to the importance that we attach to Greek- Turkish friendship.